Donald Trump would have hoped for better when he visited Beijing on 13-15 May, but the trip, instead of becoming a feather in his deal-making cap, revealed a glaring strategic asymmetry.

The White House had originally imagined a summit with ambitious outcomes across trade, security and technology. But the ongoing war with Iran altered both the timing of the summit and the substance of the meeting.

Trump, who went with a high-level delegation including top business honchos — Elon Musk (Tesla), Tim Cook (Apple) and Jensen Huang (Nvidia) — arrived in Beijing as a leader constrained by geopolitical overreach, domestic political pressures and a growing need for Chinese cooperation.

The summit yielded no dramatic breakthrough he might have hoped for, and instead revealed something more consequential: a public acknowledgment that the US, under Trump, has little appetite for open confrontation with China. This should deeply unsettle Narendra Modi’s foreign policy establishment in New Delhi.

For more than a decade, Modi’s foreign policy has rested on a foundational assumption: that the US will see India as a strategic counterweight to China and demonstrate this outlook in its policy choices. This assumption shaped India’s diplomatic posture, regional alignments and military cooperation agreements. But the Trump-Xi summit has demonstrated that this assumption is shakier than Modi’s government is willing to admit.

Trump went to Beijing hoping that Xi might use China’s leverage with Tehran to help deliver a diplomatic outcome in the Iran conflict, especially around reopening the Strait of Hormuz and stabilising energy markets. China offered rhetorical support for stability but no meaningful commitment. Beijing was not going to rescue Washington from a crisis of its own making.

Despite receiving little support on Iran, Trump was strikingly deferential to Xi. The symbolism was hard to miss. Warm personal praise, reciprocal invitations and public insistence that the relationship could become stronger than ever. Xi, by contrast, used the moment to re-draw a red line over Taiwan, reminding Trump that this remains non-negotiable for China.

The summit bore no signs that the United States is ready for a strategic confrontation with China. This was a transactional administration looking to accommodate, as far as possible.

That should matter to India because Modi has spent twelve years investing heavily in precisely the opposite reading of global politics. Since coming to power in 2014, Modi has increasingly tied India’s strategic future to Washington’s China anxieties. The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) became central to India’s Indo-Pacific narrative.

Defence agreements multiplied. Intelligence cooperation deepened. Joint military exercises expanded. In 2016, India signed the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) with the US, for reciprocal military logistics access.

These weren’t merely technical arrangements, but a political bet. The Modi government believed the US was becoming a durable strategic partner against China. More importantly, it appeared to believe that India’s visible alignment with Washington would translate into dependable US backing in any serious confrontation with Beijing.

That belief ignores the first rule of US foreign policy — support for partner countries must serve American interests not the strategic pipedreams of their partners.

The US did not come to the rescue when Chinese forces altered the status quo along the Line of Actual Control in 2020. It didn’t back rhetoric with deterrence when India faced pressure after Galwan. It offered diplomatic sympathy, intelligence cooperation and defence sales. But sympathy is not commitment.

India is not Japan nor South Korea. It is not a treaty ally of the US. Modi’s strategic establishment either failed to understand this distinction or chose to obscure it. But the Trump–Xi summit bared this reality.

Trump is fundamentally transactional. There is no ideological coherence in his statements or policy choices. Instinct and personal chemistry always take precedence over institutional doctrine in his scheme of things. In the present moment, he sees benefits in stabilising relations with China, so Taiwan concerns are less important, regional partners must manage their own risks, and the tariff battle is on the back-burner.

India should never have built a China strategy that was dependent on the whims of an American president. But the problem runs deeper than misreading Trump. For all the grand pronouncements about India’s strategic autonomy, the Modi government’s foreign policy has narrowed India’s strategic flexibility.

India always prided itself on its strategic autonomy. It was called non-alignment back then. This did not mean neutrality or indecision, but showed that India had a policy compass and it would maintain room for manoeuvre in a fluid international system. Modi rebranded this principle, but hollowed it out by leaning too heavily towards Washington.

At the same time, India’s China policy has lacked coherence. Modi pursued summit diplomacy with Xi in Wuhan and Mamallapuram, affecting great confidence in leader-driven engagement. Yet these optics didn’t prevent military confrontation in 2020. Border tensions intensified and the build-up of Chinese infrastructure didn’t stop. China grew its economic and diplomatic reach in the neighbourhood and India helped it along with self-goals.

Instead of recalibrating after these failures, Delhi doubled down on external balancing through Washington. That was strategically foolhardy because no serious power can outsource the burden of balancing its foreign policy equation to another big power whose priorities are globally dispersed and unstable.

India’s challenges vis-à-vis China are structural, geographic and permanent while America’s big-power anxieties are strategic and variable. The two are not in the same boat. Washington can negotiate tactical coexistence with Beijing when necessary but India cannot relocate itself.

The lesson for India is that America was never going to subordinate its China policy to India’s security concerns. The US may still arm India, cooperate with India and support India rhetorically. But if broader accommodation with Beijing serves US interests, then India’s anxieties will not determine Washington’s choices.

Modi’s foreign policy has often confused tactical convergence with strategic alignment. This confusion has costs.

India’s relations with countries in its neighbourhood have deteriorated, and China has exploited the growing trust deficit to its advantage. India is heavily dependent on imported defence hardware and technology; military modernisation at home is shaky. India lacks economic competitiveness; no amount of grandstanding abroad can make up for structural weaknesses at home.

A credible China strategy will have to pivot on India’s own economic resilience, technological capacity, defence manufacturing, border infrastructure, regional partnerships and diplomatic credibility. It also requires pragmatic engagement with multiple power centres, including Europe, Southeast Asia, the Gulf and Beijing itself.

‘Strategic autonomy’ was never about sitting on the fence; it was and still is about retaining agency. That has eroded in a foreign policy dispensation that is driven by spectacle. Trump’s Beijing visit should be read as a warning.

Views are personal

Ashok Swain is a professor of peace and conflict research at Uppsala University, Sweden. More by the author here

The Nagaland government has stepped up surveillance and containment efforts following outbreaks of African swine fever (ASF) in different parts of the state, with several districts imposing restrictions on the import, transport and sale of pigs and pork products to contain the disease.

According to an official statement, the Directorate of Animal Husbandry and Veterinary Services is closely monitoring the situation through district veterinary officers and field staff, who are engaged in surveillance, containment measures, awareness drives, sample collection and enforcement of bio-security protocols.

In Mon district, authorities have temporarily banned pork sales and prohibited the import, export and transportation of live pigs until further orders.

In Dimapur district, infected and surveillance zones have been identified after ASF-positive cases were detected among pigs in Signal Angami village. Restrictions have been imposed on the movement, slaughter and transportation of pigs, pork and related products within the affected areas.

In the Medziphema subdivision of Chumoukedima district, commercial slaughter and sale of pigs and pork have been brought under regulation, with prior permission made mandatory.

Mokokchung district authorities have advised residents to avoid buying and consuming pork in affected areas under Tuli subdivision, where outbreaks were confirmed in Chungtia and Kangtsungyimsen villages and the Shitikolak ward of Tuli town.

Restrictions on pig imports and transportation have also been enforced in parts of Peren and Niuland districts amid ASF concerns. Following the curbs, pork shops in several areas, including Kohima, remained shut on Saturday, 23 May.

Pork is a staple part of daily meals and traditional cuisine across Nagaland, making the outbreak and related restrictions likely to affect consumption patterns, markets and the livelihoods of thousands of pig farmers and traders dependent on the sector.

The directorate clarified that ASF is a highly contagious viral disease affecting pigs but poses no threat to humans or public health. However, it warned that the disease can inflict heavy economic losses on pig farmers, underscoring the need for immediate reporting and strict preventive action.

Appealing for public cooperation, the department urged farmers, traders, transporters, village councils, colony authorities and citizens to support ongoing containment efforts. It asked people to immediately report sudden illness or deaths among pigs to the nearest veterinary office and warned against unauthorised movement, sale or transport of pigs and pork products from affected areas.

Farmers and pig rearers have also been advised to maintain strict hygiene and bio-security measures. The directorate cautioned against disposing of dead pigs in rivers, streams, forests or open public spaces, warning that improper disposal could aggravate the outbreak.

It also urged people to avoid panic and refrain from circulating unverified information, while requesting that only official updates issued by the department be shared.

The directorate thanked district administrations and veterinary personnel, including doctors, field assistants and mobile veterinary units, for their efforts on the ground, and reaffirmed its commitment to protecting the livestock sector and the livelihoods of pig farmers across the state.

With PTI inputs

The death toll from a gas explosion at a coal mine in northern China’s Shanxi province has risen sharply to 90 according to Reuters (some outlets report the figure as 82), citing state broadcaster CCTV reporting as much on Saturday, 23 May.

The blast occurred late on Friday at the Liushenyu coal mine in Qinyuan county, where 247 workers were on duty underground at the time, according to state news agency Xinhua.

Chinese President Xi Jinping urged authorities to “spare no effort” in treating the injured and carrying out search and rescue operations. He also called for a thorough investigation into the cause of the accident and for strict accountability in accordance with the law, Xinhua reported.

Premier Li Qiang echoed the call, stressing the need for prompt and accurate disclosure of information and rigorous accountability.

Rescue operations were continuing, while authorities in Qinyuan said the cause of the explosion remained under investigation. The incident is among the deadliest mining disasters reported in China in the past decade.

China has significantly reduced fatalities in its coal mining sector since the early 2000s through tighter regulations and improved safety practices. However, accidents linked to gas explosions, flooding and other hazards continue to occur.

Executives of the company operating the mine, Shen Liao Shanxi Coal Mining Co Ltd, have been detained, according to Xinhua.

Earlier on Saturday, Xinhua had reported only eight deaths and said more than 200 miners had been safely brought to the surface. It did not explain the subsequent jump in the death toll.

With agency inputs