“A new world order must be built to ensure economic justice and equal political security for all nations. An end to the arms race is an essential prerequisite for the establishment of such an order.”

This year marks the 40th anniversary of those words from the Soviet-Indian Delhi Declaration, signed in 1986 during Mikhail Gorbachev’s visit to India and his talks with Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. It was one of the first major documents of the late Cold War era to openly speak of the need for a ‘new world order’.

At the time, the Soviet leadership believed this order would emerge through what it called ‘new political thinking’. The idea was that former adversaries would abandon confrontation and combine the best elements of their respective systems to create a more stable and equitable international framework. It was an ambitious vision: A joint effort to rebuild global politics from the ruins of ideological rivalry. But history, however, had other plans.

The Soviet Union soon disappeared into a vortex of internal crises before vanishing altogether from the world stage. The phrase ‘new world order’ survived, but it was quickly repurposed by the administration of President George H.W. Bush. In Washington’s interpretation, the concept no longer meant a shared international architecture. It came to mean a liberal order dominated politically and militarily by the US and its allies.

In reality, this wasn’t an entirely new order at all. It was an extension of the post-1945 system, only now without the counterweight of the Soviet Union.

For a time, many believed this arrangement represented the natural endpoint of history. Yet contrary to those expectations, once the Cold War confrontation disappeared, global stability didn’t deepen. Instead, tensions gradually intensified and by the beginning of the 2010s, the foundations of the system were already beginning to crack.

Since then, the pace of disintegration has accelerated dramatically.

As humanity moves deeper into the second quarter of the 21st century, it is becoming increasingly difficult to deny that the previous world order has effectively ceased to exist. Whatever doubts may have lingered vanished during the opening months of 2026.

What matters isn’t simply that the strongest states increasingly ignore laws and conventions that once appeared firmly established, more significant is the style in which politics is now conducted. Decisions are impulsive and often openly contradictory as governments act first and improvise later. Statements made today may directly contradict those made yesterday, yet this no longer seems to matter.

This atmosphere shouldn’t necessarily be mistaken for collective irrationality. Rather, many political actors appear convinced that the old restraints have collapsed and that the current moment represents a historic opportunity. The instinct is simple: Seize as much advantage as possible before the landscape hardens again.

The redistribution of the world has already begun. Political influence, transport corridors, resources, financial flows, technological ecosystems, and even cultural and religious spheres are all being contested simultaneously. Every major power is now defining its ambitions and testing the methods by which those ambitions might be achieved.

Of course, mistakes will be expensive, but that, at least, is nothing new in international politics.

The real uncertainty lies elsewhere because the previous era left behind an assumption that periods of chaos are eventually followed by the emergence of a new equilibrium. After disorder comes structure and after confrontation comes a new framework. But there’s no guarantee this time.

The international system today isn’t an empty construction site waiting for a new design. After major world wars, old structures are often swept away on a vast scale, creating space for something new to emerge, and that’s not the case now.

Instead, the world remains cluttered with institutions and habits inherited from previous eras. Many are discredited or dysfunctional, but they still exist. And even those states that attack these institutions most aggressively continue to use them whenever convenient.

The United Nations system remains an example. Its authority has diminished, yet governments still appeal to it selectively when doing so serves their interests. Likewise, the structures created during the period of liberal globalization have proven more resilient than many expected.

Despite trade wars, sanctions, geopolitical fragmentation, and increasingly open rivalry among major powers, the global economic network continues to resist complete disintegration. Supply chains bend but do not fully break. Markets remain interconnected. Even countries engaged in fierce political confrontation continue trading with one another indirectly.

This resilience appears to frustrate some of the very powers trying to reshape the system.

The creation of a genuinely new international framework will therefore be an exceptionally painful process. The available raw material consists of fragments from different historical periods, ideological systems, and institutional models. Somehow these incompatible components must be assembled into something functional.

Some states are attempting this carefully, selecting elements that might fit together into a relatively coherent structure. Others are behaving more crudely, trying to hammer incompatible pieces into place through pressure or intimidation. The danger is obvious: Excessive force may not produce stability at all, but only further fragmentation.

Yet perhaps the defining feature of the present moment is that nobody possesses a real blueprint for what comes next. During earlier periods of transition, however flawed the visions may have been, leaders at least believed they understood the destination.

However, today there is no such clarity and the latest struggle to construct a new world order comes without universal principles or even a broadly accepted idea of what success would look like. The old rules are fading, but no agreed replacements have emerged.

For now, the message confronting every major power is brutally simple: Do it yourself, and then try to live with the consequences.

RT

The headlines are filled with reports of growing discord inside NATO. Donald Trump openly questions the value of allies who, in his view, fail to carry their share of the burden. Western Europe complains about the unreliability of its American patron while simultaneously pledging loyalty to the Atlantic alliance. Beneath the daily noise, however, something far more significant is taking place: the gradual transformation of Europe’s political and military order.

For decades, the United States guaranteed Western Europe’s security while those Europeans concentrated on prosperity and welfare. That arrangement now appears increasingly unstable. Washington’s strategic priorities have shifted toward Asia and the confrontation with China. Europe remains important as a logistical and political platform for American power, but it is no longer the unquestioned center of US grand strategy.

Trump didn’t create this process, though he has accelerated it dramatically. His irritation with NATO is not simply personal caprice. It reflects a deeper American conclusion that the era of underwriting Western European security indefinitely has become too expensive and strategically distracting.

The alliance itself was built for another age and another purpose.

NATO was designed to contain the Soviet Union and anchor American influence in Europe. It was never intended to become a global instrument for confronting China. Yet this is precisely the direction in which many in Washington would like to push it.

These Europeans, however, do not share America’s sense of urgency regarding Beijing. For most of them, China is an economic competitor, not an existential threat. Russia, by contrast, remains the central security obsession of much of the bloc, especially in Northern and Eastern members. 

This divergence is beginning to reshape NATO from within.

France has emerged as the loudest advocate of greater Western European strategic independence. Paris retains a long tradition of military autonomy and still possesses something few other European powers can claim: a genuinely independent nuclear deterrent. France cannot realistically replace the American nuclear umbrella over Western Europe, but it increasingly seeks to position itself as the ideological leader of a more self-reliant bloc.

Britain, meanwhile, continues its traditional balancing act between the EU and the United States. London insists on its independence from Brussels while simultaneously searching for external support from Washington. Northern and Eastern states remain intensely hawkish and committed to confrontation with Russia, regardless of whether the Americans remain fully engaged. Southern Europe appears far less enthusiastic, distracted instead by migration, economic stagnation and domestic instability.

As so often in European history, however, the decisive factor will likely be Germany.

Much of post-war Europe was built around one central idea: Germany must never again become an independent geopolitical force. After 1945 the country was divided, militarily constrained and tightly integrated into Western structures under American supervision.

Even German reunification in 1990 was accepted partly because Germany remained embedded inside NATO. At the time, many believed that anchoring a unified Germany within the Atlantic alliance was the safest possible arrangement for Europe.

Ironically, that very decision became one of the starting points of today’s geopolitical crisis. NATO expansion eastward created a security architecture that Moscow increasingly viewed as hostile and destabilizing.

Now, three and a half decades later, Europe may again face the prospect of a Germany becoming strategically autonomous, though this time under entirely different circumstances.

Former Chancellor Olaf Scholz announced a “new era” in 2022 following the escalation of the Ukraine conflict. For some time the slogan appeared largely symbolic. Under Germany’s current leadership, however, concrete changes are beginning to emerge.

Berlin is discussing accelerated rearmament, expanded military infrastructure and legislative changes aimed at increasing recruitment for the Bundeswehr. The debate over compulsory military service, once politically unthinkable, has returned to the mainstream.

Recent comments by Franz-Josef Overbeck, the Catholic military bishop of the Bundeswehr, are revealing. Overbeck openly called for Germany to send forces to the Strait of Hormuz and argued that compulsory military service should be restored not only for men but also for women.

His reasoning was blunt. Germany, he argued, can no longer remain on the sidelines in an increasingly dangerous world.

Many within Germany’s political establishment likely agree with him privately. Politicians, however, remain cautious because German society is still deeply uncomfortable with militarism and foreign deployments. Decades of post-war political culture have created a pacifist instinct that remains powerful among voters.

The bishop, unlike elected officials, can speak more freely.

At the same time, Germany faces mounting economic difficulties. This is not merely a temporary downturn. The old German economic model rested heavily on cheap Russian energy and export-driven industrial growth, not to mention stable globalization. Much of that foundation has eroded.

As a result, discussions that would once have been politically toxic are now occurring openly. Militarization is increasingly presented not simply as a security necessity, but also as a potential engine of economic renewal.

Only a few years ago such arguments would have sounded extraordinary in Germany. Today they are becoming part of mainstream debate.

This is where the historical dimension becomes impossible to ignore.

German political culture has long been characterized by discipline and a tendency to follow strategic paths with remarkable determination once a consensus forms. In calmer periods this can be an enormous strength. In moments of geopolitical confrontation, however, it can become dangerous.

The path on which Russia once again serves as Germany’s principal antagonist is deeply familiar from European history.

For decades after the Second World War, many believed that lesson had finally been learned. Economic interdependence between Russia and Germany was supposed to make large-scale confrontation irrational. The collapse of that assumption has shocked much of Europe.

Trump’s pressure on NATO is therefore acting as a catalyst for changes that were already underway. Western Europe is being pushed, reluctantly and unevenly, toward greater military independence. Whether this ultimately strengthens NATO or gradually hollows it out remains unclear.

The alliance is unlikely to collapse outright. Institutions of this scale rarely disappear suddenly. More likely is a gradual transformation into something narrower and more fragmented.

A core bloc focused primarily on containing Russia may emerge within NATO, while the United States shifts more of its attention toward Asia.

Whether such a bloc becomes effective will depend above all on Germany. If Berlin fully embraces rearmament and strategic emancipation from American oversight, Europe’s political landscape could change profoundly and by the end of Trump’s presidency, this process may already be far advanced.

Thus, once again, Europe may discover that history is not something safely confined to textbooks. The old rivalries and anxieties that shaped the continent for centuries have an unsettling habit of returning precisely when people convince themselves they are gone forever.

This article was first published by Rossiyskaya Gazeta, and was translated and edited by the RT team.

In 2025, Russia became India’s top supplier of crude oil, accounting for about 32.3 percent of imports, with the bilateral trade reaching $68.7 billion (~₽ 74.45), following a sharp rise over the recent years. These figures reflect not a temporary spike, but a structural shift. The supplies of energy, fertilizers, and industrial goods are increasing. Yet the negotiation and execution of transactions are far from easy-going. Contracts sometimes take too long to conclude; payments are overdue because of excessive scrutiny, and shipments are delayed for reasons that are rarely disclosed in official reports. Today the need for aligning the countries’ legal systems has become urgent than never.

Several issues require a thorough consideration and prompt solution.

Firstly, the lack of a centralized legal coordination interface continues to hinder contract formation and enforcement. The negotiating parties often have different expectations of each other’s core legal concepts. In addition, since 2022 contract performance has been seriously challenged by sanctions. In Russian legal practice, sanctions are often treated as a valid force majeure reason for transactions’ disruption. Meanwhile, the Doctrine of Frustration, enshrined under Section 56 of the Indian Contract Act,1872, specifies whether disruption of contract performance has become objectively impossible rather than commercially difficult. Thus, a supplier may consider itself excused for disruption, while the buyer sees it as a breach. This difference affects risk-based pricing, definition of contract obligations, and resolution of disputes.

Without a shared interpretation baseline, every contract involves a negotiation not only of terms, but of the legal meaning. A standing bilateral interface, even with non-binding guidance, would help reduce this uncertainty if it clarifies sanctions-related force majeure and aligns the relevant governing law and enforcement practices.

Secondly, the absence of sector-specific mutual recognition frameworks continues to influence costs. A pharmaceutical product approved in India still undergoes additional conformity checks in Russia, including registration and quality evaluation under Russian State Pharmacopoeia requirements. Engineering equipment certified under Russian standards often requires additional testing in India through the Bureau of Indian Standards (BIS) for compliance with Indian Standards (IS) specifications. Each repetition extends timelines and raises costs. Pharmaceuticals, energy equipment, agricultural products, and heavy engineering products form a large share of bilateral trade. Targeted recognition in these sectors would not require full harmonization, but should involve identifying areas where standards already align and formalizing that recognition. Even limited agreements could significantly reduce duplication.

Thirdly, in customs and trade documentation, even small differences can create major disruptions. Disparities in rules of origin, inconsistencies in Harmonized System classification, and differing documentation formats lead to repeated queries at ports. Traders handling processed goods or mixed consignments are especially affected. The lost time translates directly into costs through demurrage, storage, or missed deadlines. Both countries have invested in digital customs systems. India’s GST and and Russia’s EDO systems already operate at scale domestically, but interoperability gaps remain. Digital invoices and electronic bills of lading are not always recognized by the systems and force manual checks, despite efforts to enforce interoperability of the national payment systems. Mutual recognition of digital formats and alignment of documentation standards would remove much of this disfunction.

Fourthly, the sanctions restrictions have caused legal ambiguity that affects decisions at every level. Companies must decide on contract structure, payment routing, shipment insurance, and risk allocation. However, legal boundaries often allow differing interpretations, which causes a cautious response. Even legally permissible transactions face delays because the cost of error is high. This cautious overcompliance may not appear in trade data, but it continues to influence commercial activity.

A coordinated, sanctions-aware framework would not remove risks, but would define them more clearly. Standard clauses, model structures, and clearer allocation of responsibilities would allow businesses to proceed with greater confidence.

Fifthly, an equally important challenge is banking and transactional legal interoperability. Russian banks, such as Sberbank and VTB, now operate actively in India, while Indian banks have enabled trade through special vostro accounts approved by the Reserve Bank of India for rupee-based settlements. These mechanisms have kept transactions moving. Yet uncertainty persists around non-SWIFT systems, particularly concerning the legal moment of settlement and applicable compliance requirements. In practice, Indian public sector banks have increasingly assumed a quasi-regulatory role, sometimes imposing excessive requirements, including confirmation of non-SDN status from Russian parties that are often not in a legal position to provide such assurances. This creates operational deadlocks; a delayed or disputed payment can disrupt entire supply chains.

Russia is tightening oversight of the financial flows, including stricter regulation of cryptocurrency-related activity. A bilateral protocol clarifying settlement finality, recognition of alternative messaging systems, and compliance norms would make existing channels more reliable. Another practical step could involve joint working groups between the Russian and Indian Ministries of Finance tasked with issuing operational clarifications for categories of market participants and commodity classes.

Sixthly, investment and corporate law complexity continues to limit deeper engagement. While Russia-India trade has grown, long-term investments remain modest. Companies are cautious as they face layered regulation, ownership restrictions in some sectors, taxation ambiguity, and repatriation and exit uncertainty. The India–Russia Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement, in force since 1998, already provides a framework to avoid double taxation through tax credits and rules on permanent establishment. However, parts of it remain under-used. More consistent application of permanent establishment thresholds and faster use of mutual agreement procedures could reduce disputes, improve tax certainty, and support investment. The issue is less about formal openness and more about clarity in application.

Finally, the burden of legal complexity falls most heavily on small and medium enterprises (SMEs). Larger firms can manage regulatory differences through dedicated teams. SMEs often cannot. Many depend on intermediaries, raising costs and reducing control. The absence of standardized contracts, limited familiarity with international commercial terms, and complex customs procedures create barriers. Practical steps can help. Bilingual contract templates for common transactions would provide a clear starting point. Clear guidance on Incoterms and simplified customs procedures for smaller consignments would lower entry barriers. Faster, lower-cost dispute resolution would ensure that smaller firms are not excluded due to legal costs.

In all these areas, the core issue is effective coordination.

Russia and India have established national legal systems of their own strength. The challenge arises when these systems interact without a shared framework. Businesses do not need identical laws; they need predictability. They need to know how a clause will be interpreted, how a shipment will be processed, and how a payment will be settled.

Russia-India economic engagement has moved from exploratory trade into a sustained cooperation at scale. Legal alignment will determine whether this cooperation continues smoothly or face limits. The task is to reduce uncertainty where it matters most. When contracts are clearer, certifications are recognized, documents move smoothly, payments settle with confidence, and smaller firms can participate without excessive burden, the relationship becomes easier to sustain.

The opportunity is already vivid in the performance figures. The next step is to ensure that the legal framework supports this progress. Without institutional and regulatory coordination, the difficulties will persist. One practical starting point could be a bilateral model contract approved by both countries’ ministries of justice, which would cover sanctions-related force majeure, governing law, and streamlined arbitration, while leaving technical implementation issues to working groups rather than political summits.

There will be much talk this May about the so-called “strategic triangle” of Russia, China and the United States. US President Donald Trump is expected in Beijing first, followed by Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit to his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping. Whenever the leaders of the three most influential powers meet, speculation inevitably follows. What if they strike some grand bargain? What if the world suddenly becomes more orderly?

Such expectations are misplaced. The restructuring of the global system is already under way, and it isn’t a process that can be halted or reversed by summit diplomacy. Even so, turning points in history can unfold in different ways; carefully managed, or recklessly accelerated. That’s what makes the coming meetings significant.

Both Russia and the United States are now deeply involved in large-scale military confrontations. The importance of these conflicts lies not only in their scope, but in their broader consequences for the international system. China, by contrast, has historically kept its distance from such entanglements. Yet it is becoming increasingly clear in Beijing that it can’t remain insulated from their effects. Discussions at the recent Valdai Club conference in Shanghai suggested that China is reassessing its position.

At the center of this reassessment is a simple question: what, if anything, is still possible in relations with Washington?

For decades, China’s rise was closely tied to its economic relationship with the United States. The arrangement sometimes described as “Chimerica,” American capital and technology combined with Chinese labor and manufacturing, formed the backbone of globalization.

It wasn’t an equal partnership, but it was mutually beneficial. For a long time, it seemed that basic economic self-interest would prevent either side from undermining it.

That assumption has now collapsed.

By the late 2000s, dissatisfaction in Washington was already evident. The United States increasingly viewed the arrangement not as a source of shared gains, but as a structural imbalance. Over time, the accumulation of tensions, economic and strategic, reached a point where incremental adjustments were no longer sufficient. What followed was a qualitative shift in the system itself.

For several decades, the global order operated largely in the interests of the United States as the leader of the Western bloc. Its gradual erosion now threatens those advantages. Washington’s response has been to use the current period of transition to secure as much of a head start as possible for the future.

Donald Trump has become the most visible embodiment of this approach. His rhetoric, openly transactional and even boastful, may appear unconventional, but the underlying logic predates him. The objective is clear: maximize immediate gains and build up national capacity as quickly as possible. Then use that accumulated strength to dominate the next phase of global competition.

This represents a sharp departure from the earlier American strategy, which prioritized long-term investments in the international system. Those investments didn’t always produce immediate returns, but they reinforced a framework that ultimately benefited the United States more than anyone else. Today, the emphasis has shifted toward short-term advantage, even at the risk of longer-term instability.

Whether this strategy will succeed remains uncertain. The initial phase has already produced setbacks. But the broader direction is unlikely to change. Future administrations may adopt a different tone, but they will operate within the same constraints. The liberal international order won’t return, not because of Trump’s personality, but because the conditions that sustained it no longer exist.

For other major powers, including China, this has profound implications. The idea of a comprehensive “big deal” with the United States, one that stabilizes the global system for years to come, has effectively become unrealistic.

Trump’s frequent use of the word “deal” is revealing. In his vocabulary, it’s more than a mere strategic concept but a commercial one. A deal is “big” not because it is durable or all-encompassing, but because of the scale of immediate gain it delivers. And like any commercial transaction, it can be abandoned if a more desirable opportunity presents itself.

Under such conditions, long-term agreements on the structure of world order are impossible. Washington is unlikely to commit to any arrangement that limits its flexibility before it has secured what it considers a sufficient advantage.

This is not necessarily a product of malice or arrogance. It is, in its own way, a rational response to a period of extreme uncertainty. The United States is seeking to preserve the foundations of its future dominance by acting decisively in the present.

But rationality on one side forces adaptation on the other.

If key players conclude that stable agreements with Washington are unattainable, their behavior changes. Military capability becomes more important as a safeguard against pressure. At the same time, interest grows in alternative forms of cooperation. That is, frameworks that operate independently of the United States and are insulated from its influence.

This logic isn’t new, but it’s gaining urgency. Russia has been advocating for such arrangements for several years. China, by contrast, has approached the idea with caution, hoping instead to preserve some form of mutually beneficial relationship with the United States. That hope now appears to be fading.

The upcoming visits to Beijing will provide a useful indication of how far this shift has progressed.

The meeting between Trump and Xi will likely define the limits of a temporary accommodation between two powers that remain economically intertwined, yet increasingly distrustful of one another. The question is no longer whether a comprehensive agreement is possible, but what narrow, short-term arrangements can be reached, and how long they will last.

Putin’s subsequent talks with Xi will address a different issue: the extent to which Russia and China are prepared to develop mechanisms of cooperation that bypass the United States altogether. Moscow has been moving in this direction for some time. Beijing now appears to be considering whether it must follow.

May will not produce a grand bargain. But it may show, more clearly than before, how the world is adjusting to the absence of one.

This article was first published by the magazine Profile, and was translated and edited by the RT team.

Is it possible to create a new reserve currency as an alternative to the U.S. dollar? The topic is controversial. Some believe that it is not, others think that it is even undesirable. I am one of the few who believe that it is not only desirable and possible, but perhaps indispensable.

I first wrote about the need for a new reserve currency in August 2023[1], and since then has elaborated the idea in detail[2]. In this article, I will outline some of its main points. As an innovative alternative, it certainly needs improvement and is open to criticism.

In modern history, the role of international currencies has usually been played by national currencies, and only few were specially designed to serve this function (issued and managed by a national central bank, or by a regional bank, like the euro). Since the issuing country’s objectives do not usually coincide with others’, the international currency can rarely serve the interests of other nations.

Today, we need to create a new international currency that would not perform national functions. Before discussing its characteristics, let me show why there are no efficient ready-made alternatives.

Discarding Options

The options now available are either inconvenient or unlikely.

One would be to continue living in a world dominated globally by the U.S. dollar (and, regionally, by the euro). However, the U.S. dollar system is inefficient, unreliable, and even dangerous. It has become an instrument of blackmail and sanctions. The precariousness of the monetary, fiscal, and financial foundations of the U.S. economy is becoming increasingly clear. This does not suit the emerging economies of the Global South.

Can the U.S. dollar be replaced, at least partly, by some other national or regional currency of the Global North? This scenario is not feasible on a large scale. The euro, compromised as an instrument of sanctions, suffers from the same problems as the U.S. dollar. Europe’s economic situation is even more problematic than that of the U.S.

The Japanese yen has similar problems: the Japanese economy is not doing well and does not inspire confidence. Besides, the yen has never played a major international role. Other national currencies of the Global North are either too small (e.g., the Swiss franc, the Canadian or Australian dollar) or suffer from the country’s economic weakness (the British pound sterling).

As for gold, it can replace the U.S. dollar only partially, as a reserve asset for central banks and other economic agents. However, its high price volatility, caused by the widespread nervousness about the U.S. dollar, makes this option unreliable.

There are two preconditions for the renminbi’s internationalization: free convertibility and China’s willingness to allow a large exchange rate appreciation. The Chinese government is hesitant on both—and rightly so. In the Chinese case, free convertibility would essentially mean removing capital controls—a central element of China’s economic policy in recent decades that has greatly contributed to its stability. The renminbi’s external appreciation would threaten the competitiveness of exports, one of the main factors of the Chinese economy’s dynamism. Moreover, in recent years China has seen deflation in wholesale prices and close-to-zero inflation in consumer prices, so a sharp rise of the renminbi may put the economy in a deflationary trap and at associated risk of recession.

There also remains the question of whether other countries of the Global South would want the renminbi, just another national currency, to replace the U.S. dollar and the People’s Bank of China, another national central bank, to replace the U.S. Federal Reserve. With China issuing an international reserve asset on a large scale, the rest of the world would continue to experience, albeit perhaps in a milder way, the same problems it now has with the U.S. dollar.

In any case (and there are more possible options), creation of a new reserve currency faces challenges—geopolitical (fundamentally, the U.S.’s resistance) and technical (building a trustworthy monetary institutional and operational structure is no easy task). But we need to address this task, not least because we cannot rule out a major financial crisis of the Western capital markets in the coming years, e.g., associated with artificial intelligence and technology companies. If this happens, the decline of the U.S. economy and dollar, will accelerate. Everyone will be scrambling for a solution. So, we’d better look for it today.

A Possible Path

Theoretically, one way would be to back the new currency with gold, as suggested by Russian economists. However, they have so far not solved the main problem this alternative entails: how to ensure a new currency’s stability while supporting it with an eminently unstable asset. If there is a solution, it is beyond my knowledge.

It seems more appropriate to back the new currency in the way I briefly discuss below.

The first question to address is who would create the new currency. In the current international circumstances, there seems to be only one possibility—a group of 15 to 20 Global South countries, including BRICS members and other middle-income countries. Yet none of them can accomplish this mission reliably by delegating the issuance of a new reserve currency to an existing financial institution.

Thus, a new international financial institution—an issuing bank—must be established with the sole and exclusive function of issuing the new currency and putting it in circulation. This bank would not replace national central banks, and its currency would circulate in parallel with the national currencies of the sponsoring countries and other national and regional currencies. Its operations would include international transactions only, excluding domestic ones. Contrary to what is often suggested, it cannot be a euro-type currency, i.e., a single currency issued by a single central bank which replaced national currencies (Deutsche Mark, French franc, Italian lira, etc.).

There are other questions, too. How can we ensure the success of a new international currency? What would make it widely used? The essential thing is to ensure confidence, and this depends on how the new monetary arrangement will be constructed institutionally.

The way that seems most viable to me should be based, among other things, on five legal guarantees: 1) the currency’s stability in terms of value; 2) its non-use as an instrument of sanctions or pressure; 3) operational autonomy of the issuing bank; 4) maximum limit for its issuance; and 5) backing by a basket of the sponsoring countries’ government bonds.

Let me briefly describe these five points.

First, the currency should be based on a weighted basket of the participating countries’ currencies, with its fluctuations following the changes in these currencies. Since all currencies in the basket would be floating or flexible, the new currency would also be a floating currency. The weights in the basket would be determined by the share of each country’s PPP GDP in the total GDP of the sponsor group.

The new reserve currency’s exchange rate is expected to be relatively stable since China accounts for at least 40-45% of the total (depending on the exact composition of the group). The renminbi’s relative weight in the basket would provide certain stability, given the stability of the Chinese currency. Another endogenous factor of its stability is that the basket would be formed by currencies of both exporters and importers of commodities, i.e., countries standing at the opposite sides of the commodity price cycle. These factors could be further reinforced by establishing a weighted, geometrically and symmetrically trimmed, average. Currencies with large fluctuations, beyond pre-established limits, would be temporarily excluded from the basket.

Second, the participating countries would make an explicit commitment to non-use of sanctions. This would contrast with the insecurity caused the abusive use of the U.S. dollar and the euro for punishment and blackmail. This legal guarantee would be reinforced by the issuing bank’s operational autonomy.

Third, to ensure the bank’s operational autonomy and avoid political interference and diplomatic maneuvering by its founders, its president and vice-presidents should be granted long terms (e.g., five years). This kind of guaranteed autonomy, typical of international financial organizations, does not fully protect the bank from interference, but it has its advantages.

The institution’s management could be overseen by and accountable to the Board of Governors and on the Board of Directors designated by the sponsoring countries. The oversight and accountability should be implemented through normal institutional channels, not through the president and vice presidents’ individual pressure.

Fourth, a limit should be set to the amount of the new currency circulated by the bank as a safeguard against excessive issuance. The new international currency would thus have a constraint that the U.S. dollar does not have. Yet this ceiling is secondary to the most important instrument—back-up of the new currency.

Fifth, therefore, is the importance of defining a proper procedure for creating a basket of national bonds of the founding countries and those that will join later. The issuing bank would issue the new reserve currency (NRC) and new reserve bonds (NRB), whose interest rates would be attractive as they would reflect the interest rates on the bonds of the participating nations, all of which are higher than the rates on the bonds in the U.S. dollars and euros. The NRC would be fully convertible into NRBs. The high weight of the Chinese currency, issued by a country with a solid economy, would raise confidence in the NRC’s backing and help stabilize the new currency’s average exchange rate.

The West’s Reaction

The proposal has its vulnerabilities, discussed in detail in [2]. Here let me just note the most significant one: the initiative may provoke negative reactions from the West, which can resort to threats and sanctions. This risk is real: today the declining West is more violent than ever before.

Yet we must decide now whether we are going to live indefinitely with the Western increasingly dysfunctional monetary system used as a geopolitical tool, or we will gather economic, political, and intellectual efforts to get out of this trap.

The next few years will tell whether Global South countries are up to this challenge.

The defeat of Viktor Orban and his Fidesz party in Hungary’s parliamentary election shouldn’t be seen as a shock. Opinion polls had long pointed in this direction. Nor should the outcome be divorced from a simple political reality: sixteen consecutive years in power, twenty in total, is an exceptionally long tenure by the standards of Central and Eastern Europe. Fatigue with familiar faces is inevitable, and psychologically understandable.

Yet the result contains a paradox. Orban’s defeat appears, in some ways, to confirm the very trend he has come to embody: the primacy of the national agenda, “my country first.” In recent years, particularly since the escalation of the Ukraine conflict, Hungary’s sovereignist approach has become deeply entangled with external issues. Opposition to the European Commission’s line on Ukraine, justified in Budapest as a defense of Hungarian interests, led to sustained confrontation with both Brussels and Kiev. What began as a domestic political stance increasingly played out on the international stage.

This dynamic shaped the election campaign. Orban’s camp leaned heavily on external themes, portraying Ukraine and its leadership, especially Vladimir Zelensky, as central antagonists. His opponents took the opposite approach. They focused on domestic concerns: living standards, and the promise of restoring smoother relations with the EU as a pathway to improving everyday life. Whether that promise proves justified is another matter, but it resonated with voters. The message was entirely consistent with the logic of sovereignty, only turned inward rather than outward.

It’s also notable what didn’t matter. The visit to Budapest by US Vice President J.D. Vance, along with repeated expressions of support from Donald Trump and his circle, appears to have had no measurable impact. This, too, fits the pattern: overt external endorsement rarely helps in national elections.

Indeed, Trump’s team has so far failed to influence outcomes in any European country where it has attempted to intervene, including Romania and Germany. External pressure, regardless of its source, cannot substitute for domestic political conditions.

That said, external actors were not absent. The Western European mainstream, as usual, worked against Orban where possible. But such involvement has long been a structural feature of European politics. Without underlying domestic factors, it’s rarely decisive.

There were, however, surprises in the details. Fidesz had anticipated potential losses in the proportional vote but expected to retain strength in single-member districts. The opposite occurred. The party’s relative resilience in the lists contrasted with a collapse at the constituency level. This suggests that, at a local level, voters viewed opposition candidates as more attuned to their immediate concerns, and less associated with a government perceived as preoccupied with broader geopolitical battles.

In Brussels and other Western European capitals, the mood is celebratory. Orban had become a persistent irritant, an obstacle to consensus and, at times, to policy itself. His departure will be framed symbolically as a triumph of liberal integration over a disruptive and illiberal figure, often portrayed as aligned with Moscow and Washington’s more nationalist wing.

The incoming government will be expected to demonstrate its credentials quickly. Chief among these expectations is the unblocking of the €90 billion package for Ukraine, something that will likely happen without delay.

From Moscow’s perspective, this isn’t welcome news. Yet it would be naïve to assume that the European Commission would have been unable to advance its agenda had Orban remained. Mechanisms to bypass obstruction were already under discussion.

Beyond these immediate questions, however, the direction of Hungary’s new government remains unclear. Peter Magyar’s campaign bore many of the hallmarks of a personal project. The composition of his cabinet, the balance of power within it, and its concrete priorities are still unknown.

More importantly, the structural realities facing Hungary haven’t changed. Geography and the broader geopolitical environment impose constraints that cannot be wished away. Magyar has already acknowledged the need for dialogue with Russia, a recognition that reflects practical necessity rather than ideological alignment. Whether this pragmatism can coexist with expectations from Brussels and Kiev remains to be seen.

Orban’s defeat is therefore symbolically significant, but its practical implications are far less certain. Hungary’s new leadership will have to navigate the same complex and often unfavorable conditions as its predecessor. The difference may lie less in the direction of policy than in the manner in which it’s presented.

In that sense, the election may mark not a fundamental shift, but a recalibration. The slogan may change. The constraints will not.

This article was first published by Rossiyskaya Gazeta, and was translated and edited by the RT team. 

Donald Trump has declared the start of a new “golden age” in the Middle East after announcing a ceasefire with Iran. The war, at least for now, has been paused. And while predictions are always risky with this White House, there is at least a chance that the fighting will not immediately resume.

That alone matters. A prolonged war would raise risks for everyone, but above all for Washington. For all the bombast coming from the US administration, America has always been deeply uncomfortable with prolonged uncertainty and strategic risk. It is one thing to threaten. It is another to endure the consequences when threats fail.

The precise terms of the ceasefire remain unclear and may not yet be fully agreed. But the central political fact is already visible: Faced with determined resistance, the US stepped back.

None of the sweeping demands set out at the start of the operation were met. Trump’s all-caps demand for Iran’s “UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER!” now looks more like political theater than strategic doctrine. Yet behind the social media drama, something more rational prevailed in Washington: When pressure fails, it is better to retreat than to escalate into a situation you may no longer control.

The feverish rhetoric before the truce served a purpose. It allowed Washington to claim that Tehran had blinked, while creating such a sense of looming catastrophe that any pause in fighting could be sold as relief. The White House will now try to present restraint as victory.

This conflict is undoubtedly a milestone in the wider transformation of the international system. But it is not the end of that process. Nor is it the final chapter in the struggle for the Middle East. Iran, above all, has demonstrated resilience. It has completely undermined the core assumption behind the US-Israeli campaign, namely that a sufficiently powerful blow would be enough to bring down the Islamic Republic or force it into submission.

Tehran’s response was not spectacular in the conventional military sense, but it was effective. Iran widened the theater of tension and signaled that the costs of escalation would not be confined to military targets. It forced its opponents to reckon not only with Iranian retaliation, but with the fragility of the wider regional system.

This matters because the endurance of the US and its regional partners is limited. Iran’s, by contrast, has historically been much greater.

The so-called Axis of Resistance also proved more durable than many had assumed. Despite the serious damage inflicted by Israel over the past two years, pro-Iranian forces in Lebanon, Yemen, and Iraq remain a strategic factor. Even where they did not intervene directly, they raised the temperature and forced the attackers to remain on edge.

The broader effort to neutralize Iranian influence has therefore backfired. Iran has emerged bloodied but still standing. Even if Tehran’s claims that any settlement must happen on its terms are partly negotiating tactics, one thing is already clear: Iran’s regional weight has not diminished in the way Washington and West Jerusalem intended.

Negotiations with Tehran are now unavoidable. The real question is what Iran itself wants.

Its previous strategy of regional expansion contributed to many of the crises now engulfing the Middle East. There is also the unresolved issue of its nuclear program. What exactly is Iran seeking, and what price is it prepared to pay? Iran appears to have entered a new internal phase as well, with power shifting further toward security institutions. That leadership will now have to weigh ambition against reality.

For the wider region, the implications are profound.

The Gulf monarchies have had a sobering experience. There will be no return to the comfortable old formula in which security could simply be outsourced to Washington in exchange for money and loyalty. That arrangement, which underpinned the region since the Cold War, has been badly shaken.

Publicly, the Gulf states are unlikely to make dramatic gestures. But privately, their search for new hedges and new partners will intensify. China, South Asia, Russia and, to a lesser extent, Western Europe will all become more important in their calculations.

That doesn’t mean the Gulf will accept Iranian dominance. The monarchies will not tolerate Tehran having unchecked influence over the Persian Gulf or the ability to dictate terms in the Strait of Hormuz. Their policy is likely to become more complex: containing Iran where possible while engaging with it where necessary.

Israel, meanwhile, has not achieved its stated aims either. However loudly victory is proclaimed, the basic strategic reality has not changed. The Iranian factor remains. It has not been eliminated, nor weakened enough for Israel to feel genuinely secure.

The domestic consequences for the US are harder to judge. Trump’s self-congratulation already rings hollow, but much will depend on economics. If oil markets stabilize, the White House will try to move on quickly and insist disaster was averted thanks to Trump’s leadership. Whether that helps Republicans in the November midterms is unclear.

Still, Trump has always had one instinct his critics often underestimate: He knows how to survive setbacks and reframe them.

The larger conclusion, however, goes beyond Trump. The US remains immensely powerful. Its military reach, financial leverage and ability to shape events are still formidable. But they are not limitless. America can still influence outcomes but can no longer simply impose its will at any cost.

That lesson has now been absorbed far beyond Tehran. Allies and adversaries alike will draw their own conclusions. Iran may be a special case, but a precedent has been set.

This is another step toward a different world, one in which coercion is less decisive and the old assumptions about American omnipotence increasingly obsolete. Trump may wish to replace a liberal American-led order with an illiberal one under US dominance. But the events of recent weeks suggest something else: a world moving beyond any order Washington can fully control.

This article was first published by Rossiyskaya Gazeta, and was translated and edited by the RT team.

When President Trump made the fateful decision at the end of February to go into Iran with full force and decapitate its leadership, there were a number of likely consequences to that decision that the President, apparently, did not fully take into consideration. Foremost among these was Iran’s effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz, putting a stranglehold on a critical route of international trade and hence the global economy – an outcome which had been widely discussed and expected beforehand but which, as Trump himself has stated, took him by surprise. It soon became clear that the President had expected a quick and decisive victory in Iran and didn’t fully consider the potential fallout of failing to achieve that. 

But it’s not only the consequences of failure that the President and his advisors seem not to have fully considered. It’s also certain consequences of the operation’s success, or even of its having been undertaken at all – especially the success of its decapitation strike, during negotiations, on Iran’s top leaders at the outset. One such consequence is the chilling effect that this move was likely to have on one of the top declared priorities of Trump’s presidency: improved relations with Russia and a negotiated peace in Ukraine. It’s not clear whether he is personally aware – as many of his advisors must be – of certain foreboding undercurrents in Russian political sentiment that have been developing and gaining ground over the past two or three years, and which his invasion of Iran has almost certainly exacerbated.  

Being vaguely aware of these currents among Russia’s military and political elite, and wanting to learn more about what impact the US attack on Iran has had on the political mood within Russia, Jonathan McCormick (Marker) spoke with Fyodor Lukyanov, Editor-in-Chief of the influential foreign affairs journal Russia in Global Affairs. 

Jonathan McCormick (Marker): There’s been a lot of discussion about the impact of the war with Iran on the economies and strategic objectives of various countries. And in all these discussions, Russia seems always to come out on top. From your perspective, how has the Iran crisis actually impacted Russia, and the political mood within the country? 

Fyodor A. Lukyanov: Of course this is closely watched in Russia. And I would say the impact is ambivalent. I know that in the West, many commentators assume that what is going on with Iran is favourable for Russia. And it’s true that economically, of course, we see oil prices going up – which is pretty important for the Russian budget at this point, because we have economic problems. And additionally, there’s a further sense that the whole attention of the United States and the Europeans will be diverted from Ukraine, and that the capacity to deliver arms to Ukraine might be limited. Both points are fair. But I don’t believe many people in Russia think that these are significant factors in the long term, or even the medium term. Because what the Americans and Israelis have done has caused a major disruption, obviously. And Trump miscalculated heavily, expecting an easy and quick defeat of the Iranian regime, which of course didn’t happen. And now no one knows how to get out of this.

It looks like Trump cannot simply declare victory and go home, because Iran has demonstrated the efficiency and the capacity to block the most important strategic sea route in the world. And if Trump allows Iran to get away with this, it would mean a significant blow, a huge blow to the prestige of the United States.

So now the Americans have to do something to unblock it, and to guarantee for the future that something like this will not happen again. And that’s a very risky operation. I can imagine the Americans will simply have to do it, but it’s very risky. But anyway, this is the short term outlook. In Russia, many people are looking at it through a more long term lens. And from this perspective, the whole thing could be pretty devastating for international relations at large. 

Jonathan McCormick (Marker): Well, on that point, the US has actually made a series of aggressive moves recently: first Venezuela, then Cuba – which is ongoing, the Americans may well invade – and now Iran. And in the case of Iran, the US attacked and killed their leaders while actually in negotiations with them. And of course, Russia is also in negotiations with the US. How does this sort of thing affect diplomatic relations, especially with countries like Russia that have an adversarial relationship with the United States? Are people in Russia looking closely at this? Are they worried about it? 

Fyodor A. Lukyanov: Yes, absolutely. People both at the top, and in the more rank and file public, have come to a couple of conclusions based on what happened this year, starting with Venezuela and then all the other moves. First of all, as you said, diplomacy has been discredited – heavily, massively. Because what the Americans and Israelis have demonstrated – with the Americans in the lead – is that negotiations do not mean anything. It can happen that those with whom they’re negotiating will be killed immediately, even during the negotiations. This was already demonstrated to a lesser extent last year when the Israelis attacked Iran, and even more so when they tried to kill the Hamas negotiating team in Doha, in an attack on Qatar. Which was absolutely outrageous, of course. And as you said, these same people, the same US negotiators, are conducting negotiations with Russia. Of course, Russia and Iran are different, it’s not exactly the same. But the aftertaste of that is strong. So it will be pretty difficult for Mr Kushner and Mr Witkoff to fully regain trust. Secondly – and from my point of view, this is more important and more dangerous for the international situation – the very fact of the possibility of a decapitation strike, which at once eliminates everybody, the whole political leadership – this is being very seriously considered here. First of all, because it is seen as proof that the Americans are actually capable of doing anything. It’s a kind of lawlessness. Whatever they imagine is to their benefit, they will do. 

Jonathan McCormick (Marker): In terms of assassinations and decapitation strikes, that sort of thing? 

Fyodor A. Lukyanov: Yes, assassinations of leaders – which until recently was not very common. Maybe historically, but not in the 20th century for example. But in Russia, this is having an additional impact. Beginning in 2022, and especially since 2023, we’ve been having an interesting, and somewhat terrifying, debate here in Russia, about the nuclear factor. Some have been arguing that in the case of real trouble, Russia should be ready to use nuclear weapons, even without any nuclear provocation from the other side. The debate was launched by certain commentators and scholars – in particular by Professor Karaganov, a senior colleague of mine. Of course, the idea is not to persuade the whole leadership to use nuclear weapons. Rather it’s the opposite – to avoid this scenario, by lowering the threshold for usage, as a credible deterrent. And to some extent the debate has had an impact, because Russia did correct the concept of its nuclear policy – not in support of immediate usage, but as suggested, the threshold was lowered. Of course, it’s a big debate. I would not say that the people arguing for that view are in the majority here, not at all. But after what happened in Iran, I think the national leadership has moved, at least psychologically, closer to the position of people like Professor Karaganov. Because they see that nuclear arms – the red button, the final red button – might be the only guarantee, the only means against such an aggressive policy. You remember from Cold War times, the whole system of the “dead hand” that could still launch a nuclear attack even after its own country had been annihilated – there’s that famous movie by Stanley Kubrick, Dr. Strangelove. I don’t insist, of course, that we are moving towards that. But again, with the psychological impact of such behaviour on international politics, in particular within Russia, we’re looking at very disturbing scenarios now which we couldn’t imagine a couple of years ago. 

Jonathan McCormick (Marker): Some months ago there was an incident where it looked like Putin’s residence in Valdai was targeted by a drone strike. And I remember there was a general feeling coming out of Russia that the Americans were likely involved – which of course led people to doubt the sincerity of American negotiations. From your perspective, did this incident have a serious impact on how Russians view the Americans? 

Fyodor A. Lukyanov: You know, it’s difficult to judge, because this episode was put on a very high level initially. And we remember some moves – including when Russia’s chief of military intelligence personally visited the US Embassy in Moscow to deliver some documents proving that it was an attack. But the Americans disregarded that. They said they didn’t receive sufficient evidence that this was the case. 

Jonathan McCormick (Marker): I believe he gave them some actual electronics containing targeting data, didn’t they? 

Fyodor A. Lukyanov: Yes, some sort of chip. But paradoxically, the issue then disappeared. We heard no more about it – either in the Russian political position, or in their negotiations, or continued statements. So, I don’t know what that was.

But, of course, as we already discussed, what happened in Iran has demonstrated to many Russians that there are absolutely no limits to what the Americans might be willing to do. They’ll do whatever they think is good for themselves, and that’s it. And this is being projected onto everything else – including Ukraine, of course.

And the Maduro case – that was something else again. To some extent, it was more shocking – because we had already seen the killing of leaders. We saw it done by the Israelis in Lebanon and in Iran. But just to abduct a functioning head of state – that’s quite new. 

Jonathan McCormick (Marker): Russia has been supporting Iran throughout this conflict – at least, it seems, in terms of providing critical intelligence. And as the situation has escalated – and in response to certain extreme threats made by Trump toward Iran – Russia has at least once issued a strong statement warning the US against a certain course of action. Do you or others in Russia perceive any risk that this situation could lead to a direct confrontation with the US?

Fyodor A. Lukyanov: Not really. It’s not necessarily the case that we would get into a direct confrontation with the US over this particular issue. It’s true that early last year, a couple of months before the 12-day war, Russia signed a treaty – a strategic partnership – with Iran. This treaty is pretty cautiously formulated, and it’s not binding, I would say. And to be accurate about the Russian position, Russia is in a pretty delicate situation here. Because the Russian leadership actually has a rather tense relationship with Iran – and at the same time basically a good working relationship, and a very extensive one, with the Gulf monarchies. Russia has a lot of converging and diverging interests with Turkey.

Russia has a not very good relationship, but an extensive one, with Israel. And in the case of Putin and Netanyahu – I don’t know whether they like or dislike each other, but they normally understand each other very well, because both are pretty straight-to-the-point kind of guys.

Jonathan McCormick (Marker): And how would you characterize Russia’s current relationship with the Americans? 

Fyodor A. Lukyanov: With Trump, despite all the nuances we discussed earlier, Russia – and Putin in particular – doesn’t want to break with Trump, because at the end of the day there is still the expectation, the hope, that some kind of settlement can be negotiated between Russia and the US on Ukraine. I wouldn’t say it’s a very big chance, or a very high expectation, at this point. But still, it’s something. And Putin doesn’t want completely to disrupt his relationship with Trump. So within this complicated equilibrium of relations, it’s not so easy to know how to navigate in a proper manner. And I think that’s why Putin has been pretty silent. He hasn’t made any statements since the war against Iran began. He’s had a lot of phone calls, and phone diplomacy, and probably discussed certain things with all involved, but never public statements. It’s quite remarkable, really. So again, coming back to your question – at the end of the day, I don’t think Iran’s situation will create a casus belli for Russia to involve itself in a direct conflict with the United States. But the atmosphere is very, very complicated, and there’s a question as to how Russia will be able to manoeuvre through it.

Jonathan McCormick (Marker): In terms of the global impacts of the war with Iran – apart from energy, a lot of people are also worried about the possibility of a widespread threat to food security. And in the case of the Gulf States, even water security – if the desalination plants are destroyed. And all of this, of course, could lead to more wars. How are these issues being looked at inside Russia? 

Fyodor A. Lukyanov: In terms of Russia itself this is not a big problem, because Russia is self-sufficient when it comes to food security. We do have certain shortages and certain deficits – like for example, in the process of enhancing and improving the whole food industry. Many of those things that are needed have been imported from other countries, from Europe in particular. But in general, Russia can survive very easily in terms of food, even if isolated. But when it comes to the global situation – yes, this is serious indeed. The Ukrainian crisis, when it started, created problems – but they were more or less resolved. Partly by force – to be frank, Russia failed to isolate Ukraine from the world market. But also diplomatically – as despite all the hostility, Russia was not absolutely committed to this. So at the end of the day, it worked. This time it is worse, because we see a blockade of the world’s most important channel through which fertilizers come, and elements to produce fertilizers. And just now, at this time of year, when countries have to prepare for agricultural work – this is really bad. Especially for Asia – in countries like India, Bangladesh and others, this could be really disastrous if it continues. So Russia, of course, is ready to extend support to so-called “friendly countries”, those who did not introduce sanctions against Russia. But the problem is still pretty severe – because even if those countries quickly reorient their relationships toward other partners, like Russia, this cannot be accomplished easily or in a few days. It will take months to rearrange the whole system, and then it will be too late. So I think this is a real possibility, and one of the serious dangers we face. That’s why Trump is so nervous about this, and wants to stop it. But of course, in this situation, the blockade of Hormuz is the only means Iran can employ against the Americans. And of course, they will use it. 

Jonathan McCormick (Marker): Let’s talk a bit about Europe. Obviously Europe has been trying since 2022 to rid itself of all energy imports from Russia, and to a large extent has done so. But now, with the war in Iran and the closure of Hormuz, it seems Europe will be facing a critical energy situation. Is there any sense within Russia that Europe might come and ask to have its energy imports resumed? And what do you think Russia’s response would be if that happened?

Fyodor A. Lukyanov: Well, I think it’s pretty ambivalent on Russia’s side. On the one hand, to be frank, of course Russia would be very much interested in resuming exports to Europe, because those contracts and relations cannot be replaced. Not with Asia, not with anybody else. Asia might partially compensate for the loss of Europe, but not entirely. But at the same time, the European Union has proved itself to be an absolutely unreliable partner – a 200% unreliable partner. So unreliable, in fact, that it is ready to act against its own interests, even to its own harm – to damage itself, in order to punish Russia. And of course, this makes things very difficult.

Even if, theoretically, we assume that the Europeans now decide to come to Russia, it will be very difficult to restore trust, to restore confidence. Frankly, I don’t see it happening. And I cannot imagine how it could, because that would mean basically the elimination, the cancellation of the whole policy conducted by the European Union for more than four years now.

And this is not just a policy of confrontation with Russia, or simply the replacement of Russian energy. This is very much a principled position – even proclaimed early on as a holy war, a holy war between good and evil. And nothing has changed since then. Okay, they don’t say it as frequently as they used to do, but it’s still there. The Americans may be more flexible, insisting as they do that they want to negotiate a deal for both sides – that they are not on either side, and so on. Which may be hypocritical, but still, it shows some flexibility. But with Europe, it’s different. Europe is still committed to its initial position: Russia must not gain anything at all from this war – Russia has no right to gain anything. And the war should continue as long as it takes for Ukraine to win. This will be difficult, of course, in the context of a severe energy crisis, but I don’t see how they can change it. Maybe I’m underestimating the flexibility of some European politicians. But so far, they’ve never demonstrated this skill vis-à-vis Russia.

Jonathan McCormick (Marker): I believe the Belgian prime minister, Bart De Wever, has recently moved a bit in that direction. 

Fyodor A. Lukyanov: Yes – but I think, at the end of the day, it depends on one particular country. It depends on Germany. Because Germany was the biggest consumer. Germany had the most extended relationship with Russia, the biggest economic relationship, biggest energy relationship. And Germany was the key element of this new policy of cutting off Russia: We’ve cut it off completely, we can never restore it, we will never go back, and so on. And historically we know that in many respects, what happens in Germany defines the whole European political environment. So we will see. 

Jonathan McCormick (Marker): I want to ask about the ongoing dispute between Zelensky and Orban. It seems Ukraine is blocking Russian oil going to Hungary, Orban responded by vetoing the EU’s 90 billion euro loan to Ukraine, and Zelensky responded with a thinly veiled threat to kill Orban, or his family. And with Orban up for election this month – an election he could conceivably lose – the EU is trying very hard to use the opportunity to get rid of him. And so it looks like the whole future of the war in Ukraine could be hanging on the results of this one election. How are people in Russia looking at this situation? 

Fyodor A. Lukyanov: Well, this is, of course, a moment of glory for Hungary. Who could imagine that this local election, pretty small on the global scale, would make such a big noise? On the Ukrainian side, Zelensky believes that he can afford to do anything towards anybody because he is in the right – he is fighting against Russia, and so on. As for the election, I would neither underestimate nor overestimate its significance, or the significance of Orban’s position. I suppose that if he wins and remains in power, the European Union will do everything it can to find some way around him – although this will be not easy, because it will undermine many aspects of the European Union.

In Russia, I think this situation is seen as a symptom, as one more sign of how severe the gap is between all of us, and of how nervousness creates aggressiveness – from Ukraine towards Hungary, and from Europe towards Hungary and towards anyone they believe is pro-Russian. Although neither Orban nor Fico, for that matter, is really pro-Russian – they are simply trying to keep some kind of balance for their economies.

Jonathan McCormick (Marker): There are people who believe that all of this tension, all this splintering within the EU, is only going to get worse. How are people in Russia evaluating the future of the EU?

Fyodor A. Lukyanov: Of course, many people here discuss and speculate about the future of the European Union. And it seems clear that Orban per se, or Hungary per se, cannot undermine the European Union significantly. But we’re hearing more and more dissenting voices, for example from the Belgian prime minister, as you mentioned, or the Italian prime minister, Meloni, who is not in favour of what Trump is doing in Iran, for example. I think the European Union is in confusion – in a confused situation. To some extent this is bad for Russia, because a confused European Union – which is feeling serious problems regarding its own integration – needs the Russian menace, and needs Ukraine as a herald of the free world, in order to keep itself going and to deal with internal problems. It needs to divert public opinion away from its multiple internal troubles, and towards this issue of an imagined external threat. As we discussed earlier, some people – especially in the West – believe the Russians are very happy to see what is happening in the European Union. Okay, there might be some Schadenfreude, but on the whole Russians understand that an uncertain, nervous and confused European Union might become even less able to make rational decisions vis-à-vis Russia. 

Jonathan McCormick (Marker): Coming back to Ukraine – how do you see the future of that conflict, and its possible resolution? What do you think Ukraine will look like, and Russia-Ukraine relations, after this war is finished? It seems obvious there are nationalists in Ukraine that won’t accept any kind of settlement, and presumably they will still have weapons. How does this future look from your perspective? 

Fyodor A. Lukyanov: It’s a question which I can hardly answer, because the outcome of this war – the endgame – is still not clear. In spite of the fact that Russia generally prevails on the battlefield, this advantage has not been enough to achieve a breakthrough. It’s not easy for us to admit, but the Ukrainians are resisting pretty bravely. Nobody can be sure that it will end anytime soon – for example with the collapse of Ukrainian defences or the Ukrainian state. This could happen, because the severity of internal problems within Ukraine is huge. It’s really enormous, and it’s growing – in terms of demography, in terms of everything. But no one knows when. And to be honest, Russia is suffering some problems as well. The whole situation has turned into a full-scale attrition war, and there’s no telling how long it will continue. I think we are approaching a point where the situation will be clarified, either diplomatically or militarily – but again, I don’t dare to guess.

What is clear, however, about any post-war Ukraine-Russia situation, is that any Ukraine that will still be in place after the war – reduced, exhausted, destroyed, whatever – any remaining Ukraine will be an arch-enemy of Russia. And it will be something worse than the India-Pakistan situation.

Jonathan McCormick (Marker): Worse than India-Pakistan? 

Fyodor A. Lukyanov: Yes, worse. It will be similar, but much worse, because of the closeness of the two countries – because of many things. And I think many people here understand that if Ukraine remains in place – however this war ends – Ukraine will pose a very long-term problem and threat to Russia. And there’s no reason to believe that Ukraine will disappear or be totally destroyed. And that’s why some people here argue that we shouldn’t stop – even if it’s difficult, even if it’s costly, we should continue. Because otherwise, we will create a huge precondition for another war to happen pretty soon. And that war might be much worse than this one, because then it will be a war between Russia and NATO, not between Russia and Ukraine. And so that’s part of the current debate. I wouldn’t say it’s the only view, but that’s what you can hear in Moscow and in many other places.

Jonathan McCormick (Marker): Is there still actually a worry that Ukraine could end up joining NATO? Because it seems to me that a lot of people on the European side have pretty much given up on that. 

Fyodor A. Lukyanov: No, not necessarily joining NATO. Because NATO has no appetite for it, because Ukraine has finally realized it’s a bad idea, because the Americans are absolutely not in favour of it, and so on. But the question of formal NATO integration is just a symbol – it’s not something that actually matters. The scale to which Ukraine is already part of the Western military and political machine is enough. You don’t need to be formally integrated into NATO. What’s probably more important for the Ukrainians is the European Union. Because if they were to join, that would create new opportunities. But frankly, I simply cannot imagine that the European Union would accept such a Ukraine. That would ruin the European Union completely, both economically and politically. 

Jonathan McCormick (Marker): So when you say Russia is worried they could be at war with NATO next time, you’re not talking about Ukrainian membership – you mean a direct war with NATO? 

Fyodor A. Lukyanov: Yes, I mean a war with NATO. Because the European part of NATO will never, in a sense, surrender – they will never accept the fact that this war brought about this result. And in the event that a new war does erupt after some time, I’m afraid that this new war will be much harder. There will be much more mutual hatred, even compared to what we have today. A postponed hatred is sometimes worse than the present one. 

Jonathan McCormick (Marker): You mentioned earlier that Orban and Fico are kind of exceptional in that they’re not really pro-Russian, but are pragmatic and looking after their own economies, which involves having decent relations with Russia. Does Russia see Hungary and Slovakia today as somehow different from the rest of Europe? And what do you think Russia’s attitude will be towards these countries in the context of future situations or confrontations? 

Fyodor A. Lukyanov: Yes, indeed, Russia sees Hungary and Slovakia as countries with a different position. And despite the fact that both countries are very small, they’ve demonstrated a very firm position, both of them. Which is, of course, appreciated in Russia very, very much. But having said that, realistically speaking, of course neither Hungary nor Slovakia, nor even a larger bunch of central European countries – which might include Czech Republic under Babiš, or I don’t know, maybe Bulgaria – would be enough to make an important, decisive influence on European policy. And to imagine a separate relationship between Russia and individual countries inside the European Union, countries that have different positions, that’s very difficult. Because how to go about this? These countries are so fully integrated into the European system that they are basically limited in their sovereign decision-making. Which was the whole idea, after all, of integration. Of course, in the middle-term perspective, I can guess – and many Russian experts expect – that the European Union will change as well. Because European integration, as it was designed in the 20th century and then developed in the 21st century, cannot survive. It will change.

I don’t mean the collapse of the European Union – I mean that the model of integration will need to change in order to correspond to what is now a completely different international environment.

And then we will see. But so far as I understand, there is absolutely no clear idea within Europe itself as to how to change it – neither among the establishment, nor among those so-called populist parties. Because the original model seemed to be forever – but now it is not.

Jonathan McCormick (Marker): Do you mean because of international pressures – the various wars, Ukraine and Iran, and now energy issues? The pressure on Europe because of all these things coming together? 

Fyodor A. Lukyanov: Yes, indeed, all these things are coming together. But I think the more important factor is that the whole idea of this European integration was designed for a peaceful world. Even during the Cold War – because the Cold War in Western Europe was actually pretty peaceful. There were a lot of fears, but it was a very stable, peaceful situation. And of course, after the Cold War, people believed that all the big threats were now gone. So this model was not designed for a wartime situation. And the world today is moving towards a situation of war in general – not just Iran, not just Ukraine, but in general. There is a very, very high level of hostilities, and at all levels. So Europe will have to change. 

Jonathan McCormick (Marker): You personally have been targeted by Europe and added to the EU’s sanctions list in December, along with a number of others. Did this surprise you? What do you think is behind it? And to what extent has it impacted your life? 

Fyodor A. Lukyanov: I did expect it, actually, because I’m a public person. I’m very much on the stage and the screen, and I appear once a year with the President of the Russian Federation. So the whole world sees me. And actually, if you read the explanation for the sanctions as written in the official document, I felt very much pleased. 

Jonathan McCormick (Marker): Pleased? 

Fyodor A. Lukyanov: Because it seems my role was highly appreciated – my role as a person who shapes Russian debate, who shapes Russian public opinion. I never believed I was that important. So I would like to thank the external service of the European Union for pointing this out. As to whether it’s had an impact on my life – to some extent, yes. Because I cannot travel to the European Union anymore. I haven’t done so anyway for quite some time, and I didn’t have any plans to do so, but still – before this, there was at least the possibility, and now that’s been ruled out. My only real disappointment is that my favourite city in the world, which I love passionately, is Rome. I think it’s absolutely the best city in the world, and unfortunately I can no longer visit it. As for practical life – yes, the sanctions of the European Union do have a certain impact on my capacity to make financial transactions – even with countries which are not part of the European Union. The influence of the Western world, both America and Europe, is quite big actually, even on places that are outside it. 

Jonathan McCormick (Marker): How do you perceive this step taken by the European Union, in terms of its actual effectiveness in bringing about some sort of result? 

Fyodor A. Lukyanov: I think it’s a stupid move. Because, if we assume that sanctions are designed to have an influence on policy, this will not change anything. First of all, because I’m simply not someone who can shape policy. And secondly, even if I could, I don’t believe that under pressure I would. And there’s another aspect to this.

The ability to communicate with our counterparts in the West – to interact, to discuss important issues – is now absolutely minimized, limited to almost zero.

Because people like me, and my colleagues in the Valdai Club and other organizations affected by these sanctions – yes, we are on the side of the Russian Federation, but we are always trying to find ways to build up or maintain relationships, in particular with people in the European Union. And in fact, within the Russian context we are actually quite liberal. If the European Union rejects us, then I’m afraid Europeans will not have any vis-à-vis in Russia for a very long time. Okay, that’s the choice they make. We can live without it. But it’s strange. And frankly, I could not imagine something like this happening five years ago. 

Jonathan McCormick (Marker): Do you have any sense of whether these sanctions will outlast the war – whether you’ll still be sanctioned even after open hostilities cease and there is some sort of dialogue, some normalisation? 

Fyodor A. Lukyanov: Yes, I think it will outlast the war. And I’m afraid that even after the war – even in the beginning stages of normalisation – there will be a very long process of bargaining. Both Europeans and Russians – because we introduced many sanctions as well – will attempt to sell them back at the highest possible price. So frankly, I don’t expect the sanctions to be lifted during my lifetime. I’m not so old, but not so young either.

Marker