THIS month, mixed signals emanated from India on the normalisation of relations with Pakistan.

Dattatreya Hosabale, secretary general of the Hindu extremist organisation RSS, proposed in an interview that the “window for dialogue” with Pakistan should always be open. He argued for diplomatic ties, visa issuance, trade and people-to-people contacts. His call was endorsed by several notables, including former Indian army chief (retd) Gen Manoj Naravane.

Within days, as if to ensure that there was no confusion about the real Indian intent, the serving army chief Gen Upendra Dwivedi announced that Pakistan must decide whether it wants to remain a “part of geography or history” — hubristic rhetoric that reflected the hegemonic mindset of the Narendra Modi regime.

ISPR strongly condemned these remarks, describing them as “madness and warmongering”.

It is clear that the Modi government isn’t interested in normalising ties with Pakistan, and is engaged in creating a Hindutva-led polity in India. It uses anti-Pakistan rhetoric to fetch votes and remain in power. To that end, it has exploited the issue of terrorism to malign Pakistan and thus ‘justify’ its policy of a so far decade-long disconnect with Pakistan.

After the Pahalgam terrorist attack in Indian-occupied Kashmir in April 2025, Prime Minister Modi authorised military strikes against nine non-military sites (mosques and allied schools) in Pakistan under the garb of fighting terrorism.

To project resilience following India’s unilateral, illegal and brazen aggression, Modi announced three policy decisions — often described as the new Modi doctrine. According to this, the response to every act of terrorism in India would be severe military action against Pakistan; India would not distinguish between terrorism by a non-state actor and state-sponsored terrorism; and India would not be blackmailed by the threat of nuclear escalation. This meant that India would continue to expand space for kinetic confrontation with Pakistan below the nuclear overhang. It is a high-risk strategy which the two nuclear-armed neighbours can ignore only at their own peril.

To its own surprise and dismay, however, India found an answer to this three-pronged Modi doctrine during the May 2025 stand-off with Pakistan.

One, Pakistan demonstrated that it could defend itself against a much larger and better-equipped hostile neighbour. Two, India’s campaign to malign Pakistan in the name of terrorism and isolate it diplomatically crashed to the ground. Three, India’s desire to be the regional hegemon also received a major setback. The Pakistani side has made it clear that any future kinetic misadventure under the so-called Modi doctrine will receive a befitting response from Pakistan through its policy of ‘quid pro quo plus’.

It’s clear that India doesn’t want peace with Pakistan.

Both countries are well aware that future wars between them would not be face-to-face engagement, but rather, non-contact warfare through missiles, drones, cyberattacks and electronic wars. It is still not clear, though, whether India has learned the right lessons from last May’s war.

When one hears Indian experts still talking of Modi’s doctrine, it appears that India is continuing to live under the illusion that it is a dominant power that can settle issues through its conventional superiority and use of force. Instead, the Indian side must appreciate the new reality that modern non-contact wars employing autonomous lethal weapons have already equalised battlefields in asymmetric situations.

In this context, pro-normalisation signals, such as those radiated by the RSS secretary general, app­ear tactical in na­ture. These could be intended to give the impression to the outside world that India was a reasonable country ready to engage with its nei­ghbours. These gestures could also be a smokescreen to manage international pressure should India decide to carry out another attack against Pakistan to avenge its defeat in the May 2025 war.

The Modi doctrine of expanding space for larger kinetic confrontation is very dangerous. Being neighbours, the reaction time before lethal autonomous weapons are deployed is so little that both countries could virtually destroy each other if another war erupts.

A saner alternative is for the two to incrementally resume bilateral contacts, including a back channel, and implement confidence-building measures that lower the chances of another armed conflict. The only mechanism available for bilateral contact are the DGMOs, but they normally confine themselves to routine communications. Thus, there is a need to reimagine the brinkmanship within the South Asian security construct.

If Pakistan and India cannot be friends, they must at least find a way of coexisting peacefully. They owe it to a billion and a half people.

The writer is chairman, Sanober Institute and former foreign secretary of Pakistan.

Published in Dawn, May 24th, 2026

A YEAR after the four-day military confrontation between India and Pakistan, it is time for introspection to develop a better understanding of what led India to commit this blatant act of aggression and to draw lessons that can be applied to handling future crises of this sort. First, let’s figure out why India attacked several non-military sites in Pakistan on May 7, killing 31 civilians. Prima facie, it wanted to avenge the April 22 terrorist attack on tourists in Pahalgam in Indian-occupied Kashmir.

In a knee-jerk reaction, India blamed Pakistan. The latter condemned the incident and called for an impartial investigation. India expected the world to accept its allegations against Pakistan, with no questions asked. But to its surprise, not one country endorsed its allegations. For over two decades since 9/11, India has sold a flawed narrative to the world that Pakistan was the epicentre of terrorism. That lie now stood exposed.

Another plausible reason for the May 7 aggression, codenamed Operation Sindoor, was to establish a new normal that India could use force against Pakistan unilaterally and pre-emptively if it suspected a Pakistani link to terrorism in India. Little did it know that Pakistan was well prepared to beat back its aggression and defend itself. Responding swiftly, the Pakistan Air Force brought down seven Indian aircraft, including the pricey Rafale, which were flying beyond visual range. Instead of backing off, India sent in armed drones to destroy Pakistan’s air defences and radar installations and later its missiles struck three Pakistani bases.

When it became evident that neither international law nor diplomatic efforts would check India’s aggression, Pakistan struck back on May 10, now observed as Youm-i-Marka-i-Haq (Day of the Battle of Truth). Pakistan’s network-based, integrated, and multi-domain counter attack, employing missiles, drones, electronic warfare and cyberattacks, was so emphatic that India ended up asking the US to help secure a ceasefire.

The myth of India’s conventional dominance has been broken.

Some analysts believe that the Indian attack represented its regional assertiveness, with the Hindutva-driven BJP government voicing its ambition to create ‘Akhand Bharat’. This hegemonic agenda is flawed; the Indian subcontinent was never ruled by a single political entity until the British brought administrative unity. In fact, India’s hegemonic attitude towards its own region has hindered its desire for a higher global profile.

Following the Pahalgam attack, India suspended the Indus Waters Treaty, threatening the lives and livelihoods of millions of Pakistanis. This breach of international obligations was triggered, in part, by the hostile anti-Pakistan, anti-Muslim rhetoric that Narendra Modi’s government had indulged in for years, particularly during poll campaigns. Indian threats to disrupt or divert Pakistan’s share of waters are a high-risk strategy because Pakistan will see it as an act of war. New Delhi’s hostile rhetoric and hubris, accentuated by the media, may have compelled India to attack Pakistan. Within days, India received a rude reality check.

Pakistan’s response to Indian aggression has broken the myth of India’s conventional dominance and demolished its narrative that links Pakistan to terrorism. Pakistan’s diplomatic space also expanded as its success resonated with world leaders, including the US president. Saudi Arabia signed a Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement with Pakistan. Later, Pakistan contributed to efforts for an end to Israel’s genocidal war in Gaza and mediated a ceasefire between Iran and the US. Since it all started with Pakistan’s sterling performance last May, Marka-i-Haq has become a turning point in regional geopolitics.

Will India re­­s­u­­me its paused Ope­ration Sindoor? It appears that while its armed forces address their sho­­rtcomings, Sin­do­­or is continuing through proxies such as the TTP and BLA. Knowing that the current global environment won’t accept its politicisation of terrorism, India might not embark on a kinetic misadventure for now. However, given the hubris of its government, irrationality can resurge. Pakistan must, therefore, be prepared for any Indian decision to launch Sindoor 2.

How should Pakistan leverage its high military and diplomatic profile to convert geopolitical dividends into geo-economic gains? A good starting point is ensuring the ease of doing business, joint ventures under CPEC, developing economic zones and boosting investor confidence. The government should also find ways to reduce input costs for industries, such as pursuing solar solutions. Importantly, it must muster the political will to undertake much-awaited structural reforms in institutional and bureaucratic governance, which are essential for our economic and human security.

The writer is chairman Sanober Institute and former foreign secretary of Pakistan.

Published in Dawn, May 10th, 2026