Public hearings are underway this week to highlight the impacts of the government’s new National Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS) bill to tighten eligibility and save costs.

Over the past two days, the Senate inquiry heard that if the bill passes in its current form, it risks entrenching gender inequities in the NDIS and further excluding women and girls.

We have long known the NDIS has a gender problem.

Women and girls only make up 38% of the scheme. Men outnumber women in every age category (except for 55 and over) and dominate nearly every disability type within the scheme.

From the age of 15, access requests from men are also approved at a higher rate than access requests for women.

Tighter eligibility

From January 1 2028, the bill will require scheme applicants to access all “appropriate” treatments (meaning known, evidence-based and available in Australia) likely to “materially” (meaning noticeably) improve or alleviate the impact of the impairment, before NDIS access is granted.

Applicants have always been asked to demonstrate they’ve tried other treatments before applying for the NDIS. But this new rule is likely to place an even higher burden on people with impairments that are difficult to diagnose and medically complex to treat.

Under the new permanency rules, people may have to try lots of potentially marginal treatments that might slightly improve functioning, even if their conditions are not understood, or the treatment is expensive or difficult to access.

Women are more likely than men to have medically unexplained or chronic conditions, such as myalgic encephalomyelitis/chronic fatigue syndrome and fibromyalgia, which causes chronic pain.

These “pay to prove” dynamics also disproportionately affect those with fewer financial resources. Women with disability are more likely than men with disability to live on lower incomes. They also have higher expenses and lower earning capacity due to greater caring responsibilities.

Tightening access to the scheme in this way – without first addressing costly and difficult-to-access treatment pathways – risks excluding these women and girls from key supports.

Support can only be provided for approved conditions

If the bill passes, the NDIS will only fund supports for needs that directly relate to NDIS-recognised impairments.

This reverses changes to NDIS legislation introduced two years ago, which better recognised the complex way people actually experience impairments.

We have spoken to people in our current study about chronic pain who have explained that pain from one condition (for example, a connective tissue disorder) can affect the functional impacts of another impairment (for example, autism or a psychosocial disability, for which they receive NDIS support). For them, it’s impossible to distinguish between support needs “arising directly” from their NDIS-recognised impairment and support needs that are indirectly related to that impairment.

Women are also more likely than men to experience multiple chronic health conditions and disabilities, especially in age groups under the NDIS cut-off of 65.

Narrowing the lens of assessment and restricting access in this way also has gendered consequences.

Cuts to social participation funding

The bill gives the minister power to make cuts to entire categories of supports in the future, without introducing legislation or consultation.

We got a taste of what this could look when the government announced it would cut participants’ social and community participation budgets.

The 50% across-the-board cuts will shift these responsibilities back onto informal carers – largely women.

There are more than twice as many female primary carers as male primary carers. Of those providing primary care to children with disability, the overwhelming majority (84.7%) are women.

Some 43.8% of primary carers also have disability themselves. This means that when it comes to carers, we are often talking about women with disability who are the primary carers for children with disability.

These cuts will increase unpaid caring responsibilities. The bill’s explanatory memorandum acknowledges this:

Due to the gendered nature of caring, women are more likely to be impacted by changes to the supports available […].

These changes may lead carers to cut back on paid employment, deepening women’s socioeconomic exclusion.

Cuts to social and community participation funding are also likely to increase social isolation and reduce natural safeguards of community connection for people with disability.

Women with disability are disproportionately likely to experience violence, so cutting them off from vital community participation supports poses an unacceptable risk.

What needs to be done?

The bill’s explanatory memorandum says:

opportunities to increase gender equality will be considered as part of the design and evaluation of future market reforms to delivering social and community participation and capacity building activities.

However, no timeframes, benchmarks or accountability mechanisms are provided for when or how this work will occur.

The Australian government’s approach to gender-responsive budgeting requires new policy proposals to include gender analysis proportionate to the scale, scope and likely impact of the reform.

Given the scale and implications of the proposed NDIS reforms, we need a comprehensive and publicly available gender impact analysis before this bill is passed.

We also need more certainty on what can be done for those outside the scheme who need foundational supports. The Australian government has announced the Thriving Kids initiative. However, there is limited detail on planned foundational supports for other participant groups.

Researchers and advocates have been calling for an NDIS gender strategy for years. The National Disability Insurance Agency (NDIA) began work on this in early 2025, but by 2026 this work had been paused to prioritise broader scheme reforms. Advocates, such as Women with Disabilities Australia, continue to draw attention to the gendered issues of these reforms.

The likely consequences of these reforms show a gender strategy is needed more than ever.

Sophie Yates receives funding from the National Health and Medical Research Council.

Molly Saunders does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

A year has passed since conflict broke out between India and Pakistan, briefly raising fears of an all-out war between the two nuclear powers.

While violent conflict between the neighbours has been commonplace for the past 80 years, this latest round of fighting felt different.

Both sides used new weapons against one another, including cruise missiles, short-range ballistic missiles and drones. The level of mistrust and sharp rhetoric worsened considerably, significantly testing regional partnerships.

One year later, tensions remain high, with an underlying risk of further escalation.

What happened last year?

The war broke out last May following a terrorist attack that killed 26 civilians in the Pahalgam area of Indian Kashmir on April 22.

Within days, Indian police claimed the Pakistan-based militant group Lashkar-e-Taiba was behind the attack. Pakistan vehemently denied any involvement.

Then, on May 7, India launched Operation Sindoor against alleged terrorist strongholds in Pakistan, which prompted a Pakistani retaliatory attack, Operation Bunyan-un-Marsoos.

Dozens of people are believed to have been killed. As in any India-Pakistan conflict, the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons created further alarm.

The four-day conflict came to an end with a ceasefire on May 10. It was announced by the Trump administration, which claimed to have mediated the deal. This irritated India, but Pakistan nominated US President Donald Trump for the Nobel Peace Prize.

India nonetheless claimed victory, boasting of its ability to deliver precise attacks far inside Pakistani territory, exposing weaknesses in its rival’s air defences. Pakistan, meanwhile, claimed to have shot down five Indian fighter jets (which India denies).

Political ramifications

In Pakistan, the Pakistani military returned to the political mainstream following the conflict. After leading Pakistan’s military response to India, the chief of army staff, Syed Asim Munir, was elevated to field marshal, and then to the post of the country’s first chief of defence forces.

Munir’s influence has only grown since. He has become very close to Trump and has been a key figure in the negotiations between the US and Iran to bring an end to their war.

In India, Operation Sindoor was seen as a win for the Modi government’s decisive foreign policy, and was a moment of rare political consensus in the country.

However, in Kashmir, the terror attack raised fresh questions about the government’s claims of normalcy in the region – and its push to boost tourism – following the controversial revocation of Kashmir’s statehood in 2019.

In the weeks that followed the attack, security operations in the Kashmir valley shut down several tourist sites. This led to a sharp decline in visitor numbers and severely affected local businesses. Security operations also targeted civilians, alarming human rights experts.

Shifting regional dynamics

Perhaps the most significant impact of the conflict has been the difference in diplomatic engagements of both countries.

The war highlighted Pakistan’s operational cooperation with both China and Turkey. The Pakistani military used Chinese-built fighter jets and missiles in its attacks, as well as Turkish-made drones. Its satellite-based intelligence was enabled by China, too.

After the war, Pakistan also signed a new deal with the Trump administration to develop Pakistan’s oil reserves, and a defence pact with Saudi Arabia, a staunch US ally.

India had pursued a decade-long push to isolate Pakistan diplomatically, which made Pakistan’s increasing bonhomie with the US and Gulf states particularly awkward.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s once-close relationship with Trump, meanwhile, began to deteriorate over US tariffs and India’s purchase of Russian oil.

Modi’s ill-timed visit to Israel and the visible lack of influence in the US–Iran war has also raised questions about India’s professed role as a regional leader. It has highlighted the limits to India’s strategy of balancing its strategic partnerships, especially during conflict.

India has tried to engage in proactive diplomacy, dispatching delegations of MPs and former diplomats to more than 30 countries over the past year. While India claims these visits were a success, they haven’t done much to convince the world that Pakistan was the aggressor in their conflict.

Where do things go from here?

One year on, the political rhetoric on both sides is as charged as ever.

Both India and Pakistan have signalled a resolve for further escalation in future conflicts.

Despite a sliver of hope for secret backchannel talks, India continues to give stern warnings to Pakistan over its alleged support to terrorist groups.

India has also reiterated that a major water-sharing treaty between the countries would remain suspended until Pakistan takes steps to end its support for terrorism – leaving a major concern over water security unresolved.

In response, Pakistan has made clear any attempt to target Pakistan again would “trigger consequences” that would not be “geographically confined or strategically or politically palatable for India”.

The shifting geopolitics and heightened rhetoric have narrowed the space for any prospects of meaningful dialogue between the two. As a result, the alarmingly low levels of trust will remain.

The ceasefire holds for now, but the conflict continues unabated.

Stuti Bhatnagar does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

At a security conference in Singapore over the weekend, the three AUKUS partners – the United States, United Kingdom and Australia – announced a tweak to their partnership that has generated quite a lot of attention in Canberra.

Australia will now receive three second-hand Virginia-class, nuclear-powered submarines in the coming years, instead of the original deal of two used vessels and one brand new sub.

Australian Defence Minister Richard Marles spun this as a welcome streamlining of the fleet that would simplify its supply chain, as well as the management and sustainment of these complex warships.

What Marles seems not to have noticed is that not all Virginia-class submarines are the same.

The new boat the US had promised would have been from Block 6, the most recent design. Instead, all of Australia’s submarines will now likely come from Block 4, which carry a much smaller weapon payload. Firepower is a measure of a fighting ship’s utility. Having the largest weapon capacity is a key ingredient for battle success.

It seems Australia has been a willing – not to say eager – victim of what is essentially a “bait and switch”.

The deal has always been unequal

The unilateral change of plans should not have come as a surprise to anyone in the Australian government.

AUKUS has always been a one-sided deal in which the US reaps the benefits while Australia accepts the risks. The agreement Australia entered into provides the US with numerous opportunities to cancel or modify the deal. Washington simply acted on what was permitted.

In addition, the AUKUS agreement allows the US president to cancel the submarine transfer at his or her whim, while Australia has no right to challenge or lobby against the decision. The current president, Donald Trump, is not known for loyalty to his allies. The fact the AUKUS deal was signed by his predecessor, Joe Biden, is likely to further reduce Trump’s level of commitment.

Read more: In view of Trump’s review of AUKUS, should Australia cancel the subs deal? We asked 5 experts

To make the US decision more of an affront, Australia has already contributed at least US$2 billion (A$2.8 billion) to the American submarine manufacturing pipeline.

The US is not building enough submarines to meet its own requirements, let alone the additional boats it has promised to Australia. The Australian cash contribution was meant to improve the US rate of production so Canberra would be able to get one or two of the latest boats. Australia’s investment has turned out to be a very poor one, and there are no refunds.

The Australian government has also misinterpreted what the US hopes to get out of the deal.

For the Americans, selling Australia any subs at all makes little sense in the contest with China for supremacy in the Western Pacific. It just reduces America’s own military capability.

The key element in AUKUS for the US has always been the submarine base that Australia is building at HMAS Stirling in Western Australia. This is where the US Navy plans to operate its submarines. The US has already announced the establishment of the support elements that will administer and sustain these warships.

As we can see now, Australia has virtually no leverage to make the submarine deal more equitable.

The Americans know that Australian strategic policy since before the Vietnam War has been to demonstrate relevance to the US. Australia has not hesitated to rush into US-led wars – even those of dubious legality – in order to show loyalty. If this was a poker game, the Australians would be playing with most of their cards face-up.

What can Australia do to gain more agency?

Unfortunately, not a lot. The US holds all the important cards. Australia will likely continue to be a dutiful ally in the hope the US will deliver what it has promised. But there are no guarantees.

The only vulnerability the US has is its desire to base its submarines at Stirling. If Australia was to halt construction or restrict US access to the base, it would be seen as tantamount to cancelling the deal. The price Australia would pay for its temerity would be an enormous loss of respect and favour in Washington – the very thing a long succession of governments has sought to boost.

Australia’s defence policy has seen our country ensnared in a trap of its own making. There are lessons our political leaders can hopefully learn.

The first is to accept the wisdom of former UK Prime Minister Lord Palmerston’s adage that countries have no eternal allies, just eternal interests.

The second is to recognise that an unbalanced alliance leads to servility, not partnership.

The final lesson is to develop faith in Australia’s ability to protect itself rather than turning to an ally of increasingly dubious reliability.

Albert Palazzo does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

Everyone has a storm story – whether it’s that time you just escaped a downpour, or the hailstorm that wrote off your car. Even though hailstorms are relatively rare, they cause significant damages. Two new studies shed light on how hail might change as the world warms.

In our study, published today in Nature Climate Change, we show that hail conditions may move towards the poles with global warming and shift a bit from summer to winter. This could lead to more hailstorms in places such as northern Europe, Canada, southeastern Australia and New Zealand’s South Island.

Another new study led by Shiyi Zhang at Peking University shows that hail may also become more damaging.

Hailstorms are costly. In Australia in 2025, hail in New South Wales and Queensland caused A$1.9b in insurance claims, and in recent years severe storms have caused enormous losses globally.

Severe storm costs are increasing. Much of this increase is because people and assets are more exposed to storms as populations increase and cities expand.

But is climate change also playing a role?

How does hail form?

To get hail you need a thunderstorm, and to get a thunderstorm you need an updraught. Updraughts form when buoyant air rises in a localised area. They bring up water vapour, which condenses into clouds made of tiny water droplets.

Inside a storm those drops hit each other, and if it’s cold enough, liquid drops freeze onto ice particles, growing them into hailstones.

For hail to affect us at ground level, a strong updraught needs to keep hailstones aloft for long enough to grow, and the hailstones must then survive melting as they fall to Earth’s surface.

Wind shear, or shifts in wind with height, increases storm severity by moving falling rain and hail away from the updraught, so the updraught is not inhibited and can grow stronger.

Buoyancy and wind shear form the basic atmospheric “ingredients” required for hail.

How might climate change affect hailstorms?

Climate change is warming the atmosphere and adding moisture to it. Moisture is the fuel for storms, and a warmer atmosphere is more likely to make strong updraughts that can support larger hail.

A warmer atmosphere also melts falling hail faster, which might make hailstones shrink or melt away before they reach the ground. So, these two changes work against each other.

According to past research, the broad expectation of climate change’s impact on hail is that it will bring less frequent hail, but the hailstones will be larger when hail does happen. That’s because more melting would mean smaller hail reaches the ground less often, but stronger updraughts would enable larger hailstones.

However, these changes vary regionally, depending on variations in the delicate balance between hailstorm ingredient changes.

Global climate models generally can’t tell us about individual storms, let alone hailstones – think of a low-resolution image that only shows the broad picture but no details.

So, instead of looking at hail directly, our study examined how the ingredients for hailstorms change. Because the exact relationships between ingredients and hail risk remain unclear, we used several so-called “proxy” relationships, including one that we previously developed for Australia and the wide range of weather regimes here.

New global projections for hail frequency

We applied three proxies to outputs from eight climate models to look at a range of possible future warming scenarios.

First, the proxies and models agree that in the warming scenarios hail-prone conditions are shifting toward the poles – decreasing across mid-latitudes in the southern hemisphere, and increasing in mid-high latitudes, particularly in the northern hemisphere.

We project more frequent hail conditions in northern Europe, Canada and the northwestern US, southeastern Australia, and the South Island of New Zealand; and less frequent hail conditions in northern Australia, most of Africa, southern India and southeastern China.

Second, our results predict less frequent hail conditions in summer and more in winter. That means winter crops like wheat may see increasing risk, while risk may decrease for summer crops like maize. If climate change shifts arable regions closer to the poles, these crops may be subjected to increased hail frequency there.

Third, the different proxies don’t always agree, particularly in the tropics where some show increases and others decreases. These disagreements highlight the difficulties in estimating changes in hail environments and how that connects to whether hail happens.

Less frequent, but more damaging

What about the severity of hail when it occurs? Zhang and colleagues took a different approach to ours. They applied a model of hailstone growth and melting to climate simulations, to examine possible hail sizes and changes in potential damage they might cause.

Their new global simulations overall predict more large hailstones and fewer small ones. This result is in line with previous reasoning – a warmer atmosphere can melt smaller hailstones away but produce larger hail through stronger updraughts.

Like ours, their study shows regional differences in changes. Both studies show increasing hail risk with increased frequency and hail damage potential in the mid-high latitude northern hemisphere and southeastern South America.

In sub-tropical regions of Africa and northern South America, both studies show decreasing hail risk. In southeast US, mid-northern Africa, southern India, and northeastern Australia, we project decreasing frequency while Zhang and colleagues project increasing damage potential.

These two studies point to increasing risk from hail damage in a warming world, even though the details of where this will be experienced are still not clear. The more warming occurs, the more this risk will increase.

Quickly reducing greenhouse gas emissions is the surest way to blunt the most damaging effects of climate change.

Timothy H. Raupach's role at UNSW receives funding from QBE Insurance, which had no role in the design of this study. He receives funding for other projects from the Australian Research Council, Guy Carpenter, and Aon Japan.

Steven Sherwood receives funding from the Australian Research Council and the Minderoo Foundation.

The United States has launched new airstrikes across Iran this week as President Donald Trump, losing patience over the protracted negotiations to end the war, has leaned into violence to ratchet up the pressure on the Iranian leadership.

The US secretary of defence, Pete Hegseth, made clear the airstrikes would likely continue if the peace deal continued to stall, saying:

If we need to negotiate with bombs, we’ll negotiate with bombs.

This came after Iran and Israel fired missiles at one another in recent days and Iran shot down a US helicopter.

Up to this point, both the US and the Iranian regime had respected the precarious ceasefire that had halted the war in early April. Both sides seemed to want it to continue. And Trump is still insisting a peace deal is imminent.

Why, then, are both sides firing on each other now, and where does this leave the negotiations? There are a few plausible explanations.

Escalate to deescalate

In conflicts, states often escalate to deescalate. This is when a country ramps up military action with the aim of intimidating the other side into submission.

Both the US and Iran want to show force to pressure the other side into accepting an agreement that meets their own core interests.

However, the two sides remain at an impasse because their most critical interests are at odds with one another.

The US wants Iran to capitulate on its nuclear program and reopen the Strait of Hormuz to commercial traffic, with no constraints. Iran wants its frozen assets released and a lasting ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon.

Both sides remain far apart on the nuclear issue, with Iran unlikely to fully agree to US demands that it dismantle its nuclear infrastructure and cease uranium enrichment altogether.

Given the stalemate, both sides want to show they are willing to escalate through military action. Yet, neither wants the ceasefire to break completely.

Trump wants to move on from the war and shift the political agenda domestically in an election year. Fewer than one in six Americans think the US is winning the war. The Iranian regime remains standing, but it cannot ignore the mounting economic pressures of a full-scale war for much longer.

The problem is that escalating in hopes of intimidating an adversary into a deal only works if the other side is not pursuing the same tactic at the same time. Otherwise, both sides end up in an escalation trap, each ramping up the severity of attacks and unable to back down.

Accidental escalation

An alternate explanation is that these escalations are the unintended but inevitable consequence of a tense ceasefire that includes a live military blockade in the Strait of Hormuz.

It remains unclear if the Iranian drone that downed the US helicopter this week, precipitating the retaliatory airstrikes, was intentional or an accident.

An existential regional conflict

Making things more complex is the fact this isn’t just a fight between two protagonists – Israel is simultaneously launching military strikes on an Iranian ally, Hezbollah, in Lebanon.

Israel’s military operation deep into southern Lebanon has fundamentally shifted the regional geopolitics. And it may undermine the tenuous ceasefire between the US and Iran, despite Trump’s efforts to maintain regional calm.

What the Trump administration does not seem to have fully grasped is that in the eyes of the Israelis and Iranians, this conflict runs much deeper and has been going on far longer than the current war. For both sides, it is existential. The Islamic regime in Iran has long opposed Israel’s place in the region, and Israel has long viewed a nuclear-armed Iran as the chief threat to its survival.

As such, Iran will not abandon Hezbollah, which it has long funded and armed, and respect a ceasefire with the US, while Israel wages war in Lebanon. The reason: the regime see itself and Hezbollah as one front fighting the same battle.

And on the Israeli side, the October 7 2023 Hamas attacks on Israel fundamentally shifted Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s approach to the region. Since then, his far-right government has adopted an offensive military strategy of capturing territory in Israel’s neighbours – Syria, Lebanon and Gaza – and establishing security buffer zones. Netanyahu has also vowed to eliminate any threat coming from Iran, Hamas and Hezbollah.

However, the non-state actors of Hamas, Hezbollah, and even the Houthis in Yemen cannot be eliminated with conventional military force. Militant groups like these can blend into civilian populations and reemerge, sometimes months or years later.

So, despite Israel’s significant use of military force and the widescale destruction of Gaza and now southern Lebanon, Israel will not succeed in eliminating Hamas or Hezbollah, and will keep fighting.

Trump’s approach to regional diplomacy has ignored these complexities. Trump leans heavily on bilateral and personal relationships to achieve his objectives. He has shown little interest or patience in addressing the underlying drivers motivating the multiple actors involved in the conflict.

Will the ceasefire hold?

The most important thing to understand here is how Trump views a “ceasefire”. In a news conference this week, he said in the Middle East, a ceasefire means “shooting in a more moderate manner”.

But we do know he doesn’t want to return to a full-scale war, which is why he demanded Israel and Iran stop striking one another earlier this week.

So, we could see more strikes between the three sides as they continue negotiating. And we may see a memorandum of understanding between the US and Iran in the coming days or weeks. However, this would likely be an agreement for both sides to continue talking. It is unlikely it will resolve the core issues.

Nor is Israel likely to withdraw its troops from southern Lebanon or halt its asymmetric war with Hezbollah.

As I’ve argued before, this has the making of a “frozen conflict”, or an unresolved war that continues at a low level, below the threshold of full-scale combat.

If the deeper roots of the conflict are not resolved, a “ceasefire” between the US, Israel and Iran can only ever be temporary.

Jessica Genauer does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

Frances Rings’ artistic directorship of Bangarra Dance Theatre’s shines through the company’s new triple-bill production, Sheltering.

Rings demonstrates a commitment to uplifting company members and First Nations creatives, with a coherent curatorial vision that shows care for diverse audiences.

This triple-bill is a beautiful sampler of what this important company has to offer to the cultural, political and creative facets of our nation.

A nurturing home for First Nations creatives

Sheltering comprises three individual choreographic works: Keeping Grounded, Brown Boys, and Sheoak.

Sheoak is a 2015 work by Rings herself, commissioned by then Artistic Director Stephen Page.

Keeping Grounded (2023) is choreographed by Indjalandji-Dhidhanu and Alyawarre woman Glory Tuohy-Daniell, with a cast of eight company dancers.

The most recent work is a short dance film called Brown Boys (2024). It was directed by Cass Mortimer Eipper and Daniel Mateo, a Bangarra company member and Gomeroi and Mari Ma’ufanga, Tongatapu (Tonga) man.

Both Brown Boys and Keeping Grounded were first presented in Bangarra’s emerging artist showcase, Dance Clan, and supported from there onto the mainstage program. Creators Tuohy-Daniell and Mateo trained at NAISDA, Australia’s National Indigenous Dance College, and joined Bangarra through its Russell Page Graduate Program, which provides training and mentorship for new company dancers.

Keeping Grounded

Keeping Grounded opens onto an enormous and heavy rope net designed by Dyarubbin woman, Shana O’Brien. Under it, figures twitch and roll like a catch of fish.

Karen Norris’ textured lighting supports the impression of a coastal setting, and “sets the scene” across the work as it shifts from an evocation of Country to a more technologically-mediated aesthetic.

In an interview with Glory Tuohy-Daniell, the choreographer describes how the work invites viewers “to consider how small, almost forgotten actions keep us grounded […] a step barefoot, a moment of stillness, a return”.

Tuohy-Daniell’s movement vocabulary is striking for its literal groundedness, reflecting the central theme highlighted in the work’s title.

The first sections see the dancers bound to the floor with a variation on the typical angular, rolling, swooping and sharply delineated shapes of Bangarra’s Indigenous contemporary style – here purposefully fractured.

Set to a score by Brendon Boney, the movement in this section is broken into one movement per beat, a staccato rhythm that suggests a disconnect from the flow of nature. This “pixellated” quality makes familiar forms new in an exciting way.

Brown Boys

Six-minute dance film Brown Boys is a meditation on the experience of young First Nations men. Daniel Mateo, the writer, choreographer and performer, has a cultural background spanning northern New South Wales and Tonga.

The program notes describe Brown Boys as a total work of art involving poetry, choreography, cinematography, sound and dramaturgy.

Adding to this is the central role of sculpture. Set and costume designer Elizabeth Gadsby has worked with traditional forms to establish a culturally informed aesthetic. This includes a fale (pronouned “fah-lay”), which is a traditional Tongan shelter made of grass matting. This structure frames Mateo’s body inside the film frame.

Ochres, minerals and soils are other material elements featured in the design and choreography. The striking final image shows Mateo literally grounded by a soil mound that takes the silhouette of a 19th century crinoline skirt.

Mateo’s text and performance are extraordinary. His direct and settled gaze to camera, gentle unfolding movements, and spoken word poem, give visibility, dignity and complexity to the figure of the young Indigenous man. That he has “always been beautiful” could not be more persuasively portrayed.

Sheoak

Rings’ mastery of group choreography was recently showcased in her commissioned work for the Australian Ballet, Flora. Having delivered another major work for Vivid 2025, this was likely the right time to revive one of her classics.

The opening image of Sheoak showcases both Rings’ choreographic skill and Jennifer Irwin’s amazing legacy as a costume designer. The dancers wear shirts with black on white streaks – skeletal puzzle pieces that join together to form larger human sculptures.

The theme of this work is cultural strength, resilience and adaptability, with the sheoak tree as the central metaphor. Dancer Chantelle Lee Lockhart is captivating in the role of this “Grandmother tree”, as it’s known to the Dharawal people.

The choreography weaves around Jacob Nash’s set design, featuring seven two-metre-long branches. The passing of branches signals the struggle to pass on cultural responsibility and knowledge from generation to generation.

The company of technically virtuosic dancers seems right at home in each of the three diverse works of Sheltering. The program particularly underscores Tuohy-Daniell’s potential as a new leading light in Australian choreography

Sheltering as a whole is dedicated to the late David “Dubboo” Page, brother of former Artistic Director Stephen Page. David’s work as composer, singer and musician was central to establishing the Bangarra aesthetic. His music also features in Rings’ Sheoak.

Sheltering is on now at the Sydney Opera House until June 13. The production will show at the Arts Centre Melbourne from June 18 to 27, and at the Queensland Performing Arts Centre from July 9 to 18.

I am writing as an Australian of Irish and Danish political exile, convict, and settler descent working within the Western tradition of contemporary art and dance. I acknowledge the much deeper cultural traditions that bind music, dance, painting, sculpture, and site in the art of Indigenous peoples.

Shark fins on a plane, seahorses in your bag and sea cucumbers in the post – these are just a few examples of illegal marine wildlife trafficking.

This crime can be hard to detect. But in a new study, published in the journal Frontiers in Ocean Sustainability, we show how artificial intelligence (AI) can be harnessed as a complimentary detection tool to help stop marine wildlife trafficking at international airports and mail facilities.

A global crime

The cross-border trade in live animals, animal parts or products is a global crime, facilitating the flow of billions of illicit dollars each year. It’s known to converge with other criminal activity, including the trafficking in drugs, arms and humans.

The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime identifies five sources of demand for wildlife trafficking: food, medicine, pets and ornamental plants, specialist collection and adornment.

In some cases, such as pet prestige, people are motivated both by the desire to have a pet and the perceived status it brings to own an exotic animal.

People traffic marine animals too

Wildlife trafficking affects around 4,000 species. Many of the more well-known examples involve land-based animals – ivory from elephant tusks, horns from rhinos and scales from pangolins – the world’s most trafficked mammal.

Closer to home, we also see native Australian reptiles and birds, sometimes shoved in tins, put in socks and packaged up live to be sent overseas.

Marine creatures, unfortunately, are targeted too. This can include live animals such as fish in people’s bags, or dried marine life such as the rise of the seahorse trade and demand for shark fin.

We have small pockets of knowledge of this activity. But the reality is we don’t fully understand how widespread it is.

AI to detect marine wildlife trade

Currently, the best means of detecting illegally trafficked wildlife is humans. And then there are our four-legged friends: biosecurity dogs.

Recently, Australia has also been working to develop the use of AI as a potential means of detecting land-based wildlife in illegal wildlife movements – building on existing detection pathways using 3D X-ray machines fitted with algorithms.

For our latest study, we built on these efforts by developing world-first marine wildlife algorithms. We taught computers to look for shark fins, seahorses and sea cucumbers.

We did this by collecting a total of 68 samples of dead marine animals, which we scanned in a 3D X-ray machine to create a library of images. We then used this image library to develop algorithms to enable computers to search for what we taught it to look for – in this case, shark fins, seahorses and sea cucumbers.

Samples were scanned alone and then in more complicated scenarios to reflect how people actually traffic marine life. This means if a bag or mail item is hiding a shark fin, seahorse or sea cucumber, the algorithm will be able to flag this to an operator, prompting them to inspect the item.

Out of a total of 298 scans and a training data set derived from these samples, our algorithm had success rates of 95%, 95% and 85% for shark fins, seahorses and sea cucumbers, respectively.

Humans and biosecurity dogs still needed alongside AI

While technology fitted with computer algorithms may help people inspecting luggage or mail, we still need people to verify what computers see. Sometimes the algorithms get it wrong and may miss items.

Despite this, the broader implications of having AI as a second set of eyes searching for trafficked marine life will aid in identifying key trade routes to potentially stop this activity. The next step is relying on implementation of these algorithms at the front lines.

Like computer algorithms and AI, the more we learn, the better we get at detecting and potentially stopping this harmful crime.

Vanessa Pirotta received funding from Rapiscan Systems for this research.

Justine O'Brien receives funding from the San Diego Zoo and Wildlife Alliance; NSW Department of Climate Change, Energy, the Environment and Water; the Australian Research Council; Institute of Museum and Library Services; Great Barrier Reef Foundation; and the Taronga Foundation.

Phoebe Meagher receives funding from San Diego Zoo and Wildlife Alliance and the Taronga Foundation.

Zara Bending serves as a Resident Expert for the Jane Goodall Institute Global and is a Distinguished Research Fellow at the Macquarie University Environmental Law Research Centre.

After another spell of wet weather along Australia’s east coast, with storms, heavy rain and flash flooding across Sydney and parts of New South Wales, it is natural to ask whether our cities are shaping the rainfall that descends upon them.

This matters because most people now live in cities. If urbanisation changes rainfall, even slightly, the effects can reach large populations through flooding, stormwater design, water supply and infrastructure planning.

Satellite data have consistently shown that many cities experience more rain events than the countryside around them. The usual explanation is that cities themselves are involved: urban heat, rougher surfaces, aerosols and changed land cover can all affect how storms develop and where rain falls.

Our new study, published in Environmental Research Letters, asks a related question: how much of this data reflects real changes in rainfall, and how much depends on how we observe it?

Why we need satellites

Understanding rainfall over cities is hard.

Rain gauges accurately measure rainfall at a specific location, but are irregularly distributed and cannot fully capture how rain varies across a large city. Climate models can simulate urban weather in detail, but kilometre-scale simulations across many cities and decades remain computationally expensive.

Satellite observations help fill this gap.

NASA’s Integrated Multi satellite Retrievals for GPM, known as IMERG, provides near-global rainfall estimates at high resolution, and is now widely used for studying rainfall over cities.

What the satellite data shows

We examined IMERG rainfall data across 15 of the world’s largest cities, including Sydney and Melbourne. The cities span different climates and geographic settings, including both coastal and inland regions.

A clear pattern emerged. Rain events occurred more often over urban areas than over nearby rural ones. The strongest signal was not that every storm became stronger, but that satellites counted more hours in which it was raining over cities. Individual events over urban centres often dropped less water than those in surrounding areas.

In other words, the main urban signal in IMERG is more frequent rain, not heavier rain.

Different sensors, different stories

Modern satellite rainfall data combines both infrared and microwave observations.

Infrared sensors estimate rainfall indirectly from the temperature at the top of clouds. They provide broad coverage, but can miss light, shallow or warm rain because these can occur even when the tops of the clouds are not very cold.

Microwave satellites fly in low orbit and detect signals more directly linked to raindrops and ice inside clouds, making them particularly useful for identifying whether rain is actually occurring.

When we separated the IMERG data by observation type, the urban signal mainly came from microwave observations, while infrared estimates showed no urban pattern.

This does not mean the microwave signal is wrong, but it raises a potential problem for long-term studies: microwave observations have changed over time. New satellites have been launched and older ones retired, and across the cities we studied, microwave sampling frequency happened almost twice as often by 2023 as it had in 2001.

This matters because the more often a microwave sensor passes overhead, the more rain events it can detect. A light shower missed in 2002 could now be caught by one of several satellites passing within the hour.

Testing the artefact

To test whether this changing sampling affects observed rainfall trends, we compared the microwave and non-microwave with long-term averages. This meant we could separate out the result of changing satellite sampling from the actual changes in weather.

Changes in microwave sampling explained up to about 20% of the long-term rainfall trends across the 15 cities. For rainfall frequency, cities such as Lagos, London, Melbourne, Beijing, Berlin, Mexico City and Paris showed areas where more than 40% of the apparent trend could be linked to the changing observing system.

The satellites did not create the whole urban rainfall pattern. After accounting for sampling effects, the urban signal remained, but the long-term trend became smaller. So we think it really is raining more often over cities, but perhaps not as much as we thought.

Moving forward

For Sydney, we also compared IMERG with CMORPH, another satellite product, and with Bureau of Meteorology rain gauges. CMORPH showed a similar urban pattern, though the two products are not fully independent because they use overlapping microwave observations.

The gauges are a more independent check, but with too few stations outside the urban core, in Sydney and most cities, the true magnitude cannot yet be confirmed on the ground.

Satellite rainfall data is now used everywhere, in climate science, flood risk, agriculture, insurance and water planning. In many regions it is the only consistent rainfall record over large areas. Our results are a caution: part of an apparent trend can come from the changing observing system rather than real change.

As for why cities get more frequent rain, the likeliest explanations are familiar: urban heat that lifts air, rougher surfaces that nudge winds upward, and aerosols that alter cloud droplets. The signal is real. The task now is measuring it properly.

Shankar Sharma receives funding from the Australian Research Council.

Andy Pitman receives funding from the Australian Research Council.

Jason Evans receives funding from the Australian Research Council.

It’s been quite a week for Beijing, with back-to-back visits by the leaders of the United States and Russia. Chinese President Xi Jinping has had his hands full with hosting duties, gun salutes, photo opportunities and high-level talks.

Each visit was important in its own way. US President Donald Trump’s state visit was his first to Beijing since 2017. It came at a moment of strained China-US relations, with the US at war in the Middle East and its foreign policy undergoing a massive transformation under Trump.

For Putin, it was his 25th official visit to China. The trip was intended to further consolidate the China–Russia strategic alignment amid global uncertainty. Putin was also keen to secure China’s continued economic lifeline and diplomatic cover as its war with Ukraine grinds on.

And while the timing of the back-to-back visits should not be over-interpreted – Moscow says there was “no connection” between the two – they do reveal a deeper structural shift in global politics.

Beijing’s rising confidence

First, the United States is clearly no longer the most important country in China’s strategic worldview – and Beijing is increasingly willing to show it.

This was visible in Xi’s posturing and negotiating style with Trump. From his rather distant handshake to his dominant body language throughout their meeting, Xi sent a message: Washington has a limited ability to influence Beijing anymore.

The modest outcomes of their summit reinforced this dynamic. Trump left China without a formal deal, a press conference or a joint communiqué. Nor was there a breakthrough on either Iran or Taiwan.

Putin, meanwhile, met his “good and old friend” Xi and took home some 20 agreements ranging from trade to technology.

The most striking, if not unsettling, moment was Xi’s invocation of the “Thucydides Trap” during his meeting with Trump. This is the idea that a rising power inevitably threatens an established one, risking war.

Xi asked a pointed question:

Can China and the United States transcend the so-called ‘Thucydides Trap’ and forge a new paradigm for major-power relations?

Xi has used this concept before, but his directness this time sent a warning: the US risks creating a major crisis if it continues to rely on a containment strategy to counter China’s rise.

In short, Beijing used the Trump visit to signal confidence, autonomy and the fact that Washington is not the only capital that matters to China.

Russia has new usefulness to Beijing

Second, the China–Russia alignment has become less equal, but it has gained greater strategic depth. And Beijing is now using it to put pressure on the US leadership.

During a private garden stroll through the highly secretive Zhongnanhai leadership compound last week, Trump asked whether Xi often brings other world leaders there. Xi replied that such visits are “extremely rare,” but added that “Putin has been here”.

The innocent reading of this exchange is that Xi was simply noting the depth of his personal rapport with Putin. But in the current geopolitical context, it also served as a subtle reminder to Trump that China’s “no limits” partnership with Russia is not rhetorical. Beijing was signalling Moscow remains a privileged strategic partner – and that China has options.

The deeper message is this: if Washington seeks to isolate China, Beijing can lean even more heavily on its relationship with Moscow.

China does not need to help Russia “win” in Ukraine to make this point. What matters is that Beijing has the ability – if it chooses – to bolster Russia’s war effort through economic, diplomatic and long-term technological and energy cooperation. Beijing’s influence now extends well beyond the Indo-Pacific and reaches into Europe in ways Washington cannot ignore.

Xi didn’t give Putin everything he sought during his meeting, though.

With the turmoil in the Middle East cutting off China’s access to Middle Eastern oil and gas, Moscow sensed an opportunity to push ahead on a new pipeline, called the Power of Siberia-2, to bring Russian gas to China.

While Putin and Xi came to a “general understanding on the parameters” of the project, however, no final deal was signed.

China is now in the driver’s seat

Third, China now sees itself as the central node of great-power politics.

For many decades, the United States sat at the apex of the “great triangle”, balancing between China and the Soviet Union and then Russia.

Today, the geometry has flipped. Both Trump and Putin felt compelled to come to Beijing – for stabilisation, reassurance and strategic signalling – even as they confront each other elsewhere.

China is not playing triangular diplomacy in the classic sense. It is not trying to pit Washington and Moscow against each other. Instead, it is positioning itself as the system’s centre: the place where major-power diplomacy must pass, even if the outcomes are uncertain.

China is not at the apex of this arrangement because it is the strongest militarily or economically, but because it has the confidence to engage the US and Russia on its own terms.

In this new geometry, great-power politics does not revolve around Washington. Increasingly, it runs through Beijing.

Alexander Korolev does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

The United States is threatening to impose trade tariffs of up to 12.5% on 60 countries, including Australia, over their inaction on forced and slave labour worldwide.

On Wednesday, US trade representative Jamieson Greer said:

The failure of our most important trading partners to address the importation of goods made with forced labor is unacceptable.

Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese responded that a new tariff on exports to the US was “unjustified”, as Australia has “robust, comprehensive and world-leading legislation addressing forced labour and modern slavery”.

Who’s right? And are the US claims about other nations turning a blind eye to forced and slave labour – where a person is either forced to work, or even owned by someone else – actually true?

Which countries could face new tariffs

In a new report released by the US Trade Representative, 54 countries – including Australia, China, New Zealand and the United Kingdom – were found to have:

failed to impose a legal prohibition on the importation of goods produced wholly or in part with forced labour and to effectively enforce such a prohibition.

All of those countries face a proposed 12.5% tariff on their exports to the US.

Another six economies – including Canada, the European Union and Indonesia – face lower 10% tariffs. They were seen to have done more overall, but failed to effectively enforce their own laws.

Forced labour is a form of modern slavery, defined under international law as “all work or service which is exacted from any person under the threat of a penalty and for which the person has not offered himself or herself voluntarily”.

This definition is consistent with an almost century old US law, Section 307 of the US Tariff Act of 1930. It’s now being used to legally justify this latest round of tariffs.

The US has a strong history of taking legislative action against forced labour. Section 307 prohibits imports of goods mined, produced or manufactured by forced labour.

In 2022, the US also established the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act, prohibiting goods being imported from China’s Xinjiang Uyghur region, where there are “credible” allegations of widespread forced labour.

‘We get one ruling, we do it a different way’

These proposed forced labour tariffs appear to be less about labour rights and more about trade.

This latest move comes after US courts blocked US President Donald Trump’s sweeping international tariffs announced over the past year. That prompted Trump to pledge: “We get one ruling, and we do it a different way.”

As former Australian ambassador to the US Joe Hockey said about the new forced labour tariff today, “America is running out of money and they need to get it from somewhere”.

These tariffs are still subject to public consultations over the next month.

While using tariffs as a way to strengthen action on forced labour is questionable, there is some substance behind the US allegations.

41,000 people in Australia alone

An estimated 50 million people around the world – and rising – are trapped in modern slavery, more than half of those in forced labour.

Australia is estimated to have more than 41,000 people working as forced labourers or other forms of modern slavery, including child marriages.

Reports to the Australian Federal Police of human trafficking have nearly doubled in the past five years.

Australia’s laws are not world leading

In 2018, Australia established its Modern Slavery Act. This law was hailed as a critical first step in acting on modern slavery.

The law requires large business to report annually on the risks of modern slavery in their operations and supply chains.

Since 2019, more 17,000 modern slavery statements from more than 27,000 businesses have been lodged on Australia’s modern slavery registry.

Yet in 2023, an independent report found:

there is no hard evidence that the Modern Slavery Act in its early years has yet caused meaningful change for people living in conditions of modern slavery.

That’s not surprising: there is no enforcement built into the law.

What more needs to be done?

If Australia does want to have “world-leading” laws – and a stronger case to argue for lower US tariffs – what needs to change?

While the Modern Slavery Act has raised awareness of the problem in Australian boardrooms, it is not improving the working conditions of supply chain workers, here at home and overseas.

So Australia needs to move quickly to strengthen that law with enforcement, and establish a forced labour import ban.

A 2023 review of the Modern Slavery Act recommended penalties for companies failing to comply with reporting requirements and the introduction of a human rights “due diligence obligation” – similar to European Union laws and emerging requirements in South Korea, Thailand and Indonesia. This sees companies working to reduce human rights harms not just in their own factories, but through their suppliers’ suppliers too.

The Albanese government partially accepted some of the 2023 report recommendations, including the need for penalties. Three years on, it’s failed to take serious action.

The Australian government should also establish a forced labour import ban, like one the EU passed two years ago, now being phased in across all 27 member states. This would stop specific goods suspected of being produced with forced labour at the border.

Whether these proposed tariffs come into force or not, this new US forced labour investigation could actually do some good.

Right now, millions of people are working in dangerous, dehumanising conditions to make goods sold in Australia and worldwide. It’s long overdue to do more to stop it.

Justine Nolan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

The latest Ebola outbreak is showing no signs of slowing.

On April 24, the first suspected case of the rare Bundibugyo strain of Ebola was detected in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). On May 17, the World Health Organisation declared the outbreak a “Public Health Emergency of International Concern”.

The current Ebola outbreak is the third-largest in world history, with 906 suspected cases and 223 deaths in the DRC alone as of 27 May.

And it may have spread to other continents. Health authorities are now investigating a suspected case in Italy, and two possible cases in Brazil. All three are believed to be travellers returning from either the DRC or Uganda. One American man who tested positive for Ebola is currently being treated in Germany.

As concerns grow, the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations has committed more than A$86 million in funding to fast-track the development of three potential vaccines, targeting the Bundibugyo strain.

But in the meantime, could this outbreak spread further? And how concerned should we be?

A deadly virus

Ebola is a rare but potentially fatal virus that mainly spreads through direct contact with the bodily fluids – such as blood, faeces and vomit – of an infected person.

Early symptoms of Ebola include sore throat, headaches, fever, fatigue and body pain. Severe Ebola cases can cause skin rashes, shortness of breath, vomiting, diarrhoea, abdominal pain and seizures.

Ebola was first identified in humans in 1976. Since then, there have been more than 40 outbreaks around the world, with the majority occurring in African countries.

The current outbreak is the third ever to be caused by the rare Bundibugyo strain. The majority of past outbreaks were driven by the more deadly Zaire strain, which kills up to 90% of people compared to up to 34% for Bundibugyo.

Read more: Ebola outbreak declared a global health emergency – what you need to know

What is driving this latest outbreak?

The factors driving this latest outbreak also contributed to the devastating West African outbreak of 2014-16, where more than 11,000 people died.

In both outbreaks, the virus had been circulating for months before an outbreak was declared, and initial cases had non-specific symptoms.

Both outbreaks also rapidly spread in urban areas. Transmission in health-care settings is another common factor.

Political instability and social unrest also contributed to both outbreaks. Most recently in the DRC, crowds have set fire to hospital tents, prompting some patients to flee isolation wards.

And certain cultural practices – including traditional burial rituals that often involve handling dead bodies – may have accelerated the spread of both outbreaks.

Read more: Health authorities are racing to contain Ebola in the DRC and Uganda. Here’s what’s making it so challenging

How it crossed continents

Similar to the West African outbreak, this latest Ebola outbreak has spread to other continents through travel.

Nine cases and one death have already been reported in Uganda, which shares a border with the DRC.

An American man who tested positive for Ebola while working in the DRC, is in a stable condition after being treated in Germany.

In Italy, authorities are monitoring a traveller who recently returned from the DRC to the city of Cagliari.

According to some reports, Brazilian authorities are investigating two suspected Ebola cases. They are believed to be two travellers, one who returned from the DRC to São Paulo and the other from Uganda to Rio de Janeiro.

Importantly, both suspected cases have been diagnosed with other illnesses. The São Paulo patient presented with fever and was later diagnosed with severe meningitis. The Rio de Janeiro patient tested positive for malaria after developing a cough, chills and diarrhoea, but has since tested negative for Ebola.

So for now, no Ebola cases have been confirmed in Brazil. But these suspected cases have prompted the country to activate its Ebola safety protocols, including patient isolation, laboratory testing, and epidemiological investigations.

Meanwhile, several countries have imposed travel restrictions to prevent Ebola from reaching their shores.

Both the United States and Canada are temporarily restricting entry for travellers from the DRC, Uganda and South Sudan. The US and other countries such as India and Mexico are also strengthening public health screening and disease monitoring measures, particularly at airports. Some countries have mandated a 21-day quarantine period for their citizens returning from the DRC.

Read more: Ebola outbreak in the DRC: four reasons it will be hard to contain

Could it spread further, including to Australia?

At this stage, the risk of Ebola reaching Australia is very low.

Australia has not put in place any travel or quarantine requirements for affected countries, but federal health minister Mark Butler says authorities are still monitoring the outbreak “very closely”.

Based on lessons from past outbreaks, there are three main ways the current Central African outbreak could play out.

Without effective control measures, cases may surge in the coming months. Some models suggest that by mid-May, up to 1,000 cases had already occurred in the DRC, compared to official figures of about 900 cases. So the actual number of Ebola cases may be much higher than authorities realise.

In a more favorable scenario, a strengthened public health response could bring this latest outbreak under control. This would be possible with continued support from the international community, the rapid development of vaccines and community engagement.

However, the most realistic outcome is cases will continue to rise before authorities successfully contain the current outbreak.

Nevertheless, the international community responded much more swiftly to this outbreak, particularly compared to the devastating 2014-16 West African outbreak. That alone may protect us from an outbreak of the same catastrophic scale and cost.

Holly Seale receives funding from the National Health and Medical Research Council and NSW Health. She has previously received funding from Pfizer to present at international conferences.

Abrar Ahmad Chughtai and Md Saiful Islam do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

The latest data on Australian schooling shows about 81.5% of Year 10 students go on to Year 12.

This is a modest rise of 1.6 percentage points on the previous year, but figures have been largely stable since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic.

There has been decades of research on how to help students finish school.

Each student is of course different and will have different needs. But there are many things schools can do from Year 7 to support students to stay until Year 12.

Here are three of the most important ones.

Why it’s important to finish school

Completing Year 12 is associated with a range of positive longer-term outcomes.

These include better employment prospects, higher lifetime earnings, and stronger health and wellbeing.

It also keeps the widest range of post-school options open, from vocational training and apprenticeships to further study and direct entry into work.

Why do students leave?

The reasons students leave before Year 12 are varied and often complex.

For example, some students might be managing health challenges, navigating difficult life circumstances, or pursuing opportunities like an apprenticeship that fit their goals well.

For others, however, leaving early is shaped by experiences at school itself.

Somewhere along the way, they became disengaged, fell behind, or lost their connection to school. These are the experiences schools are best placed to influence.

Research shows there are three key areas schools can better develop now to help increase the retention numbers in the years ahead.

1. How teachers teach

It may sound obvious but one main way schools can keep students is through teaching approaches that help students learn effectively. This is because students need to feel they can succeed at school — and see themselves making progress — in order to stay engaged and connected to it.

When learning is consistently out of reach, students disengage. In contrast, when they can see themselves getting better at things, school feels worth their effort.

Our research shows effective teaching in Year 7 is connected all the way through to whether a student completes school six years later.

This type of teaching is also linked with students putting in greater effort at school and higher achievement.

What kind of teaching practices are we talking about?

One well-evidenced approach is explicit instruction where teachers clearly model new concepts and skills, guide students through examples, and gradually shift responsibility to students as they gain mastery.

As part of this, two strategies stand out.

First, reducing difficulty during initial learning. When a concept is new, break it into manageable steps and match the challenge to what students already know.

Second, give students well-organised opportunities to practise, paired with specific guidance on how to improve.

2. How the classroom works

Orderly, predictable and positive classrooms free up students to focus on learning rather than navigating disruption.

This is why classroom management is important. This is how teachers structure the classroom environment and the interactions within it so learning can happen.

In a recent study, we found students whose teachers provided strong classroom management were up to six times more likely to have high motivation, engagement, and resilience at school than students whose teachers did not.

Two strategies are particularly effective for classroom management.

First, establishing and consistently maintaining clear rules and routines is important, so students know what to expect.

Second, recognising and building on what students do well rather than only focusing on what goes wrong.

3. Student-teacher relationships

Research also tells us it’s important for teachers to build warm, respectful relationships with students.

It is not only important for retention in its own right — it also underpins the other two areas above. Strong teaching and good classroom management both depend on positive teacher-student relationships.

When students feel known and supported by their teachers, they are more willing to engage and stay connected to school.

Our research shows each relationship a student has with a teacher matters. The more positive relationships students have with their teachers — relative to negative ones — the greater their academic engagement.

Academic engagement in turn, is a key driver of school retention.

Research tells us every teacher can make a difference, and the relationships teachers build with their students could be what helps that student stay on and complete school. This is because the relationships add up — and for some students, the bond they build with one teacher in particular can be what tips the balance toward staying engaged with school.

So it is important to create conditions where every student has the chance to build genuine, positive connections with teachers. This means teachers getting to know students as individuals, showing interest in their lives beyond the classroom, and teaching in ways that feel personal and engaging.

Rebecca J. Collie receives funding from the Commonwealth Department of Education and the New South Wales Department of Education.

Andrew J. Martin receives funding from the Commonwealth Department of Education and the NSW Department of Education.