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  • ✇Mexico Today
  • Opinion | Criminalizing Humanitarian Assistance Staff
    Immigration politics are playing themselves out in the US in many disturbing ways, not the least of which is the current legal effort by Texas State Attorney General, Ken Paxton, to take down Annunciation House, a refugee and migrant services organization. Annunciation House was started in the 1970s by church lay workers seeking to serve the poor. What became of that effort was a ministry that has served hundreds of thousands of refugees, migrants and local El Paso residents. Annunciation Hou
     

Opinion | Criminalizing Humanitarian Assistance

By: Staff
21 March 2024 at 16:02

Joy Olson

Immigration politics are playing themselves out in the US in many disturbing ways, not the least of which is the current legal effort by Texas State Attorney General, Ken Paxton, to take down Annunciation House, a refugee and migrant services organization.

Annunciation House was started in the 1970s by church lay workers seeking to serve the poor. What became of that effort was a ministry that has served hundreds of thousands of refugees, migrants and local El Paso residents. Annunciation House provides food, shelter and other forms of humanitarian assistance and hospitality. It is well respected within El Paso and by those working to meet the needs of refugees and migrants all along the border.

As the saying goes, no good deed goes unpunished. In February of this year lawyers from Paxton’s office Texas arrived unannounced at Annunciation House demanding operational records. Since then, the Attorney General’s office has filed a lawsuit accusing the organization of being, “engaged in the operation of an illegal stash house by potentially allowing others to use its real estate to engage in human smuggling.”

This is so twisted that it’s hard to know where to begin. Human smuggling is a heinous crime, a business designed to exploit its victims. The humanitarian assistance and accompaniment provided by Annunciation House is as far from human smuggling as one can imagine. Their work is motivated by faith in God and a call to serve, not in the exploitation of others or the enrichment of themselves.

The Attorney General is trying to shut down Annunciation House and instill fear in those who provide aid to refugees and migrants throughout the state. The organizations on the border who provide this kind of assistance are run by volunteers and this lawsuit attempts to intimidate them. It forces volunteers to wonder: “if I drive a migrant to the hospital, can I be accused of smuggling? “

To use laws designed to combat human smuggling to close one of the premier migrant shelter and assistance organizations at the US-Mexico border is sick. It reminds me of Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador’s attempt in 2021 to use an organized crime and money laundering statute to go after an academic institution – the misapplication of the law for political ends.

The reason there isn’t more of a crisis at the border is because of the work of places like Annunciation House. If the Texas AG wants a real crisis at the border, he would shut down places like Annunciation House and see what happens when the needs of so many are not met by non-governmental organizations but fall squarely upon local communities and state government.

Criminalizing humanitarian assistance does nothing to staunch the flow of migrants and asylum seekers. Furthermore, it does nothing to stop human smuggling. Blessed be those who serve the poor this Easter season and may they be protected from those who twist the law.

* Joy Olson is the former Executive Director of the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), a research and advocacy organization working to advance human rights. Twitter: @JoyLeeOlson

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  • ✇Mexico Today
  • Opinion | Open Banking, Mexico’s Pending Wave of Data-Driven Innovation Staff
    Open banking is quickly revolutionizing global financial systems, including in Mexico where it has already started to reshape the country’s financial landscape. This concept, which implies the sharing of banking data between financial institutions and third parties, is driven by the core belief that individuals, rather than the financial entity, own their transaction data and therefore have the right to share it. As explained by the Mexican Fintech Association’s Annual Report, Mexico has yet to
     

Opinion | Open Banking, Mexico’s Pending Wave of Data-Driven Innovation

By: Staff
11 December 2023 at 10:56

Open banking is quickly revolutionizing global financial systems, including in Mexico where it has already started to reshape the country’s financial landscape. This concept, which implies the sharing of banking data between financial institutions and third parties, is driven by the core belief that individuals, rather than the financial entity, own their transaction data and therefore have the right to share it.

As explained by the Mexican Fintech Association’s Annual Report, Mexico has yet to leverage the wealth of information constantly being produced, with the finance industry only using 3% of the available data to make decisions. Simply put there is an unexploited landmine of data that could revolutionize financial services, not only in Mexico but around the world.

While Mexico was one of the pioneers of open banking legislation, with the Ley Fintech entering into force at roughly the same time as the United Kingdom’s open banking regulations in 2018, it has lagged behind in implementing secondary regulations laid out in the famed FinTech Law. The law requires financial entities to develop tools (in technical terms known as APIs) to facilitate the secure sharing of data with third parties. More specifically, the Ley Fintech refers to data generated by the financial entities, aggregate data related to the entities’ operations, and personal transactional data that can only be shared with the users’ consent. Thus far, only secondary regulations governing the sharing of data generated by financial entities have been published, preventing the country from experiencing the full benefits of open banking, while other countries charge ahead.

Despite the lack of clear regulation, several entrepreneurs are building the technology needed to unlock the power of the financial data being generated in Mexico. Those leading the way include Belvo a fintech that has built its own connections to prominent financial entities, and Finerio Connect, a fintech that offers white-label personalized financial products and services based on consumers’ data to banks – in October the latter secured US $6.5 million in venture capital funding to further develop its situs slot platform.

The transformative potential of open banking for Mexico’s small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) cannot be overstated. Currently, SMEs are estimated to receive less than 10% of private-sector financing, significantly restricting their growth opportunities. Open banking could play a key role in fixing this financing gap by allowing SMEs to share their financial data more efficiently with potential lenders. This, in turn, could have an important impact on the Mexican economy, given that over 95% of businesses in Mexico are considered micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs).

It could also automate some of Mexico’s notorious back-office operations, which according to Stripe, the majority of which are still performed manually by almost half of Mexican CFOs. This is something that the leading bank BBVA and fintech Syncfy are already addressing. It is also important to highlight that the most prominent open banking fintechs in the country have remained focused on business-to-business applications, leaving a big opportunity for consumer-focused applications situs slot.

Once the remaining secondary regulations are in place, which are anticipated to be finalized in 2024, or more likely in 2025 after Mexico’s Presidential elections have passed, open banking will transform the lives of millions of Mexicans. Looking further into the future, open banking will quickly be followed by open finance in which other entities such as insurance companies, retirement funds, mortgage companies, and other entities will share other financial data.

Belvo has previewed how this could impact consumers when earlier this year it launched a tool to allow consumers to share information from Mexico’s Social Security Institute (IMSS) via its platform to prove creditworthiness. The ultimate progression of open banking is expected to culminate in an open data ecosystem. In this scenario, data will be widely shared to guide decision-making across all societal layers, from individual choices to governmental policies.

While open banking in Mexico is still in its infancy, its potential to transform the financial landscape is immense. By improving the accessibility of banking data, it promises to unlock new opportunities for consumers and businesses, drive innovation, and foster a more inclusive financial environment. As Mexico navigates the complexities of implementing these changes, the focus should remain on ensuring that the benefits of open banking reach all sectors of society, rather than remaining isolated to the top of the pyramid, paving situs slot the way for a more connected and efficient financial future.

* Sara Hayden Van Velkinburgh is a senior analyst with the public relations division of Miranda Partners, where she works primarily with fintechs, investment funds, and startups. With a background in public policy and public affairs, she has analyzed Mexico’s regulatory framework and digital policy in Latin America as it applies to tech companies while at McLarty Associates and the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center. Twitter: @svanvelk 

 

  • ✇Mexico Today
  • Opinion | Texas’ Immigration Enforcement Affects U.S.-Mexico Relations Staff
    By Arturo Castellanos Canales * Texas is taking immigration matters into its own hands — with cost and controversy attached. And its efforts are having a collateral effect on U.S. foreign policy. First came Gov. Greg Abbott’s Operation Lone Star, meant to stop migrants from crossing the Texas-Mexico border. Now, just this month, the Texas Legislature passed SB 4, a deeply problematic law that criminalizes unauthorized entry of immigrants and allows Texas judges to effectively deport people to M
     

Opinion | Texas’ Immigration Enforcement Affects U.S.-Mexico Relations

By: Staff
27 November 2023 at 18:51

By Arturo Castellanos Canales *

Texas is taking immigration matters into its own hands — with cost and controversy attached. And its efforts are having a collateral effect on U.S. foreign policy.

First came Gov. Greg Abbott’s Operation Lone Star, meant to stop migrants from crossing the Texas-Mexico border. Now, just this month, the Texas Legislature passed SB 4, a deeply problematic law that criminalizes unauthorized entry of immigrants and allows Texas judges to effectively deport people to Mexico without coordinating with U.S. or Mexican authorities.

Together, the two efforts empower state and local law enforcement officials to enforce immigration laws — even though state and local law enforcement typically have limited familiarity with immigration enforcement, which has long been a federal responsibility.

SB 4 drew a rebuke from the Mexican government, and Operation Lone Star quickly elicited reactions from both the U.S. and Mexican governments: “The Government of Mexico reiterates its rejection of any measure that contemplates the involuntary return of migrants without respect for due process,” reads a Nov. 15 statement by Mexico’s secretary of foreign relations.

Another flashpoint came in July when Governor Abbott ordered the installation of buoys separated by discs with serrated edges in the Rio Grande and razor concertina wire on the riverbanks. This step elicited reactions from both the U.S. and Mexican governments.

Mexico’s responses are no small matter; it is the United States’ largest trading partner and a key hemispheric ally. Nor is Mexico’s concern new — it has long raised objections to Operation Lone Star for the program’s impact on migrants seeking protection in the United States as well as its adverse effects on trade and commerce.

Texas has asserted that Operation Lone Star was intended to protect the United States and is arguing that the buoys are entirely on the U.S. side of the border — not on the Mexican side, which would violate two international treaties regarding physical barriers along the U.S.-Mexico border. In any case, Mexico’s government denounced the tactic, calling Texas’ action a trespass on its sovereignty.

The buoys also seem to violate the Rivers and Harbors Act here in the U.S., which prohibits the obstruction of U.S. waterways. Not to mention that immigration enforcement and foreign policy are exclusive authorities of the federal government, not states, as the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled.

Beyond legal breaches, the buoys and concertina wire along the river have exerted a human toll. In recent months, an asylum seeker was found dead in the southern section of the buoys, a pregnant woman was found trapped in the riverbank razor wire and had a miscarriage, and a 5-year-old was injured after being ensnared by a coil of concertina wire. Those incidents sparked indignation and pushed Mexico’s president to call Abbott’s actions “inhumane.” In yet another incident, a Texas National Guard officer shot a Mexican national across the Rio Grande, an action that Mexico’s government deemed “inadmissible” and a “violation of international law.”

In addition, in response to Texas’ increasingly intrusive border inspections of vehicles, Mexico has taken steps to disentangle its trade relationship with the state. In May 2022, Mexico’s Ministry of Economy announced that a new railway project connecting the port of Mazatlán, Mexico, to Winnipeg, Canada, would be routed through New Mexico instead of Texas as initially planned. Considering that Mexico is the largest trading partner of Texas (US $400 billion of goods cross annually through the Mexico-Texas border), the rerouting of the rail network is expected to have long-lasting effects on Texas’ economy.

Whether Texas’ actions have succeeded in stemming migration at the border or not — and indications are they have not — the acts of this single state have threatened to harm U.S. international prestige and credibility and have made U.S.-Mexico relations more tense.

So far, Mexico’s government has expressed its concerns about Texas’ policies only through U.S. diplomatic channels, including urging the U.S. government to remove the buoys and investigate the shooting incident. But Texas’ actions, including SB 4, could further harm relations between the two countries and lead Mexico to pursue remedies before an international tribunal. It could also deter businesses, organizations, and tourists from going to Texas and spending money there.

These diplomatic incidents are not minor. The current relatively friendly terms between the U.S. and Mexican administrations do not mean Mexico will continue to tolerate Texas’ unilateral actions. And that would undermine U.S. foreign policy at a time when U.S. credibility remains essential.

The U.S. government already filed a civil complaint against Texas for Operation Lone Star and ordered the state to remove the buoys along the Rio Grande — steps the Mexican government celebrated. As that litigation makes its way through the U.S. federal court system, U.S.-Mexico relations remain in the balance. Similarly, legal challenges to SB 4 are likely to follow, with significant implications for the U.S.-Mexico relationship slot dana.

While most people are focused on the national and domestic political implications of Texas’ actions along its border with Mexico, we must pay attention to the potential damage to U.S.’s international standing and its adverse effects on the Texan economy. These effects are precisely why immigration policy is the federal government’s responsibility — and why Republicans and Democrats on the federal level must work together on lasting solutions that balance security, compassion, and lawfulness scatter hitam.

* Arturo Castellanos Canales is the Policy & Advocacy Manager at the National Immigration Forum. Arturo holds a Doctorate in Juridical Science (J.S.D.) and a Master of Laws (LL.M.) from Cornell Law School as well as a Bachelor of Laws (LL.B.) from Escuela Libre de Derecho in Mexico City.​ This Op-Ed is part of a series sponsored by The Center for Binational Institutions’ whose mission is to promote a better understanding of the bilateral institutions between Mexico and the United States. The Center is a program of the US-Mexico Foundation is a binational non-profit organization dedicated to fostering bilateral cooperation and improving the understanding between the United States and Mexico by activating key people in the relationship that once were dormant.Twitter: @USMexicoFound

  • ✇Mexico Today
  • Opinion | Out of sight, out of mind, out of water. Staff
    By Gabriel Eckstein * As climatic changes continue to grip the American Southwest and precipitation declines, communities across the U.S.-Mexico border are not looking to the skies. Rather, they are turning their eyes to the ground below them, specifically to the numerous aquifers that cross the frontier. Unfortunately, a dearth of information, lack of monitoring, and near absence of cross-border cooperation make it unlikely that the region’s last vestige of native water will quench their growi
     

Opinion | Out of sight, out of mind, out of water.

By: Staff
6 November 2023 at 16:21

By Gabriel Eckstein *

As climatic changes continue to grip the American Southwest and precipitation declines, communities across the U.S.-Mexico border are not looking to the skies. Rather, they are turning their eyes to the ground below them, specifically to the numerous aquifers that cross the frontier. Unfortunately, a dearth of information, lack of monitoring, and near absence of cross-border cooperation make it unlikely that the region’s last vestige of native water will quench their growing thirst.

Hidden all across the frontier, from Baja to the Gulf, more than seventy subsurface formations holding precious groundwater crisscross the Mexico-US border. For many border communities—like Ciudad Juárez in Chihuahua, Ciudad Acuña in Coahuila, Del Rio in Texas, Nogales in Sonora and Arizona, and a dozen others—the water in these transboundary aquifers is the only reason they continue to survive the parched frontier.

Despite this heavy reliance, information about these resources is desperately lacking. Few aquifers have been explored or monitored, and scant information is available on the origins of the water, as well as their recharge rates, the extent of withdrawals, chemistry, flow rates, direction, dependent ecosystems, and much more. What is known is that many of the aquifers along the frontier are being overexploited as populations and industries expand, with little regard for sustainability or cross-border consequences. Moreover, many are polluted due to poorly regulated–or unregulated–agricultural and municipal runoff, industrial waste, and mining activities.

More troubling, though, is the reality that the two nations have yet to ink an agreement addressing how these underground resources might be managed, shared, exploited, or protected. In fact, groundwater has long been neglected in Mexico-US political relations. Transboundary aquifers are excluded from the existing treaty regime, rarely appear on the binational agenda, and have only sporadically received the focus of federally funded research. Without cooperation, these resources are doomed to dwindle, jeopardizing the viability of the region’s communities, economic growth, and environment.

As temperatures continue to rise and droughts become more widespread, there is an urgent need for action on the region’s transboundary aquifers. Information on the border region’s groundwater is desperately needed, especially for those aquifers underlying cities and communities that depend on the subsurface resources for their survival. That information must also be shared and exchanged between the two neighbors, especially among stakeholders, local and regional leaders, and academics. In addition, where rivers do traverse the frontier—such as the Rio Grande, Colorado River, Tijuana River, San Pedro River, and Mimbres River—information on the hydrological relationship that those rivers have with surrounding aquifers must be explored to better understand how they influence each other.

The two countries and the border states should also come to terms with administering these shared resources, especially their allocation, and protection. Ideally, because every subsurface formation tends to function differently, Mexico and the U.S. should develop aquifer-specific rules, policies, and procedures for the most critical aquifers on the border. If that is not possible, at the very least, they should develop principles and priorities to guide them in managing these critical freshwater resources under drought conditions.

Lastly, the two nations should facilitate public participation in the decision-making process, especially from local and regional stakeholders. Groundwater use is a local activity. Local institutions and communities may not always have the resources or technical knowledge to address broad and scientifically complex transboundary challenges, yet they are typically better informed about local cross-border needs and challenges. They are also likely to be more responsive and adaptable to evolving environmental and economic circumstances.

Relying on the Rio Grande, Colorado River, and the other rivers that cross the Mexico-US frontier is no longer an option. Overallocation and climate change-driven droughts have made it a foregone conclusion. If the border region is to have a future, it lies underground in its aquifers.

* Gabriel Eckstein is Professor of Law and Director of the Energy, Environmental & Natural Resources Systems Law Program at Texas A&M University. Holding an LL.M. in International Environmental Law, a Juris Doctor in Law, an M.S. in International Affairs, and a B.A. in Geology, Gabriel focuses his research and teaching on water, natural resources, and environmental law and policy issues at the local, national, and international levels. He regularly advises UN agencies, national and sub-national governments, NGOs, and other groups on international and US water and environmental issues, and has represented nations before the International Court of Justice. This Op-Ed is part of a series sponsored by The Center for Binational Institutions’ whose mission is to promote a better understanding of the bilateral institutions between Mexico and the United States. The Center is a program of the US-Mexico Foundation is a binational non-profit organization dedicated to fostering bilateral cooperation and improving the understanding between the United States and Mexico by activating key people in the relationship that once were dormant.. Twitter: @USMexicoFound

  • ✇Mexico Today
  • Opinion | Militarization in the Age of Authoritarianism Staff
    Militarization is a term that I often avoid. It comes with baggage from the 1970s and 80s. Nonetheless, I’m re-engaging the term after reading, “Remilitarization in Central America: A Comparative and Regional Analysis” written by IBI Consulting, because it provides a renewed perspective on militarization in present-day authoritarian contexts. The Cold War played itself out in our hemisphere during the 1960s, 70s and 80s, a period in which dictators and military governments were not uncommon. By
     

Opinion | Militarization in the Age of Authoritarianism

By: Staff
2 November 2023 at 06:00

Joy OlsonMilitarization is a term that I often avoid. It comes with baggage from the 1970s and 80s. Nonetheless, I’m re-engaging the term after reading, “Remilitarization in Central America: A Comparative and Regional Analysis” written by IBI Consulting, because it provides a renewed perspective on militarization in present-day authoritarian contexts.

The Cold War played itself out in our hemisphere during the 1960s, 70s and 80s, a period in which dictators and military governments were not uncommon. By the 1990s democratically elected governments were the norm in almost the entire hemisphere.

By then Honduras, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua, had elected governments. Militaries were still powerful, but they took a backseat to civilian leaders. While demilitarization didn’t really happen, the trend line wasn’t in their favor.

The IBI study documents how military institutions are gaining expanded roles, powers and money, as authoritarian leaders and oligarchs work with military institutions to bending nations to their will.

In the context of authoritarianism, militarization doesn’t happen overnight. We don’t see military coups like those of earlier decades. It happens when elected authorities cede civilian roles and authorities to the military.

This kind of militarization is scary because it is incremental. When there was a coup, everyone noticed. Civilians went to the streets to protest. Other countries – like the US – cut off diplomatic relations or aid. When militarization takes place at a slow roll it might get a day of news, but then we all move on. Furthermore, when the president – commander-in-chief – and Congress give militaries powers, it takes place within a “democratic” context, giving it a stamp of approval.

The examples of militarization in Central America documented in the report include militaries: repressing environmental activists and indigenous communities seeking to defend their land rights; having economic interests in the mining, timber, and fishing industries; having significant non-defense related economic investments; roles in agriculture; running prisons; and supporting the unconstitutional mass arrest of alleged gang members.

We need to get over the idea that if the military doesn’t assume control of the government, its other roles don’t matter. The military is a key tool that oligarchic interests and elected authoritarians use to create national environments in which rights and economic development is limited.

* Joy Olson is the former Executive Director of the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), a research and advocacy organization working to advance human rights. Twitter: @JoyLeeOlson

  • ✇Mexico Today
  • Opinion | What We Didn’t Learn from the Testimony of the DEA Administrator – Part III Staff
    The recent extradition from Mexico to the United States of Ovidio Guzmán is a most welcome development. As U.S. Department of Justice indictments against him and the rest of the Chapitos, the sons of Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán and leaders of the main branch of the Sinaloa Cartel showed, Ovidio’s responsibilities within the cartel centered on the production and trafficking of deadly fentanyl to the United States. Bringing him to justice, far more likely in a U.S. court than a Mexican one where eff
     

Opinion | What We Didn’t Learn from the Testimony of the DEA Administrator – Part III

By: Staff
25 September 2023 at 12:35

Vanda Felbab-BrownThe recent extradition from Mexico to the United States of Ovidio Guzmán is a most welcome development. As U.S. Department of Justice indictments against him and the rest of the Chapitos, the sons of Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán and leaders of the main branch of the Sinaloa Cartel showed, Ovidio’s responsibilities within the cartel centered on the production and trafficking of deadly fentanyl to the United States. Bringing him to justice, far more likely in a U.S. court than a Mexican one where effective prosecution rates still remain abysmally low, is very important. On July 27, the head of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) Anne Milgram highlighted Ovidio’s role during a U.S. Congress hearing on “Drug Enforcement Administration Oversight.” In this four-part series, I have been analyzing some of these key takeaways from Milgram’s fascinating testimony that was full of important insights into the China-Mexico-United States fentanyl traffic. In my previous oped in the series, I analyzed what Milgram’s testimony told us about the Mexican cartels’ operations, including Ovidio. In the first oped, I focused on the international fentanyl traffic, the role of China, the global synthetics drug revolution, and the public health effects of fentanyl prevalence in the United States. In today’s oped, I discuss several important aspects of the Mexican cartels’ operations and new supply trends about which Administrator Milgram did not speak in her testimony. In my next column, the concluding piece in the series, I will analyze the big changes in the DEA’s policies that Administrator Milgram presented and suggest further policy recommendations.

A very dangerous development in the U.S. illicit drug market about which Milgram’s testimony did not comment is the spread of xylazine. Nonetheless, as part of the Biden administration’s strategy for countering  the threat of xylazine mixed into fentanyl (officially unveiled in July 2023) Milgram had repeatedly spoken out about the risks of unauthorized xylazine use, describing xylazine as “making the deadliest drug threat our country has ever faced, fentanyl, even deadlier.”

A tranquilizer used in veterinary medicine for surgery on large animals, xylazine is a non-opiate sedative, analgesic, and muscle relaxant. Over the past several years, its presence in street drug use on the U.S. East Coast has escalated dramatically and its spread westward appears to be mimicking the spread of fentanyl a decade ago. Amidst the already most lethal drug epidemic ever in human history, xylazine poses further grave threats. Its use causes horrific morbidity, such as tissue necrosis so bad it often leads to amputation. It generates its own addiction. And, crucially, by suppressing the central nervous and respiratory systems, it can cause death. Because it is not an opioid, it does not respond to naloxone, undermining the effectiveness of naloxone to reverse lethal drug overdose.

The death rate from xylazine overdoses increased 35 times from 2018 to 2021. The DEA has found fentanyl-xylazine mixtures in 48 states, and in 2022, about 22% of fentanyl powder and 7% of fentanyl pills seized by the DEA contained xylazine. Although almost 110,000 U.S. residents died of drug overdose in 2022 – 300 people a day! — the actual number of drug overdoses that did not result in death (although might have caused potentially lifelong health impairment) was many times higher. If xylazine starts spreading through U.S. drug use, we can see a further dramatic escalation of drug deaths from an already terrible baseline.

Like fentanyl, xylazine is frequently mixed into other drugs without users knowing it.

Yet little is known about how and where xylazine is added into street drugs. Its use as an illicit drug adulterant was first registered in Puerto Rico in the early 2000s. A decade later there, it circulated as a drug of abuse on its own. Xylazine has many of the same effects in recreational use as opioids, but the high lasts longer. Indeed, one supposition is that it was Puerto Rican drug trafficking networks, widely present in New York, that introduced the drug into street use. As of October 2022, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration believed that xylazine was being mixed into the drugs at the retail level.

Developments since suggest that the mixing may also take place during the wholesale supply, but not enough is known what role Mexican cartels play in the distribution of xylazine. A May 31, 2023 Financial Times article asserted that Mexican cartels were mixing xylazine into fentanyl. The Director of the U.S. Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), Rahul Gupta, also suggested that beyond online sales from China and Puerto Rico, to a lesser extent some drug traffickers were mixing xylazine into fentanyl in Mexico. The fact, as detailed below, that xylazine has been detected in fake drugs sold by Mexican pharmacies to Western tourists strongly suggest that at least some Mexican illicit drug traffickers are also involved in mixing xylazine into drugs, whether at the wholesale or retail levels. But we need to know far more than just that. Which of the Mexican cartels peddle and mix xylazine into drugs? Both Sinaloa and CJNG? Are the Chapitos themselves directing the mixing of xylazine into other drugs or does the mixing happen more downstream? The interrogation and trial of Ovidio Guzmán should focus on those questions.

Xylazine is readily available for purchase on the internet. Chinese suppliers price a kilogram of xylazine powder between a mere US $6 and US $20. Like synthetic drugs overall, and particularly synthetic opioids, that makes is dangerously cheap. But far more needs to be known about whether and how Chinese suppliers are selling the drugs to illicit markets. Are the sellers the same Chinese sellers that also knowingly sell fentanyl precursor chemicals to Mexican cartels? Xylazine is not internationally a scheduled drug (even though in February 2023, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration restricted its unauthorized import). Will the United States thus find itself in a situation where vast numbers of Chinese suppliers ship the drug to the United States, as was the case with fentanyl before China scheduled the entire class of fentanyl-type drugs, further increasing prevalence of use?

A second highly pernicious development in the China-Mexico-U.S. drug trafficking not mentioned in Administrator Milgram’s testimony is the spread of pharmacies in Mexico, particularly in major international tourist areas, that sell fentanyl-laced drugs and other dangerous substances. Proliferating over the past three years in places such as the Mayan Riviera, Los Cabos, Puerto Vallerta, and Los Algodones, a small border town in Baja California, known for the more than 300 hundred dental clinics catering to U.S. citizens, these pharmacies are physical buildings that look like other Mexican pharmacies. Yet they openly advertise drugs such as antibiotics, anabolic steroids, and prescription opiates, and sell them illegally without a prescription. Investigative work by The Los Angeles Times and separately by Vice discovered that drugs sold as Percocet, for example, also contained fentanyl, methamphetamine, and xylazine. During my June 2023 fieldwork in Mexico, shop assistants in these pharmacies claimed they could mail any of these drugs to the United States even in the absence of prescription.

U.S. citizens have long been used to buying medications that are too expensive in the United States from Mexico. Unwittingly, intending to buy other medication, they may end up buying drugs causing lethal overdose or addiction. The legitimate veneer of these pharmacies also exposes a much wider set of potential customers to fentanyl and other dangerous drugs, ranging from teenagers to the elderly. Because the pharmacies aggressively target international tourists in major vacation resort areas, they can export the fentanyl epidemic to other regions of the world, such as Western Europe. Many of these pharmacies are likely linked to the Sinaloa Cartel and Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG). Further funding the Mexican cartels and other drug trafficking networks, a geographic spread of fentanyl use would augment the global public health disaster.

These pharmacies greatly magnify the threats to public health – in the United States, but also Europe and other areas from which international tourists come to Mexico. They are far more dangerous than informal street sale of illegal drugs. Their veneer of regulatory authorization gives customers a false sense of safety and mimics the crimes of the U.S. pharmaceutical industry that deceived and captured regulatory bodies and health providers in the United States with fallacious claims about prescription drugs, setting off substance use disorder in far greater numbers of people than an illegal market ever could. In a sense, the Mexican cartels are copying the illegal practices of U.S. pharmaceutical companies in the 1990s and 2000s.

The adulteration of fake medications with fentanyl and methamphetamine is not the sole problem. The unauthorized sale of antibiotics without prescription at these pharmacies also poses other massive global public health, economic, and security harms, such as the intensified emergence of drug-resistant bacteria.

Shutting down these unscrupulous pharmacies to minimize the criminals’ market access and to reduce exposure to customers is imperative. Simply seizing illicit pills while letting the pharmacies operate is inadequate. Shutdowns and strong prosecutorial actions are necessary against suppliers. Yet while these pharmacies operate in violation of Mexican laws, in plain sight, and visibly saturate major tourist areas, Mexico’s Federal Commission for Protection Against Sanitary Risks (COFEPRIS) only just began taking action in recent months. In June 2023, COFEPRIS finally raided three such pharmacies in Los Cabos, arresting four employees and seizing some 25,000 pills. Seizing problematic pills is not enough as illegal suppliers will simply bring in more. Thus, more importantly, at the beginning of August, COFEPRIS shut down 23 pharmacies selling illegal or restricted drugs in the Mayan Riviera.

Such law enforcement operations cannot remain isolated. COFEPRIS and the other Mexican regulatory and law enforcement agencies must continue diligently and continuously monitoring the sales of Mexican pharmacies, shutting down those that act illegally, and investigating, arresting, and effectively prosecuting the trafficking networks behind them.

Administrator Milgram’s testimony laid out various ways Mexican cartels launder money. The National Drug Intelligence Center of the U.S. Department of Justice estimated in 2011 that Mexican and Colombian drug trafficking groups earned between US $18 billion and US $39 billion a year from wholesale drug sales. Other estimates from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, research organizations, and news media have assessed Mexico’s drug export revenues to have been in the range of US $6 billion to US $21 billion a year between 2010 and 2018.

Milgram’s testimony highlighted the increasing use of cryptocurrencies in the illegal drug trade, as well as the rise of Chinese money laundering actors and methods. In 2019 and 2020, the U.S. Department of Treasury and Europol characterized Chinese money launderers as “key threats.” They have been outbidding and displaying Latin American money launderers, such as those linked to the Black Peso market. As described in detail in Drazen Jorgic’s Reuters special report, the Chinese brokers mostly manage to bypass the U.S. and Mexican formal banking systems, thus evading anti-money laundering measures and simplifying one of the biggest challenges for the cartels, namely moving large amount of bulk money subject to law enforcement detection. The only interface with the formal banking system takes place in China, into which U.S. law enforcement agencies have little-to-no visibility, such as the Bank of China.

But Milgram’s testimony did not mention a novel and highly pernicious method of laundering money and value transfer across illegal economies also linked to China: the increasing payments for Chinese drug precursors originating in Mexican wildlife products. These often illegally-sourced wildlife products are coveted in China for Traditional Chinese Medicine, aphrodisiacs, and other forms of consumption, or as a tool of speculation, such as in the case of the highly prized swim bladder of the endemic and protected Mexican totoaba fish poached for Chinese markets. I have detailed this method in my 2022 investigative report “China-linked Wildlife Poaching and Trafficking in Mexico.”

Other wildlife commodities used for money laundering, tax evasion, and as barter payments between Mexican cartels and Chinese precursor networks include abalone, jellyfish, and lobster. Instead of paying in cash, Chinese traffickers are paid in commodities. The amount of value generated by wildlife commodity payments, likely in the tens of millions of dollars, may not cover all of the precursor payment totals, but could cover a substantial percentage since the total payments for precursors likely amount to tens of millions of dollars also. Wildlife barter may not displace other methods of money laundering and value transfer. But the increasing role of this method can devastate natural ecosystems and biodiversity in Mexico as the cartels steadily seek to legally and illegally harvest more and more of a wider range of animal and plant species to pay for drug precursors. In Mexico, poaching and wildlife trafficking for Chinese markets are increasingly intermeshed with drug trafficking, money laundering, and value transfer in illicit economies.

That is hardly surprising as Mexican criminal groups are increasingly controlling larger and larger portions of Mexico’s territory, people, illegal and legal economies, electoral processes, and institutions.

* Vanda Felbab-Brown is a senior fellow in the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence in the Foreign Policy program at The Brookings Institution in Washington, DC. Twitter: @VFelbabBrown

 

  • ✇Mexico Today
  • Opinion | What We Learned from the Testimony of the DEA Administrator – Part II Staff
    On July 27, the head of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) Anne Milgram testified in the U.S. Congress in the periodic hearing on “Drug Enforcement Administration Oversight.” Far from a canned pro-forma event, Administrator Milgram’s written and oral testimony and the exchanges with Members of Congress provided fascinating insights both into the substance of the China-Mexico-United States drug trade and the Mexican cartels as well as to recent significant and positive changes to DEA’
     

Opinion | What We Learned from the Testimony of the DEA Administrator – Part II

By: Staff
8 September 2023 at 16:53

Vanda Felbab-BrownOn July 27, the head of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) Anne Milgram testified in the U.S. Congress in the periodic hearing on “Drug Enforcement Administration Oversight.” Far from a canned pro-forma event, Administrator Milgram’s written and oral testimony and the exchanges with Members of Congress provided fascinating insights both into the substance of the China-Mexico-United States drug trade and the Mexican cartels as well as to recent significant and positive changes to DEA’s policies. In this four-part OpEd series, I pull out and analyze some of these key takeaways (highlighting Milgram’s words in Italics to distinguish them from my own commentary).

In this second piece in the series, I focus on some of the striking aspects of what Milgram’s testimony told us about the Mexican cartels’ operations as well as begin a discussion of what the testimony did not say, something to which I devote fully the third column. In the first oped, I focused on the global picture of fentanyl traffic, the role of China in precursor supply, the global synthetic drugs revolution, and the effects of fentanyl use in the United States. In the fourth concluding piece, I will analyze the big changes in the DEA’s policies that Administrator Milgram presented and suggest further policy recommendations.

As Milgram clearly and unequivocally stated in her testimony, fentanyl production for the United States overwhelmingly takes place in Mexico, with the Sinaloa Cartel, specifically the Chapitos’ faction of the cartel, and the Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG) dominating production and the Sinaloa Cartel “supplying the majority of the fentanyl trafficked into the United States.” Milgram singled out the Chapitos “as currently leading the most violent faction of the Sinaloa Cartel” and “the largest, most violent, and most prolific fentanyl trafficking operation in the world,” with sophisticated fentanyl labs in Culiacán, Mexico. 

Milgram also described the Chapitos as “oversee[ing] and control[ing] every step in their fentanyl trafficking process,” alleging “they will stop at nothing to ensure the expansion of their operations and the flow of fentanyl to the United States.”

She painted a picture of the Chapitos and CJNG as of voracious businessmen and brutal criminal actors: “The business model used by the Sinaloa and Jalisco Cartels is to grow at all costs, no matter how many die in the process. The cartels are engaging in deliberate, calculated treachery to deceive Americans and drive addiction to achieve higher profits.” 

Indeed, the Sinaloa Cartel and CJNG have been lacing fentanyl into fake prescription pills such as Oxycontin and Xanax, despite the enormous risks of lethal dose to users. They have been similarly adding fentanyl not just into heroin, but also cocaine and methamphetamine to increase the number of people addicted. Yet the lack of knowledge users have as to what actual drug mixture they buy from dealers has been the source of the vast rates of lethal overdose in the United States.

I am often asked why the cartel leadership is so indifferent to killing off its customer base. Doesn’t it harm their business? Wouldn’t they want customers to stay alive? The April 14, 2023 U.S. Department of Justice indictments of the Chapitos and other key Sinaloa Cartel operatives provided the answer in extraordinary detail: In various instances, the indictments show, the cartel leaders decide to send into the United States batches of fentanyl so potent it will kill the users. Yet in a vicious indifference to the loss of life and striking lack of concern for the response of the U.S. law enforcement, the cartel leaders repeatedly calculate that they will ultimately get more people addicted than they will kill off. The indictments cite Ivan Archivaldo Guzmán Salazar as saying they want to flood the United States with fentanyl in order to create and be able to supply “streets of junkies.”

The indifference to the deaths of tens of thousands of Americans is all the more striking because the production of fentanyl is so very cheap. Halting a particular batch would cause very little financial loss for the cartel. Yet the leaders decide not to halt even very lethal batches.

Their unconcern for inevitably provoking a very strong reaction from the U.S law enforcement is also notable. This lack of restraint is markedly different from the older generation of the Sinaloa Cartel leaders –El Mayo and the Chapitos’ own father, El Chapo. While expanding a massive drug empire and engaging in various wars of aggression against rival drug groups, this older Sinaloa Generation leadership was nonetheless far more cautious to avoid crossing certain redlines and thus triggering a massive law enforcement response, whether from the United States or the government of Mexico. The older leaders were far more focused on carefully calibrating brutality and violence.

Indeed, the April 2023 indictments and Milgram’s testimony focus preponderantly on the Chapitos, singling out their faction for the production and trafficking of fentanyl and for the brunt of U.S. law enforcement, not mentioning the still-at-large El Mayo and his branch of the Sinaloa Cartel.

Another striking aspect of Administrator Milgram’s testimony was her characterization of the size of the two leading drug trafficking groups. She described the Sinaloa Cartel as having 26,000 members, associates, facilitators, and brokers globally and a presence in 19 out of 32 Mexican states while, according to her statement, CJNG had 18,000 such members, associates, facilitators, and brokers in 21 out of Mexico’s 32 states. Mexican president Andrés Manuel López Obrador angrily disputed these claims as exaggerated, and the DEA didn’t release its methodology behind the estimates.

To me, the described geographic reach of the Sinaloa Cartel in Mexico is, if anything, surprisingly low. All the more so if “presence” is defined merely as an operational cell or affiliate maintaining some lasting activities, as opposed to control over territories, people, economies, and institutions.

Both cartels have been actively seeking and expanding the latter and are engaged in a bipolar war with each across Mexico and through their affiliates and proxies across Latin America all the way down to Chile in the pursuit of this ambition. In some states of Mexico, Sinaloa and CJNG may be able to exclude their arch-rival, but many areas, from cities like Cancún to even the very state of Sinaloa, they are both present and compete, often violently.

That the DEA estimates the Sinaloa Cartel to be still functionally absent from a third of Mexico’s states is further striking if one considers that both cartels have been on a determined campaign to dramatically expand their involvement in many legal economies in Mexico, with Sinaloa often as the pioneer in the endeavor. This drive establish a role along the entire vertical chain of Mexico’s legal economies goes beyond merely taxing any economic activity in an area – be legal agricultural products, water distribution, fisheries, mining, logging, Oxxo convenience stores, manufacturing production, or government offices. Sinaloa and CJNG are actively seeking to dictate terms to many actors in these economies, and even monopolistically dominate their components, such as in fisheries.

Administrator Milgram’s description of Sinaloa’s and CJNG presence in the United States is noteworthy, and leaves many questions. Milgram described the Sinaloa Cartel as having drug distribution hubs in Phoenix, Los Angeles, Denver, and Chicago and CJNG as maintaining them in Los Angeles, Seattle, Charlotte, Chicago, and Atlanta. Remarkably,  Miami (long a massive smuggling hub for cocaine), New York, Philadelphia, Boston, Washington, DC, San Francisco (where fentanyl overdose is massively surging), and Baltimore (the US city with the largest fentanyl overdose) are absent from the list. All of cities have large fentanyl use and overdose problems and are important transportation hubs. In ports such such as Boston, New York, and Baltimore, delivering fentanyl by hiding it container cargo would be very convenient for the drug trafficking organizations. Which begs the question why the cartels do not have key drug distribution hubs there, or at least why they were omitted from Milgram’s list.  

If the cartels have indeed not established distribution hubs in those cities, is it that overland smuggling across the U.S.-Mexico border so dominates all wholesale supply? Yes, over 90% of fentanyl seizures at the U.S.-Mexico border take place in legal ports of entry or interior vehicle checkpoints, but that doesn’t mean that 90% of fentanyl seizures take place at the U.S.-Mexico border or that 90% of fentanyl enters the United States through that land border.

Another possible hypothesis would be that the cartels judge law enforcement density and effectiveness to be particularly high in those localities. However, this could hardly be said about Baltimore, for example. Though perhaps there is marked difference between the effectiveness of federal counternarcotics policing and local street crime policing in Baltimore, where local drug retail markets are extensive and violent.

Or perhaps the cartels’ relations with other U.S. criminal groups in these places are not thick and firm enough for them to judge that large stashes of fentanyl would be safe from rivals.

Administrator Milgram emphasized in her testimony that between January and July 2023,“3,337 associates of the Sinaloa and Jalisco Cartels in the United responsible for the last mile of fentanyl distribution and methamphetamine distribution on [U.S.] streets and through social media” were arrested. That is a very high number!

It would be great to have further information about this datapoint: How many of the arrested are U.S. citizens? What exactly does “the last mile of fentanyl distribution” mean? Are these street dealers or are they cartel operatives who sell drugs to neighborhood-level suppliers? What are the patterns and thickness of interactions between the Mexican cartels and U.S. wholesale suppliers, criminal gangs, and retail dealers? Over the past several years, U.S. think tank image of the Mexican cartels’ operations in the United States has been that the Mexican cartels are not directly involved in street level distribution, leaving that to their clients. How many layers of middlemen are there between the cartels and the street dealers? Do the Mexican cartels only deal with the heads of street gangs, such as in Baltimore, New York, or Chicago? With whom else? What about places where and customers to whom fentanyl is not distributed through street gangs? Is much of that supply handled directly through social media sales and the dark web directly from the cartels’ operatives?

Having answers to those questions as well as to why the Mexican cartels choose not or are unable to establish large stash hubs in certain crucial U.S. cities would significantly improve our ability to enhance supply-side policy measures against the most lethal drug epidemic ever in history.

* Vanda Felbab-Brown is a senior fellow in the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence in the Foreign Policy program at The Brookings Institution in Washington, DC. Twitter: @VFelbabBrown

  • ✇Mexico Today
  • Opinion | Authoritarianism and El Salvador Staff
    Authoritarianism – obedience to authority at the expense of freedom – is as bad as it sounds, and it is gaining ground in the Americas. It is a temptation leaders struggle to resist, if not embrace. At the same time, too many citizens of the Americas are willing to relinquish their freedoms in exchange for what the authoritarians are offering. El Salvador is this article’s case in point. For decades, personal security has been an enormous problem in El Salvador. With the end of the civil war, th
     

Opinion | Authoritarianism and El Salvador

By: Staff
5 September 2023 at 17:56

Joy OlsonAuthoritarianism – obedience to authority at the expense of freedom – is as bad as it sounds, and it is gaining ground in the Americas. It is a temptation leaders struggle to resist, if not embrace. At the same time, too many citizens of the Americas are willing to relinquish their freedoms in exchange for what the authoritarians are offering. El Salvador is this article’s case in point.

For decades, personal security has been an enormous problem in El Salvador. With the end of the civil war, the country was optimistic that violence they had known was behind them. Those hopes were dashed as the post-conflict period dealt with the reintegration of soldiers from both sides of the conflict, combined with deportees from the US who had been educated in the ways of LA street gangs. Those gangs, most importantly MS-13 and Barrio 18, began in Los Angeles where young Salvadoran migrants whose parents had sought shelter in LA during the war, organized to protect themselves from local LA gangs. As those youth were arrested and deported back to El Salvador, they brought the gangs with them and changed El Salvador.

Over the next two decades El Salvador was plagued by violence and extortion, most of it gang and organized crime related. For years the country had one of the highest murder rates in the world. The government tried varied strategies to bring the homicide rate down, negotiating with the gangs, programs for at-risk-youth and often the most popular – mano dura. The mano dura approach jailed gang members and others caught up in broad sweeps. The post-implementation analysis of this approach was that jail became a finishing school for criminals, making the problem even more complex.

Fed up with the constant violence and the extortion that reached down to the smallest of businesses, Salvadorans elected President Nayib Bukele. Under his watch the country has become demonstrably safer. The homicide rate, which was 106 people per 100,000 in 2015, plummeted to 7.8 in 2022.

He accomplished this feat by implementing drastic measures. He declared a state of emergency and deployed the army to the streets. He suspended the right to counsel and the right to a fair trial. He built the largest prison in Latin America and jailed 70,000 people in 16 months. Two percent of the population is now in jail. That is more than twice the percentage of those jailed in the United States, a record anyone should want to beat.

To provide a semblance of due process, the Congress recently passed a law that will allow hundreds of those jailed to be tried simultaneously – up to 900 people at once. There is no doubt that innocent people have been caught up in the sweeps to arrest gang members. But with hundreds tried at a time, the odds of the innocent being freed are not good.

The government seems to have decided that the problem with past attempts at mano dura was that criminals eventually got out of prison. So, they are constructing a system where the accused don’t return to the community.

The tactics employed to control violence have obliterated individual rights, but they have received widespread support. President Bukele declared the state of emergency, but the Congress has approved its implementation, and the people support the policies. Bukele has an enviable approval rating, coming in lately at between 80-90 percent.

It is a failure of democratic governance when people are willingly to trade their rights in exchange for feeling safe. In a democracy people should be able to have both personal security and freedoms.

Remember, authoritarians can be elected. They can also use the democratic process to take away freedoms and dismantle democracy. Bukele has successfully changed the constitution to allow himself to run for president again. With his approval rating, he is a shoo-in. Salvadorans should be careful what they wish for.

* Joy Olson is the former Executive Director of the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), a research and advocacy organization working to advance human rights. Twitter: @JoyLeeOlson

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