Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif on Sunday hailed United States President Donald Trump’s “extraordinary efforts to pursue peace”, saying the latter held a “very useful and productive call” with multiple countries’ representatives, including Chief of Defence Forces and army chief Field Marshal Asim Munir.

Trump held a phone call on Saturday with the leaders of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkiye, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Jordan and Pakistan.

The leaders encouraged Trump to agree to the emerging framework, Axios reported.

In a post on Truth Social, Trump said he had a “very good call” with Saudi Arabia’s crown prince; the presidents of the UAE, Turkiye and Egypt; Qatar’s emir, prime minister and a minister who is part of the Board of Peace; and the kings of Jordan and Bahrain.

A call with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu also went “very well”, Trump noted.

Subsequently, in a post on X, PM Shehbaz said CDF Munir represented Pakistan in the call with Trump, appreciating the field marshal’s “tireless efforts during the entire process”.

“The discussions provided a useful opportunity to exchange views on the current regional situation and how to move the ongoing peace efforts forward to bring lasting peace in the region,” the premier said.

“Pakistan will continue its peace efforts with utmost sincerity and we hope to host the next round of talks very soon.”

Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar commended the US president’s leadership and “commitment to dialogue and diplomacy”, saying the call marked a “significant step closer toward the shared objective of regional peace, stability, and an early diplomatic outcome”.

In a statement on X, the deputy prime minister commended PM Shehbaz’ “visionary leadership” and CDF Munir’s central role in the mediation process.

He also appreciated the rest of the US team, including Vice President JD Vance, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, special envoy Steve Witkoff and adviser Jared Kushner for their sustained engagement.

In addition, he appreciated the constructive engagement of the Iranian leadership, naming President Masoud Pezeshkian, Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and Speaker Bagher Ghalibaf. He also praised the efforts of United Nations chief Antonio Guterres as well as “our brotherly regional partners and all other countries, with whom I remained closely engaged throughout this process”.

“Dialogue and diplomacy must prevail over conflict and confrontation for the collective prosperity and security of our region and beyond,” he said.

Pakistan is continuing its efforts to revive the stalled Iran-US peace process after plans for a second round of negotiations in Islamabad fell through.

The first round of historic direct US-Iran talks was held in Islamabad on April 11 and 12, following a Pakistan-brokered ceasefire on April 8. It had ended without an agreement, but also without a breakdown.

Trump later called off a planned visit by US Special Envoy Steve Witkoff and adviser Jared Kushner to Islamabad for a second round of talks with Iran. However, he extended the ceasefire indefinitely “upon the request of Field Marshal Asim Munir, and Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif”.

The latest round of contacts is taking place under heightened pressure from the US and its Middle East allies. Trump on Wednesday said talks in Iran were in the final stages, and also threatened to resume strikes if a deal is not reached in a “limited timeframe”.

Then, this weekend, he said that a ‌memorandum of understanding on a peace deal ​had been “largely negotiated” ​with Iran and would ⁠open the Strait ​of Hormuz, with details ​to be unveiled soon.

Pakistan has stepped up its diplomatic efforts to break the deadlock in the US-Iran negotiations, with CDF Munir concluding a high-level visit to Tehran on Saturday.

In Tehran, he conducted intensive negotiations with the Iranian leadership that resulted in “encouraging progress towards a final understanding”, the Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) said in a statement.

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio commented about CDF Munir’s visit, saying that the US was in “constant communication with him [and] the highest levels of our government are constantly talking to him”.

He also praised Pakistan for doing an “admirable job” trying to mediate a peace deal between Washington and Tehran.

Interior Minister Mohsin Naqvi also made his second visit to Iran in less than a week to resuscitate negotiations. The minister had previously met Iran’s president, parliament speaker and foreign minister over the weekend.

The visits came at a time when negotiations appeared to have moved beyond political signalling into detailed bargaining over a narrow interim framework dealing with the Strait of Hormuz, Iran’s nuclear programme, sanctions relief and guarantees against renewed military action.

• CM, city mayor among others perform groundbreaking of the landmark project at Clifton’s Beach View Park
• Murad says museum will preserve stories and legacy of migrants, traders, intellectuals for generations to come

KARACHI: For now, it is only a piece of turf by the seaside. But this part of the Beach View Park in Clifton is where a new, one of its kind, digitally interactive museum to preserve and celebrate the history and heritage of Sindh and the Pakistan independence movement will come up soon. It is where the Sindh government, the Karachi Metropolitan Corporation (KMC) and the Citizens Archive of Pakistan (CAP) hosted the ground-breaking ceremony of the Karachi Museum of History on a very breezy Saturday afternoon.

Planned as a landmark cultural and educational space, the Karachi Museum of History will be built on globally recognised museum practices to create an immersive cultural institution that brings Pakistan’s independence and Sindh’s 5,000-year history to life through storytelling, technology, archival material and interactive experiences.

Through innovative exhibition design, oral history, research and public engagement, the museum aims to become a landmark destination for culture, education and tourism in Karachi. It is an initiative that builds on CAP’s long-standing commitment to public history and cultural preservation, following the launch of the National History Museum in Lahore in partnership with the Punjab government in 2017.

The groundbreaking was attended by key government officials and civil society members, including Sindh Chief Minister Syed Murad Ali Shah, Chief Secretary Asif Hyder Shah, Culture Minister Syed Zulfiqar Ali Shah, Karachi Mayor Barrister Murtaza Wahab, KMC representatives and CAP members, including its Patron-in-Chief Sharmeen Obaid-Chinoy.

Speaking on the occasion, CM Shah said Karachi is not only a city, it is an opportunity, a living archive of our collective memory, resilience and cultural diversity.

“Karachi is a city where everyone wants to come and no one wants to leave. The Karachi Museum of History will preserve the stories and legacy of migrants, traders, labourers, intellectuals, who came to this city, for generations to come. Karachi reflects the spirit and values of coexistence,” he added.

He also said that Ms Obaid-Chinoy had first got the idea for such a place more than 10 years ago. “At the time we thought of using the Fayzee Rahamin building for the project but it was not given to us,” the CM said.

He appreciated the efforts of the culture department, the KMC and the CAP for their commitment and collaboration in transforming this vision into reality.

He congratulated all the scholars, historians, architects, artists and professionals who have contributed to the project. “Your work will help preserve the soul of this great city for generations to come,” he said.

The culture minister said that the Karachi Museum of History will be a flagship project for the city.

Speaking on the occasion, Mayor Wahab said that Karachi is one of the great cities of the world. For too long, it has lacked a civic institution that reflects its richness.

“The Karachi Museum of History will change that. It is Sharmeen Obaid-Chinoy’s dream for Karachi, which will soon turn into a reality. The KMC is proud to play its part in delivering a landmark that belongs to every resident of this city,” he said.

While thanking the Sindh government and the KMC for joining hands with CAP for the museum project, Sharmeen Obaid-Chinoy said that Karachi has many stories to tell and we have grown up listening to those stories which are very much true.

“There are stories from the Cantonment Railway Station where people arrived with a single suitcase and lots of hope, stories from refugee camps where people started lives afresh and stories from the first government offices where in the absence of office furniture people used hardboard crates for desks. Then these people slowly became a part of this city and Sindh opened its heart for all of them,” she said.

“As Pakistan approaches the 80th anniversary of its independence, our partnership with the Government of Sindh and the KMC is an opportunity to create a lasting home for the stories that shaped our nation. The museum will honour the people who fought for Pakistan’s independence, celebrate the rich history and culture of Sindh and reflect the resilience, hope and extraordinary spirit of Karachi, a city that has carried the dreams of generations from across the country,” she concluded.

Published in Dawn, May 24th, 2026

Introduced by the Imran Khan administration (2018-2022), the controversial Single National Curriculum (SNC) represented a final institutional attempt to preserve a state-curated national narrative dating back to the 1970s.

By the 2010s, this identity framework had begun to fracture under the weight of escalating sectarian violence, unprecedented Islamist terrorism and fraying civil-military relations. The Islamist violence intensified alongside growing political friction between the military and the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP)-led government that took power in 2008. The resulting instability triggered a national debate over the state’s religious narrative.

The conflict between the state and the Islamists exposed a stark ideological contradiction: anti-state extremists were utilising the exact same Islamist rhetoric that the state, mainstream religious parties, and centre-right groups had been championing, especially ever since the 1980s.

This forced a fundamental questioning of state-sponsored Islam, particularly its presence in school textbooks.

For decades, the Pakistani state crafted a national identity detached from the Subcontinent’s past. But changing dynamics within the country and in the region are pushing it towards a different imagination of itself — as the modern inheritor of the ancient Indus civilisation

This discourse was not entirely unprecedented. In the 1980s, intellectuals such as Sibte Hasan, K.K. Aziz and Ayesha Jalal created a counter-narrative by arguing that the state was distorting the foundational vision of Pakistan’s founder, Muhammad Ali Jinnah. They contended that Jinnah viewed Islam as an enlightened, humane and modern faith. This portrayal was in stark contrast to the rigid version of Islam and of Jinnah’s image sculpted by the state from the 1970s onward.

However, the counter-narratives remained largely confined to elite intellectual circles. Meanwhile, the official state narrative grew increasingly dominant, thoroughly propagated through textbooks, state-controlled media, and pro-state ulema [Islamic scholars] empowered by the Ziaul Haq dictatorship (1977-1988).

A second wave of academic criticism emerged during the 1990s and early 2000s. Led by scholars such as Dr Abdul Hameed Nayyar, Rubina Saigol and Ahmad Salim, this critique posited that the era’s escalating Islamist and sectarian violence was a direct consequence of classroom indoctrination.

According to Saigol, after the violent secession of East Pakistan in 1971, a pervasive state paranoia began to suffocate national rhetoric and reshape the curriculum. This insecurity culminated in the formal unveiling of the “Pakistan Ideology” in 1978. It was a construct born out of the fear that, without stitching a rigid interpretation of Islam into the country’s political and social fabric, Pakistan would face further disintegration.

Nayyar, Salim and Saigol further suggested that the state and its nationalist intelligentsia harboured a perpetual urge to divorce the roots of South Asian Muslims from those of other regional faiths, particularly Hinduism.

This ideological project gained urgency after the 1971 ‘East Pakistan debacle.’ In post-1978 textbooks, Pakistan was finally decoupled from its Subcontinental geography and tied to a civilisational claim that South Asian Muslims were genealogically linked to the birthplace of Islam in Arabia. Critics termed this the “Arabisation of Pakistan” — a claim that Arabs found rather amusing.

From the late 1970s, history textbooks largely disregarded the region’s pre-eighth century past, undermining everything prior to the Arab invasion of Sindh. The ruins and artefacts of ancient civilisations physically located within Pakistan, including the 5,000-year-old Indus Valley Civilisation, were treated as foreign phenomena rather than foundational elements of the nation’s own heritage.

Although an extensive 2003 study on this subject by Nayyar and Salim attracted brief interest from the ‘modernist’ military dictatorship of Pervez Musharraf (1999–2008), it yielded only superficial structural reforms.

In 1996, the state narrative was more comprehensively challenged by Aitzaz Ahsan, a prominent intellectual and senior member of the PPP. Synthesising fragmented ideas into what became known as the ‘Indus Theory’, he formalised his thesis in his book The Indus Saga and the Making of Pakistan. The theory suggests that modern-day Pakistan is far from an artificial state hastily created in 1947. Instead, it is the organic, modern manifestation of a distinct 5,000-year-old civilisation anchored to the Indus River system.

According to Ahsan, the civilisational divide between Pakistan and India is fundamentally cultural and geographical rather than purely religious. It is driven by the separate evolution of two distinct societies: one born along the banks of the Indus River in Pakistan, and the other along the Ganges in India.

Versions of this theory had circulated since the 1950s. Their lineage can be traced back to the 1950 book Five Thousand Years of Pakistan by British archaeologist Sir Mortimer Wheeler. The concept was then revived in the 1970s by figures such as Sibte Hasan, eminent archaeologist Dr Ahmad Hasan Dani, and veteran Sindhi nationalist scholar G.M. Syed. However, the post-1971 state sidelined this paradigm in favour of its Arabian hypothesis. Ahsan’s mid-1990s formulation remains the Indus Theory’s most cohesive and articulate expression.

In 2010, the PPP-coalition government succeeded in passing the 18th Amendment to the Constitution, with the support of the main opposition party, the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N). The amendment provided extensive autonomy to the provinces, devolving education from the federal government and loosening the Islamabad-driven national narrative.

Sindh took the lead, exercising its new authority to reintroduce the province’s ‘Sufi’ history and regional heroes into provincial textbooks, bypassing old federal frameworks. In 2015, the Sindh government reintroduced Jinnah’s August 11, 1947 speech into textbooks. This speech, in which Jinnah declared that the state would have nothing to do with the religion of its citizens, had been expunged from the curriculum after 1971.

Combined with the widespread availability of internet-driven literature challenging the state’s post-1971 narrative, these developments hurled the Indus Theory into mainstream national discourse like never before.

The state made a last-ditch effort to mitigate the erosion of the old narrative through the SNC, launched by Imran Khan in August 2021. While the SNC was a more radical manifestation of the traditional state narrative, it was ultimately rejected by the governments of Sindh and Balochistan. What’s more, its implementation triggered widespread confusion and disgruntlement among middle-class parents in Punjab, causing the project to stall after Khan’s regime was removed through an act of parliament in 2022.

Today, as Pakistan navigates its position as a rising regional power, both the government and the military establishment are prioritising pragmatism. Seeking to sustain this status while addressing Baloch separatism, Islamist violence and the Indian threat in a more systematic manner, the state is quietly integrating the Indus Theory into its own narratives.

An additional driver of this shift is the Hindu nationalist regime in India, which is aggressively reshaping the past to construct a Hindu-centric, civilisational identity. This has eroded India’s secular image internationally. Pakistan views this as an opportunity.

By embracing the Indus Theory, Pakistan seeks to position itself as a moderate, pragmatic nation-state with ancient roots in the civilisations that emerged along the Indus, the country’s largest river and ‘life giver.’

Published in Dawn, EOS, May 24th, 2026

THIS month, mixed signals emanated from India on the normalisation of relations with Pakistan.

Dattatreya Hosabale, secretary general of the Hindu extremist organisation RSS, proposed in an interview that the “window for dialogue” with Pakistan should always be open. He argued for diplomatic ties, visa issuance, trade and people-to-people contacts. His call was endorsed by several notables, including former Indian army chief (retd) Gen Manoj Naravane.

Within days, as if to ensure that there was no confusion about the real Indian intent, the serving army chief Gen Upendra Dwivedi announced that Pakistan must decide whether it wants to remain a “part of geography or history” — hubristic rhetoric that reflected the hegemonic mindset of the Narendra Modi regime.

ISPR strongly condemned these remarks, describing them as “madness and warmongering”.

It is clear that the Modi government isn’t interested in normalising ties with Pakistan, and is engaged in creating a Hindutva-led polity in India. It uses anti-Pakistan rhetoric to fetch votes and remain in power. To that end, it has exploited the issue of terrorism to malign Pakistan and thus ‘justify’ its policy of a so far decade-long disconnect with Pakistan.

After the Pahalgam terrorist attack in Indian-occupied Kashmir in April 2025, Prime Minister Modi authorised military strikes against nine non-military sites (mosques and allied schools) in Pakistan under the garb of fighting terrorism.

To project resilience following India’s unilateral, illegal and brazen aggression, Modi announced three policy decisions — often described as the new Modi doctrine. According to this, the response to every act of terrorism in India would be severe military action against Pakistan; India would not distinguish between terrorism by a non-state actor and state-sponsored terrorism; and India would not be blackmailed by the threat of nuclear escalation. This meant that India would continue to expand space for kinetic confrontation with Pakistan below the nuclear overhang. It is a high-risk strategy which the two nuclear-armed neighbours can ignore only at their own peril.

To its own surprise and dismay, however, India found an answer to this three-pronged Modi doctrine during the May 2025 stand-off with Pakistan.

One, Pakistan demonstrated that it could defend itself against a much larger and better-equipped hostile neighbour. Two, India’s campaign to malign Pakistan in the name of terrorism and isolate it diplomatically crashed to the ground. Three, India’s desire to be the regional hegemon also received a major setback. The Pakistani side has made it clear that any future kinetic misadventure under the so-called Modi doctrine will receive a befitting response from Pakistan through its policy of ‘quid pro quo plus’.

It’s clear that India doesn’t want peace with Pakistan.

Both countries are well aware that future wars between them would not be face-to-face engagement, but rather, non-contact warfare through missiles, drones, cyberattacks and electronic wars. It is still not clear, though, whether India has learned the right lessons from last May’s war.

When one hears Indian experts still talking of Modi’s doctrine, it appears that India is continuing to live under the illusion that it is a dominant power that can settle issues through its conventional superiority and use of force. Instead, the Indian side must appreciate the new reality that modern non-contact wars employing autonomous lethal weapons have already equalised battlefields in asymmetric situations.

In this context, pro-normalisation signals, such as those radiated by the RSS secretary general, app­ear tactical in na­ture. These could be intended to give the impression to the outside world that India was a reasonable country ready to engage with its nei­ghbours. These gestures could also be a smokescreen to manage international pressure should India decide to carry out another attack against Pakistan to avenge its defeat in the May 2025 war.

The Modi doctrine of expanding space for larger kinetic confrontation is very dangerous. Being neighbours, the reaction time before lethal autonomous weapons are deployed is so little that both countries could virtually destroy each other if another war erupts.

A saner alternative is for the two to incrementally resume bilateral contacts, including a back channel, and implement confidence-building measures that lower the chances of another armed conflict. The only mechanism available for bilateral contact are the DGMOs, but they normally confine themselves to routine communications. Thus, there is a need to reimagine the brinkmanship within the South Asian security construct.

If Pakistan and India cannot be friends, they must at least find a way of coexisting peacefully. They owe it to a billion and a half people.

The writer is chairman, Sanober Institute and former foreign secretary of Pakistan.

Published in Dawn, May 24th, 2026

AS Pakistan and China celebrate 75 years of diplomatic relations, an important question emerges that goes beyond symbolism: what direction will the relationship take in a rapidly changing world and regional order?

No longer merely a rising power, China is now in the ranks of global superpowers alongside America. This transformation has profound implications for Pakistan. Sharing borders with an emerging superpower presents opportunities, dependencies, pressures and strategic dilemmas that Pakistan has never experienced before.

Pakistan’s long association with the US has seen fluctuating phases of cooperation, mistrust and tra­­nsactional alignments. Geographic distance was a critical factor that allowed Pakistan to have divergent strategic priorities. Washington not only tolerated it but also took advantage whenever needed. But with China, it is a different story.

The relationship is rooted in strategic convergence, regional connectivity, defence cooperation and political trust developed over decades. Yet Chi­­na’s rise has transformed the nature of this partnership as the China with which Pakistan built its early ties during the Cold War era is not the same today. Beijing’s global ambitions, econo­m­­ic priorities and security concerns have exp­a­nded, compelling Pakistan to revisit ways of sustaining strategic closeness while preserving diplomatic flexibility in an increasingly polarised world.

Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif is in Beijing on a four-day state visit, accompanied by senior government and military officials, with expectations that Sino-Pak ties will remain on the same trajectory despite the occasional friction. Most concerns revolve around security issues and threats faced by Chinese nationals working on various projects, particularly CPEC-related, in Pakistan.

Although both countries share the goal of a terrorism-free neighbourhood and their views broadly converge on Afghanistan, there are differences over how to address the problem. Pakistan has drastically altered its Afghanistan policy in recent years, while China has maintained a relatively consistent and pragmatic approach, preferring engagement, mediation and gradual stabilisation.

China’s rise has transformed the nature of the Sino-Pak partnership.

Pakistan’s geopolitical thinking has historically followed a realist framework, largely shaped by its long partnership with Washington. Allia­nces such as Seato and Cento, followed by cooperation during the Afghan wars, created the foundation of that relationship. Military training programmes and security cooperation further institutionalised this approach under which Pakistan pragmatically calculated its interests and maintained working relations with Washington despite recurring mistrust and divergent priorities.

Pakistan moved closer to China after the downturn in US-Pakistan relations following the Osama bin Laden operation in May 2011 and the Salala border incident, when Nato forces attacked Pakistani military border posts in the Salala area of Mohmand Agency in November 2011. The launch of CPEC further cemented ties. However, neither Islamabad nor Rawalpindi ultimately abandoned the balancing approach between Washington and Beijing. Pakistan still depends on China for strategic cover, defence cooperation and financial support, while simultaneously relying on the US-led economic order for exports, international financial institutions and macroeconomic stability.

This balancing act has not weakened Pakistan’s ties with Beijing but has altered their character. Unlike the US, China has rarely pressured Pakistan publicly to choose sides or adopt bloc politics; it has, instead, quietly adjusted its own expectations and vocabulary, gradually shifting from describing Pakistan as an ‘all-weather friend’ to a ‘trusted strategic partner’.

At the same time, the relationship has undergone a subtle but important change, with the earlier optimism regarding CPEC and expectations of an economic breakthrough increasingly giving way to a more realistic understanding of mutual interests and limitations. CPEC itself symbolises both the achievements and limitations of the partnership. It helped address Pakistan’s energy shortages and infrastructure gaps, but the promise of structural economic transformation is only partially fulfilled. Today, the Sino-Pak partnership is more security-driven, more unequal economically, and more strategically consequential.

The future trajectory of the relationship appears less centred on grand economic promises and more on concrete strategic cooperation, including defence integration, counterterrorism coordination, industrial cooperation, mining, agriculture, technology and regional connectivity.

Defence ties have deepened to an unprecedented level, with China accounting for the overwhelming majority of Pakistan’s arms imports, while cooperation now extends to co-production, intelligence sharing, naval modernisation, and long-term defence-industrial integration.

Pakistan’s internal security has also emerged as the most sensitive dimension of bilateral ties. Beijing is increasingly concerned about attacks on Chinese nationals and CPEC-linked projects, and its tolerance is now shaped less by Pakistan’s relations with Washington and more by Islamabad’s ability to protect Chinese interests and maintain policy consistency.

Although China repeatedly reaffirms support for Pakistan’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and stability, there is still no evidence of a formal Nato-style mutual defence guarantee between the two countries. Nevertheless, Pakistan’s strategic dependence on China continues to deepen, making it increasingly difficult for Islamabad to maintain a genuinely equidistant posture between Beijing and Washington.

However, Pakistan has sought alternative avenues to preserve this balance. Its expanding role in Gulf security affairs, evolving defence partnerships with Saudi Arabia, Turkiye, Qatar and Egypt, participation in President Donald Trump’s peace initiatives, though currently dormant, and its mediation role in the US-Iran war have opened up diplomatic space for Islamabad to sustain strategic flexibility. The idea of emerging middle-power alignments is also gaining greater significance in the state’s strategic thinking.

However, one question is likely to re-emerge: how will China view Pakistan, a close neighbour that continues to maintain ties with its principal rival, the US?

China possesses several strategic cards, and the one that concerns Pakistan most is the ‘India card’. Yet Islamabad appears confident that India faces broader strategic constraints in evolving an exclusive partnership with China similar to its historical relationship with Russia.

India’s strategic and geo-economic DNA also aligns more naturally with the West, a reality — and an advantage for Pakistan — that Islamabad will continue attempting to challenge within the broader regional competition.

The writer is a security analyst.

Published in Dawn, May 24th, 2026