Since April 15, Victoria has been operating without meaningful political finance laws. As the days have passed, candidates have received unregulated political donations that would once have exceeded donation caps. Foreign and anonymous donations have been allowed.

For the first time in years, Victorians have had no reliable way of knowing who is funding political campaigns.

That vacuum is a serious threat to the integrity of Victoria’s democratic system. The unregulated and undisclosed flow of money into politics raises concerns about corruption, undue influence, and the creation of an unfair playing field between the political candidates who have access to wealth, and those who do not.

So it’s a welcome development this week that the Allan government appears to have finally secured a pathway to restoring some key political finance safeguards.

Just as importantly as the short-term fix, secured through the political negotiations with the cross-bench, the proposed legislation also includes a comprehensive independent post-election review of Victoria’s political finance framework.

The wild west for political donations

The current predicament began with the collapse of the previous laws, held in April to be unconstitutional by the High Court. The court found the laws fell foul of the Constitution’s implied freedom of political communication because of the preferential treatment of bodies known as “nominated entities”.

Nominated entities were organisations associated with the major political parties that could receive unregulated donations separately from those parties.

Following the High Court’s decision, the state government appeared to have been caught flat-footed. The weeks of urgent political negotiation that followed had, until now, failed to produce a replacement.

Read more: High Court takes an axe to Victoria’s political donations laws - and it will make federal MPs nervous

What’s in the new laws?

The bill that has finally been introduced into parliament restores some essential guardrails.

It reintroduces the previous 21-day disclosure obligations for donations over $1,250. There are again prohibitions on donations from foreign and anonymous donors.

The bill reinstates donation caps, but at a higher level than the previous $4,970. It is effectively $10,000 for the upcoming 2026 election. After that, it will be set at $7,500.

In an attempt to offset the advantage of incumbents, this is doubled for “new entrants”.

The bill also restores public funding. Administrative funding has been increased, with parties receiving $300,000 for the first MP elected, $100,00 for the second MP, and $55,000 for the 3rd to 45th MP.

Victoria appears to have learnt at least the immediate lesson, because the new bill removes the nominated entity arrangements that lay at the heart of the High Court’s decision. It also includes provisions requiring the major parties to pay back donations received from nominated entities.

That key elements of the regulatory vacuum have been filled – and particularly the disclosure scheme – should be welcomed.

But it’s not perfect

However, the rushed and politically driven nature of the process that has led to this bill, which allocates significant new public funding to political parties and restricts political activity, makes the legislation more of an emergency repair job than a comprehensive redesign.

Indeed, several weaknesses from the previous regime remain. Notably, the legislation still does not provide for expenditure caps, which are essential for a level playing field.

It does not resolve longstanding ambiguity about the treatment of fundraising events. It continues to allow wealthy people to spend large amounts financing their own political participation.

It doesn’t address the exceptions carved out for affiliation fees from associated entities, including organisations such as unions, think tanks and businesses. These are payments made by organisations to political parties to maintain formal relationships, such as participation and representation rights.

And on policy development funding, the bill retains distinctions between political parties and independents that raise concerns about unfair treatment.

It also introduces some new features that raise questions. There is a new provision allowing for wealthy individuals and entities to spend unrestricted amounts for the benefit of others.

There are concerns the significant expanding of public funding for administrative expenses that benefit political parties creates a potentially unconstitutional preferential treatment.

There is a newly introduced ability to set disclosure thresholds and donation caps into the future through regulation, and without full parliamentary review. The application of donation caps and bans to transactions that have already occurred raises concerns about fairness, legal certainty, and whether the rules can actually be implemented in practice.

A path forward

Political finance regulation is inherently difficult to get right. It requires elected representatives to make decisions about rules that affect their own electoral interests.

The Centre for Public Integrity has long argued that a holistic political finance framework should incorporate evidence-informed donation and expenditure caps, robust disclosure requirements and fair public funding arrangements.

However, donation and spending caps and public funding at the right level takes time. It requires looking holistically, informed by evidence about the cost of running campaigns, at a range of issues. These include how disclosure requirements, donations and spending caps, and public funding work together.

For instance, before South Australia introduced its landmark “donations ban”, the state government engaged an expert panel to inquire into these matters.

Previously, too, Victoria has recognised these challenges through independent review processes that have produced important evidence and recommendations. Some of these were relied on in the High Court challenge.

The bill’s current review clause requires a three-person expert panel to be created after the November 2026 election to examine the operation of the new laws. It says the panel cannot be dominated by politicians. It would be required to consult with stakeholders and the public, and to consider options for a comprehensive and enduring political finance framework for Victoria.

In the meantime, the Victorian government has managed to plug the worst of the gaping hole left by the High Court’s decision. Most importantly, it has restored disclosure requirements.

Other aspects of its short-term solution are questionable. But encouragingly, the government has also committed to the kind of robust independent review that longer-term reform requires.

Correction: in the table above, a zero was missing from the administrative expenditure figure in the new bill, this has now been added.

Gabrielle Appleby works as the Research Director for the Centre for Public Integrity. She has received funding from The Australian Research Council.

Joo-Cheong Tham has received funding from the Australian Research Council, the Australian Council of Trade Unions, European Trade Union Institute, International IDEA, the New South Wales Electoral Commission, the New South Wales Independent Commission Against Corruption and the Victorian Electoral Commission. He is a Director of the Centre for Public Integrity; Expert Network Member of Climate Integrity; a Fellow of the Academy of Social Sciences in Australia; and the Victorian Division Assistant Secretary (Academic Staff) of the National Tertiary Education Union.

The abrupt resignation of the National Anti-Corruption Commissioner Paul Brereton is a pivotal moment for the federal watchdog. For years, questions over the commissioner’s leadership arising from concerns about his ability to manage conflicts of interest had undermined public confidence and trust in a key Australian integrity institution.

The government has committed to a “merit-based process” to appoint the next commissioner.

But can we trust the government to do that and rebuild trust in our national anti-corruption commission? Research finds governments often abuse their power to appoint, fund and oversee integrity agencies in order to avoid serious oversight.

How do we avoid this abuse and safeguard the independence of our integrity agencies? A new report from the Centre for Public Integrity outlines three key ways to ensure these agencies are truly independent.

These reforms should guide the appointment of a new national anti-corruption commissioner.

Fundamental tensions

To do their job, integrity agencies must be independent from the government. This means they must be able to investigate and criticise governments and public officials without fear of political retaliation.

But in practice there are a few problems with this idea.

Unlike the courts and parliament, these agencies are not protected in the Constitution. Instead, they are often created by the government through an act of parliament.

This creates a foundational tension: integrity agencies are designed by government, to hold the government to account.

The government has a vested interest in these institutions being weak. Governments have been accused of establishing weak watchdogs, or deliberately “clipping the wings” of these bodies by amending laws.

There are also operational tensions. Governments can weaken integrity agencies in more subtle ways.

One way is through political appointments. In Australia, we have seen such politicisation, for instance, in appointments to the former Administrative Appeals Tribunal, ultimately leading to its abolition.

Or they might be in the form of cutting funding. This happened most recently in the current budget, with a funding cut in real terms to the Australian National Audit Office. The office had previously said that with its current funding levels, it would not be able to meet its responsibilities for performance audits.

On budget day, the joint parliamentary committee on public accounts and audit expressed its ongoing concern about the operational capability of the office given its financial position.

A new report released by the Centre for Public Integrity outlines a number of ways the independence of these agencies must be protected across three key pillars: appointments, funding and oversight.

You can’t choose your own watchdog

Our analysis shows that across the country, there is significant variation in how heads of integrity agencies are appointed. Many governments exercise broad and opaque discretion over who leads the core integrity agencies.

This creates obvious risks. If governments can appoint agency heads through opaque processes, there may be concerns — justified or not — about whether those leaders are suitably qualified or truly independent.

The controversy surrounding Brereton illustrates the stakes involved. Questions about conflicts of interest under his leadership have fuelled broader concerns about the lack of a transparent, merit-based appointment process for the role.

Our report recommends legally requiring open advertising of senior integrity positions, independent selection panels and greater parliamentary involvement in appointments.

There’s no need to wait. The government could implement such a process in the upcoming NACC appointment, instead of relying on vague platitudes of a “merit-based process”.

This proposal is similar to one that has been successfully adopted elsewhere, including for the reformed Administrative Review Tribunal.

We also recommend longer but non-renewable terms for agency heads to alleviate any pressure leaders may feel in seeking reappointment.

Handing over the purse strings

The second problem then is funding. Most Australian integrity agencies rely on governments to decide how much money they receive each year.

In practice, this means the government can place pressure on agencies by limiting their resources. Underfunded integrity agencies cannot properly investigate corruption, scrutinise spending or carry out oversight work.

Our report argues integrity agencies should have stronger protections around funding, again, drawing on models that have been successfully developed elsewhere, particularly in the ACT for their “Officers of Parliament”.

Our proposal includes separate parliamentary processes and independent funding panels that can publicly recommend appropriate funding levels. Governments would still make final budget decisions, but there would be greater transparency when they made decisions that cut agency funding.

Read more: Australia’s anti-corruption commissioner has a trust problem. He needs to change course to fix it

Genuinely independent oversight

Finally, independence does not mean integrity agencies should operate without accountability. These agencies exercise significant powers. Some can compel evidence, conduct hearings and make findings that seriously affect reputations and careers.

So oversight is essential – but that oversight must be independent. Oversight systems for integrity agencies are often poorly designed. In many jurisdictions, for instance, parliamentary oversight committees are dominated by government members.

A better system would involve parliamentary committees not dominated by government MPs, alongside independent inspectors for agencies exercising coercive powers.

The importance of such roles is underscored by the work of the NACC Inspector, in receiving and investigating complaints about the commission’s decision not to investigate Robodebt referrals.

Read more: NACC belatedly to investigate whether six Robodebt referrals engaged in ‘corrupt conduct’

Is real independence possible?

Australia has invested heavily in creating a set of core integrity agencies. Even if reluctantly, every jurisdiction across the country now has an anti-corruption agency, auditor-general and ombudsman office.

The next challenge is ensuring those institutions are sufficiently independent to do their job. Across the country, there are good designs that alleviate the operational pressures these agencies face. Adopting these designs will help secure better and more transparent funding, appointment, and oversight of core integrity agencies.

These more independent integrity agencies can in turn help safeguard the health of our democracy.

Gabrielle Appleby works as the Research Director for the Centre for Public Integrity. She has received funding from the Australian Research Council.

William Partlett is a Stephen Charles Fellow at the Centre for Public Integrity.